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Viewing cable 07WELLINGTON194, PM CLARK GOES TO WASHINGTON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07WELLINGTON194 2007-03-02 04:55 2011-04-28 00:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Wellington
VZCZCXRO2665
OO RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0194/01 0610455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 020455Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3972
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 4773
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH IMMEDIATE 0043
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY IMMEDIATE 0637
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA IMMEDIATE 0573
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 WELLINGTON 000194 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR EAP/FO AND EAP/ANP 
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA 
OSD FOR JESSICA POWERS 
PHNOM PENH FOR POL/MCKEAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NZ
SUBJECT: PM CLARK GOES TO WASHINGTON 
 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires David J. Keegan, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Prime Minister Clark has announced to New 
Zealanders that she will use her March 20-21 visit to 
Washington to discuss key regional and world events with the 
President and other Senior Officials.  In reality, she has a 
broader agenda as well: to improve the tone of her dialogue 
with us and to send a message to the NZ electorate that 
cooperating with the U.S. is normal and advances New 
Zealand's interests. Now in her third term in office, Clark 
has over the years developed a deeper understanding of the 
breadth and benefits of the US-New Zealand relationship.  She 
recognizes that sound bites matter, and in response has begun 
to modulate her public statements to be more positive about 
the relationship.  She also strenuously avoids saying 
anything critical about U.S. policy. Although a strengthened 
centrist domestic political opposition may motivate Clark to 
be more open to us, most of her efforts to improve bilateral 
cooperation have not been made public, indicating genuine 
commitment.  Over the past year, she has quietly filled a 
number of key positions with officials who are well disposed 
towards the United States, and she and her Ministers now 
treat official meetings with us as opportunities to advance 
common agendas rather than either public relations coups or 
something to deny. The PM closely monitors and supports the 
"Matrix" process as well as deeper US-NZ cooperation in 
intelligence and other issues.  She particularly appreciates 
our cooperation in the Pacific and Antarctica.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) A micro-manager, Clark will come to Washington 
extremely well briefed on the issues.  She will likely 
suggest small but concrete ways to cooperate within the 
boundaries of the Presidential Directive, such as by 
regularizing our dialogue on scientific and Pacific Island 
issues.  She will probably announce that New Zealand will 
extend its military deployments in Afghanistan through 
September 2009.  Clark will not seek any dramatic changes to 
bilateral policy, which she recognizes would be more than 
either side's system could bear.  Nor will she make a heavy 
pitch for an FTA as she did during her 2002 visit, instead 
leaving that for Trade Minister Goff's trip to Washington 
later this year. 
 
3.  (C) We should use this visit to urge continued tangible 
commitments to the improving bilateral cooperation and NZ's 
defense modernization.  We should also elicit a greater 
willingness to publicize our successes where possible.  Clark 
will be setting the pace for improving U.S.-New Zealand 
relations for the foreseeable future. This visit provides us 
an opportunity to encourage her to stay the course and to 
resist negative pressures from those in her party who prefer 
to keep us at arm's length. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
MOVING UP THE LEARNING CURVE: WE MATTER 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) With over seven years in office, Clark is now the 
longest serving Labour Prime Minister in New Zealand history. 
 Although she has no clear successor and may run for an 
unprecedented fourth term, she is clearly already focused on 
her legacy.  Arriving in office well to the left of the 
political spectrum, Clark began her tenure by stressing New 
Zealand's role as a small but principled player favoring 
multilateral (ideally UN-based) solutions to the world's 
problems. Since then, she has witnessed such events as 9/11, 
cooperation between NZDF and US troops in Afghanistan, and 
shortcomings of the UN system (such as its inability to react 
to the 2005 Tsunami).  As a result, she has over time focused 
more on New Zealand's role in the Pacific region and its 
relations with Australia and other bilateral allies. 
 
 
5.  (C) Through learning on the job, Clark has clearly 
developed a more sophisticated understanding of the breadth 
and importance of the US-New Zealand relationship.  Her 
desire to improve relations with the Administration may be 
due in part to the influence of Foreign Minister Winston 
 
WELLINGTON 00000194  002 OF 004 
 
 
Peters, but we see evidence that Clark herself wants to 
improve US-New Zealand ties.  Contacts tell us she has 
especially valued our close cooperation following the coup in 
Fiji, and during her recent meetings with PM Howard she 
praised EAP DAS Davies' trip to the Solomons.  The Ambassador 
reports that Clark is obviously impressed by our dedication 
to environmental protection and generous support for New 
Zealand activities in Antarctica, which she witnessed first 
hand during this year's celebrations of US-NZ cooperation on 
the ice. 
 
6.  (C/NF) Recognizing that her Government had initially 
resisted improving the U.S. relationship, Clark has since the 
2005 election appointed to key positions a number of 
officials well disposed towards working with the United 
States.  In addition to Foreign Minister Winston Peters 
(arguably a marriage of convenience), she has appointed 
Warren Tucker as Director of the NZ Security Intelligence 
Service (NZSIS), Bruce Ferguson as Director of the Government 
Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), Roy Ferguson as NZ 
Ambassador to Washington; and  John McKinnon as Secretary of 
Defence.  Together with Peters and Simon Murdoch, second in 
command at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these officials 
have improved their agencies' coordination on U.S. policy and 
instructed staff to be helpful to us wherever possible. For 
example, NZSIS had for months resisted housing equipment 
needed to implement a possible HSPD-6 agreement with the 
United States.  Soon after his arrival, Tucker ordered NZSIS 
to be the host, paving the way for negotiations. 
 
7.  (C) Clark has been more mindful of the public side of our 
relationship as well.  She participated in the Embassy's 4 
July reception even though she never attends national day 
events.  She was also gracious guest at a media-covered 
reception at the Ambassador's residence last May in honor of 
her favorite Kiwi composer.  Mindful that her 2003 remarks 
about the Iraq war have not been forgotten, Clark now slaps 
down her Cabinet Ministers for similar offenses.  When on 
January 12 Duty Minister Jim Anderton issued a blistering 
critique of the President's plan to send more troops to Iraq, 
Clark quickly disavowed the comments and removed Anderton 
from duty within the day.  She was roundly criticized in the 
media for her actions, but did not budge.  After confirming 
her visit to Washington on March 1, a reporter asked what 
Clark would say if the President asked her views on the war. 
Clark merely said she doubted that would happen, adding that 
New Zealand is not in Iraq and it would be "gratuitous to 
offer any advice." 
 
---------------------------------- 
CLARK REALLY DOES WANT CLOSER TIES 
---------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Some observers claim Clark only wants to mend fences 
with the United States to wrest center ground from the 
opposition National Party, which is gaining in the polls.  We 
doubt this is her main motive.  For one thing, polling 
suggests up to half of all Kiwis  believe New Zealand does 
not need a closer relationship with the United States, and 
the anti-American sentiment in the left side of her own 
caucus is well known. Although Labour is losing ground in 
opinion polls, Clark is far from being in such crisis that 
she needs to change her foreign policy to get votes.  New 
National leader John Key is charming and confident, but has 
been in Parliament for only five years and his practical 
agenda remains fuzzy.  In contrast, while many Kiwis consider 
Clark cold and some question her integrity, we have yet to 
meet any who regard her as anything less than competent.  The 
majority seem proud of the way she has helped forge a new, 
modern identity for the country: clean, green, multicultural, 
multilateral, creative, and yes -- nuclear free.  Nor is 
there a chance of the type of leadership putsch within Labour 
that has plagued National in recent years. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
WE BENEFIT FROM STRONGER COOPERATION, TOO 
----------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) New Zealand is small, but concrete improvements in 
 
WELLINGTON 00000194  003 OF 004 
 
 
bilateral cooperation over the past year, including via the 
"Matrix" process initiated in Bangkok last year, have brought 
tangible, positive gains for U.S. interests.  We continue to 
cooperate closely on events in Fiji and have come to value 
the views of Kiwi officials regarding events in E.Timor, the 
Solomon Islands, and Tonga.  We are increasing 
behind-the-scenes dialogue on N.Korea and Iran, both of which 
have diplomatic relations with New Zealand. The  "Matrix" 
process has also been helpful in enabling both sides to stay 
joined up in response to other events, such as ensuring that 
the recent fire on board a Japanese whaling vessel in 
Antarctic waters would not lead to an environmental disaster. 
 
 
10.  (S/NF) Improvements on the defense and intelligence side 
have also borne fruit. As Minister in Charge of the NZSIS and 
GCSB, Clark is read into all major operations involving U.S. 
intelligence.  She understands the implications of a 
post-9/11 world for New Zealand's security.  She also 
realized after the Fiji coup that New Zealand had become too 
reliant on Australian intelligence.  Clark grasps that NZ 
must "give to get" and that some of our cooperative 
operations -- such as monitoring radicalizing Kiwi jihadists 
-- strengthen her country's security.  But she also has been 
willing to address targets of marginal benefit to New Zealand 
that could do her political harm if made public. Over the 
past year, she has supported increased counterterrorism 
cooperation with us. 
 
11.  (C/NF) While the Presidential Directive still limits our 
defense relationship, New Zealand's push since 2004 to 
modernize its forces have improved our ability to work 
together in those areas in which we can cooperate.   In 
support of NZ military activities in the Pacific Islands, 
Timor Leste, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, there have been more 
high-level U.S. military visits to New Zealand over the past 
6 months than in the previous two years.  This March alone, 
there will be visits by two Admirals for maritime security 
consultations with New Zealand, France, and the UK, as well 
as a yearly call by PACAF Commander General Hester.  There 
have been more U.S. military waivers for multilateral 
exercises including the NZDF as well.  Unlike in the past, 
the PM and her Government have focused on the substance 
behind these visits and exercises instead of touting them to 
the press as a sign that NZ's nuclear ban no longer matters 
to the United States.  New Zealand continues to be an active 
participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, has 
helped explain the importance of this effort to Pacific 
Island states, and will for the first time host an 
Operational Experts Group Meeting in Auckland March 26-28. 
 
---------- 
Key Issues 
---------- 
 
12.  (C/NF) Regional/Global Security: In her public 
statements announcing the visit, Clark has said that she 
hopes to discuss with senior US officials common interests in 
counter-terrorism/Afghanistan; regional security and good 
governance in the PICs and E.Timor; and DPRK, Iran and other 
nonproliferation issues.  Although she told a journalist that 
Iraq is unlikely to come up, MFAT staff tells us that she 
knows that this is a major issue on the mind of the 
Administration.  They also say she is likely to raise 
concerns over China's role in the Asia Pacific region. Clark 
will likely announce during her visit that New Zealand will 
extend its deployments to Afghanistan through September 2009, 
the longest extension since the Afghan war began.  She may 
also propose that both sides agree to regular consultations 
on Pacific Island issues.  We agree this could send a 
positive public signal about our joint work in the region, 
although in reality fast moving events make it a certainty 
that we will continue to communicate in real time as well. 
We would also have to ensure that the search for agenda items 
and "deliverables" did not overwhelm our constructive 
dialogue. 
 
13.  (S/NF) Intelligence:  Although it will be obviously 
impossible to publicly highlight the exact nature of NZ's 
 
WELLINGTON 00000194  004 OF 004 
 
 
intelligence cooperation during Clark's visit, she 
undoubtedly would appreciate having it acknowledged behind 
closed doors.  We should also encourage New Zealand to agree 
to some public recognition of the HSPD-6 MOU that we 
understand will be signed during the visit.  A public signing 
ceremony the Embassy hosted when we concluded the US-NZ 
Regional Alert Movement agreement received positive press 
play here, which indicates that not all intelligence 
cooperation issues are tabu to Kiwis. 
 
14.  (C) Environment and other issues:  Since the Antarctic 
celebrations in January, Clark has become more aware of the 
close level of cooperation between US and NZ scientists both 
on and off the ice.  She may propose new areas for 
cooperation in Antarctica and suggest both sides review the 
US-NZ Science and Technology Agreement to consider possible 
new joint research efforts.  GNZ officials were struck by 
parallel references to climate change and sustainable energy 
in both the President's and PM's opening statements to their 
legislature this year, and Clark may raise this as well.  She 
may also propose cooperation on efforts towards sustainable 
fisheries.  Clark will almost certainly acknowledge U.S. 
leadership in WTO Doha negotiations. 
 
15.  (C) The Public message: Clark will deliver three 
speeches while in the United States.  Unlike her speech there 
in 2002 on New Zealand's desire for an FTA, Clark's address 
in Washington will present a more positive focus on overall 
US-NZ relations. This reflects both her understanding that an 
FTA is not possible for now and her desire to speak to the 
broader relationship.  Clark will deliver a second speech in 
Chicago covering WTO and economic issues (including a soft 
FTA pitch) and a third in Seattle on innovation in New 
Zealand. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
16.  (C) PM Clark will continue to set the course for 
improved US-NZ relations.  It is clear there will be no 
change in New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy in the medium 
term; even the new opposition leader John Key has announced 
that the National Party wants to maintain the ban.  National 
also continues to be vulnerable to accusations of being too 
close to the United States, which cost it significant support 
at the 2005 election.  If elected in 2008, the Nats will have 
more political room to work with us if they can build on 
progress made under this Government towards better US-NZ 
ties.  A re-elected Labour Government will do the same.  This 
visit provides a chance to encourage Clark to set the bar 
high.  We may have setbacks along the way, but the better our 
mutual understanding of what each side can expect from each 
other, the less likely that these hiccups will undermine our 
progress.  End Comment. 
 
 
 
 
Keegan