VZCZCXRO6900
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0227/01 0800032
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210032Z MAR 07 ZDK
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1562
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0387
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1210
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0996
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0801
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0627
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0247
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: MEMBERS DISAPPOINTED WITH BASHIR 
RESPONSE BUT LITTLE APPETITE FOR SANCTIONS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 34477 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000227  001.6 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At March 19 United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) consultations, Under-Secretary-General (U/SYG) for 
Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno stressed that the 
three-phase package of Darfur peacekeeping operations was 
"indivisible," with its proposals "interlinked and 
interdependent."  The March 6 rejection by Sudanese President 
Bashir of the second phase of the plan, the Heavy Support 
Package (HSP) of assistance to the African Union Mission in 
the Sudan (AMIS), threatened to prevent the UN from assuming 
any operational role in Darfur.  Only USUN and the UK Mission 
(UKUN) raised the possibility of sanctions in response to 
stalling on the package; other Members - most notably Chinese 
Permanent Representative (PR) Wang, South African PR Kumalo 
and the Qatari and Indonesian delegates - opposed the 
imposition of any measures that could be applied at the 
expense of the ongoing political process spearheaded by UN 
Special Envoy Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim.  As to 
next steps, Guehenno reported that while the UN and AU were 
drafting a response to Bashir's letter on the HSP, 
preparations for the third phase of the plan, the hybrid 
force, were nevertheless continuing, with a UN team currently 
on the ground in Addis Ababa to finalize arrangements.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
GUEHENNO: UN AND GNU HAVE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN DARFUR 
PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS 
 
¶2. (SBU) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) U/SYG 
Guehenno reported to the UNSC at March 19 consultations on UN 
views of the March 6 letter from Sudanese President Bashir 
that rejected major elements of the second phase of the plan 
for Darfur peacekeeping operations.  Calling Bashir's 
agreement on the importance of re-energizing the political 
process "common ground" between the GNU and the UN/AU, 
Guehenno was hard pressed to find any other areas of 
agreement.  He highlighted major problem areas in Bashir's 
response, namely the inclusion of air assets, Level II and 
III hospitals, re-structuring from eight to three sectors 
(which he said had been an AU initiative) and a re-focus of 
the role of the Tripartite Mechanism from facilitating HSP 
implementation to defining the HSP's contents. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Guehenno expressed mild exasperation at Bashir's 
response, given the fact that the UN's and AU's plans for 
support to AMIS, restoration of stability and protection of 
civilians in Darfur "had not come out of the blue," but were 
rather rooted in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and 
represented months of intensive UN/AU collaboration, of which 
the GNU had been apprised at every step of the way and which 
had culminated in the November 16 Addis Ababa Agreement. 
Guehenno emphasized that the UN and the AU had worked closely 
to find credible approaches to sticking points like command 
and control of the hybrid force so that the package presented 
would be sufficiently credible to attract troop-contributing 
countries (TCCs).  The Addis Ababa package, Guehenno 
emphasized, was "indivisible," with its proposals 
"interlinked and interdependent."  Bashir's letter, he 
argued, threatened to prevent the UN from assuming any 
operational role in Darfur and implied a re-opening of 
negotiations on the whole package, which in turn would mean 
protracted negotiations with uncertain conclusions.  Guehenno 
welcomed the opportunity to clarify with the GNU certain 
elements of the HSP but strongly recommended against 
re-negotiating the whole plan. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Guehenno responded to accusations from the South 
African PR and current UNSC President Kumalo that the UN had 
not treated the GNU as a viable partner in the Darfur 
peacekeeping planning process by citing at least nine visits 
by high-ranking UN officials to Khartoum in the past 16 
months as evidence of the UN commitment to transparency. 
Guehenno said the difficulty lay in coming to agreement with 
Khartoum in assessing the Darfur situation and what needed to 
be done in response.  He said the GNU was in need of a 
"strategic shift" in its thinking vis-a-vis protection of 
civilians, which would require Khartoum's abandoning its 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000227  002.6 OF 003 
 
 
proposition that Sudanese police could handle the task 
exclusively in favor of its accepting the international 
community's help in this regard.  Absent this type of 
political shift, Guehenno warned that the UN would never have 
an operational role in Darfur and humanitarian operations 
there would collapse. 
 
ALL HOPE NOT LOST: ELIASSON MISSION, HYBRID PLANNING 
 
¶5. (SBU) Guehenno was hopeful about the political mission of 
UN Special Envoy Eliasson, who will be in Khartoum the week 
of March 26.  In response to questions from Ambassador 
Sanders as to the focus of Eliasson's mission, Guehenno 
responded that Eliasson would stress with Bashir that he 
should exploit the "unique window of opportunity" now facing 
him on Darfur and that he should show a willingness to 
address concretely rebel grievances; with the rebels that 
they should show good faith in negotiations with the GNU and 
that "forum shopping" was not a constructive means of 
negotiation; and with all parties that the political process 
should be consolidated but not mistaken for an alternative to 
peacekeeping. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Also in response to Ambassador Sanders' query, 
Guehenno reported that despite the "stalemate," DPKO 
continued to engage potential TCCs for the Darfur operation 
and planned to convene a TCC meeting in early April. 
Guehenno reported that while the UN and AU were drafting a 
"respectful but clear" response to Bashir's HSP letter, 
preparations for the hybrid force continued, with a UN team 
currently on the ground in Addis Ababa to finalize 
arrangements.  Still, given the current delay in planning, 
Guehenno said that no significant UN deployment in Darfur 
could realistically be expected until 2008. 
 
LITTLE SUPPORT FOR PROSPECT OF UNSC SANCTIONS 
 
¶7. (SBU) Only UKUN PR Jones Parry and Ambassador Sanders 
raised the possibility of sanctions in response to Sudanese 
stalling on implementation of the three-phase package for 
Darfur, and there was no traction among other Members. Jones 
Parry argued that coercion was a necessary part of the 
overall package in order to maintain momentum on the 
three-phase plan, specifically the naming of individuals 
identified by the Panel of Experts, a broadening of the arms 
embargo and the monitoring of air space over Darfur. 
Ambassador Sanders recommended the Council consider 
additional and expanded sanctions and announced the USG's 
readiness to take unilateral measures.  French PR de La 
Sabliere declared the time was not right for sanctions, 
putting his faith instead in the efforts of SYG Ban at the 
Arab League Summit in Riyadh beginning March 28 and in 
Eliasson's mission.  Congolese PR Ikouebe echoed de La 
Sabliere's comments and announced that South African 
President Mbeki and Nigerian President Obasanjo would shortly 
travel to Khartoum to negotiate with Bashir. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Chinese Political Coordinator Li told PolMinsCouns 
at a P5 Coordinators lunch before consultations that we 
should not bother to table a sanctions resolution, as Beijing 
had already decided it "could not be allowed to pass." 
Chinese PR Wang told the UNSC that Sudan's fundamental 
disagreement with the approach of UNSCR 1706 had to be taken 
into account in implementing the three-phase plan.  Wang 
agreed that the HSP should not be re-opened for negotiation, 
but advised that DPKO and the UNSC honor the Sudanese demand 
for further clarification and explanation to secure GNU 
cooperation.  Wang cited the "bedrock principle" that any 
peacekeeping operation needed the consent of the receiving 
country and explicitly rejected sanctions as a threat to the 
political process and further dialogue with Khartoum. 
(COMMENT: While the Chinese have likely not decided in 
advance on a veto of any sanctions measure, it is a prospect 
that has to be taken seriously, as is opposition from some of 
the elected members (Qatar, South Africa and Indonesia). 
Wang seemed less protective of Khartoum than he had been in 
earlier comments, at times clearly indicating his 
disagreement with what Bashir had said.  END COMMENT.) 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000227  003.6 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Qatari representative advised the international 
community to act "constructively" on Darfur and not to impose 
any measure that could jeopardize the political process.  He 
announced Doha's plans to host a meeting between President 
Bashir and Eritrean President Isaias, and he hailed the 
Libyan and Eritrean mediation efforts on Darfur.  The 
Indonesian PR suggested that the UNSC try to bridge the 
divide with Bashir over their respective understandings of 
the Darfur crisis by responding to Bashir's March 6 letter, 
not by imposing sanctions that would be counterproductive and 
would even further alienate the UN from the GNU.  South 
African PR and current SC President Kumalo was dismissive of 
the potential efficacy of sanctions, quipping, "As if 
sanctions are going to save even one life in Darfur." 
 
¶10. (SBU) Russia has been uncharacteristically quiet in 
recent days on the sanctions issue; formerly PermRep Churkin 
was one of the most outspoken critics of the prospect.  Now 
the delegation seems resigned to sit back and watch others 
carry on the debate: the Russian Political Coordinator kept 
quiet during a March 19 P5 Coordinators lunch on the subject, 
and a Russian Political Officer told Poloff after 
consultations that with the Council so deadlocked on the 
issue, "What is there to say?" 
 
¶11. (SBU) One new note among DPKO and some Members (including 
the UK, Ghana, China and Qatar) was a broader recognition 
that the Sudanese rebels were causing more problems in Darfur 
than was the GNU and a hope that the groups would unite as 
soon as possible to begin negotiations with the GNU.  A 
representative of the Sudanese Mission informed Poloff after 
the meeting that Justice and Equality Movement leader Khalil 
Ibrahim was not cooperating at a rebel conference in Asmara 
and had walked out of a March 19 negotiating session.  The 
Sudanese rep said Khartoum was nevertheless "optimistic" that 
the negotiations would continue and promised to update 
accordingly.  He said President Isais' mediation was 
progressing. 
WOLFF