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Viewing cable 07TOKYO1271, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/22/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO1271 2007-03-22 08:28 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO2134
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1271/01 0810828
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220828Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1908
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 2797
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0331
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 3845
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 9691
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 1286
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6254
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2330
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3645
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 001271 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/22/07 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Poll on Abe cabinet, political parties 2 
 
(2) Poll on Abe cabinet, political parties 3 
 
(3) 6 months of Abe administration -- Loneliness and agony: Torn 
between Kono statement and US House resolution; LDP will launch a 
reinvestigation into coercion mentioned in Kono statement, and 
government will cooperate as necessary 4 
 
(4) Editorial: Make aid to Africa a model for economic independence 
6 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Poll on Abe cabinet, political parties 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
March 20, 2007 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage. Parentheses denote the results of a 
survey conducted in February.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Abe cabinet? 
 
Yes                      43.8       (45.3) 
No                       43.9       (42.7) 
Other answers (O/A)       4.4        (3.0) 
No answer (N/A)           7.9        (9.0) 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the foregoing question) 
Give up to two reasons for your approval of the Abe cabinet. 
 
I can appreciate its political stance                      27.4 
It's stable                                                 9.2 
The prime minister is trustworthy                          27.6 
There's a fresh image of the prime minister                43.4 
I can appreciate its economic policy                        4.3 
I can appreciate its foreign policy                        15.1 
Because it's a coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the New 
Komeito                                                10.2 
It's better than its predecessors                          10.4 
O/A+N/A                                                     3.9 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the foregoing question) Give 
up to two reasons for your disapproval of the Abe cabinet. 
 
I can't appreciate its political stance                     44.4 
It's unstable                                               32.0 
The prime minister is untrustworthy                         27.3 
The prime minister lacks political experience               16.6 
I can't appreciate its economic policy                      19.3 
I can't appreciate its foreign policy                       10.7 
Because it's a coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the New 
Komeito                                                  8.6 
It's worse than its predecessors                            10.7 
O/A+N/A                                                      3.9 
 
Q: Which political party do you support now? Pick only one. 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)                 36.4       (34.2) 
 
TOKYO 00001271  002 OF 007 
 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto)    11.3       (12.0) 
New Komeito (NK)                                2.1        (3.9) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP)                  1.8        (1.4) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto)       0.7        (1.0) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto)      0.1        (0.3) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon)         0.1        (0.1) 
Other political parties                         ---        (---) 
None                                           46.0        46.8 
N/A                                             1.5        (0.5) 
 
Q: The rate of public support for the Abe cabinet has been declining 
over the past six months. Why do you think this is? Pick as many 
reasons as you like from among those listed below, if any. 
 
The prime minister has failed to display leadership in his cabinet 
or toward his party 
43.7 
The prime minister has not set forth any appropriate policy 
21.0 
The prime minister has not fully accounted to the public for his 
policy, etc.       32.2 
The prime minister had postal rebels reinstated in the LDP 
31.6 
The prime minister is negative about reform       15.2 
The prime minister has made no remarkable achievements 
33.9 
There are scandals and gaffes involving his cabinet ministers 
 
60.1 
O/A 
1.7 
Nothing in particular 
3.5 
N/A 
1.5 
 
Q: Because of scandals and gaffes involving cabinet ministers, there 
are calls from within the LDP for shuffling the cabinet before this 
summer's election for the House of Councillors. Do you think it 
would be better for Prime Minister Abe to shuffle his cabinet before 
the upper house election? 
 
Yes                           30.3 
Yes to a certain degree       22.9 
No to a certain degree        16.3 
No                            21.9 
N/A                            8.6 
 
Polling methodology 
Date of survey: March 17-18. 
Subjects of survey: 3,000 persons chosen from among all eligible 
voters throughout the country (at 250 locations on a stratified 
two-stage random sampling basis). 
Method of implementation: Door-to-door visits for face-to-face 
interviews. 
Number of valid respondents: 1,741 persons (58.0% ). 
 
(2) Poll on Abe cabinet, political parties 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
March 19, 2007 
 
Questions & Answers 
 
TOKYO 00001271  003 OF 007 
 
 
(Figures shown in percentage. Parentheses denote findings from the 
last survey conducted in February.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Abe cabinet? 
 
Yes                                      43       (49) 
No                                       45       (41) 
Can't say (C/S) + don't know (D/K)       12       (10) 
 
Q: Which political party do you support or like now? 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)                    41       (44) 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto)       18       (21) 
New Komeito (NK)                                   4        (3) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP)                     5        (3) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto)          2        (3) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto)         0        (0) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon)            0        (0) 
Other political parties                            1        (1) 
None                                              25       (21) 
C/S+D/K                                            4        (4) 
 
Q: Do you appreciate the Abe cabinet's job performance? 
 
Yes                  29       (34) 
No                   56       (52) 
Can't say which       8        (6) 
C/S+D/K               7        (8) 
 
Q: What do you think about the Abe cabinet's reform stance compared 
with the Koizumi cabinet's? 
 
Positive                  3        (3) 
Negative                 50       (50) 
Not very different       38       (37) 
C/S+D/K                   9       (10) 
 
(Note) The total percentage does not become 100% in some cases due 
to rounding. 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was taken March 16-18 by Nikkei 
Research Inc. over the telephone on a random digit dialing (RDD) 
basis. For the survey, samples were chosen from among men and women 
aged 20 and over across the nation. A total of 1,568 households with 
one or more voters were sampled, and answers were obtained from 901 
persons (57.5% ). 
 
(3) 6 months of Abe administration -- Loneliness and agony: Torn 
between Kono statement and US House resolution; LDP will launch a 
reinvestigation into coercion mentioned in Kono statement, and 
government will cooperate as necessary 
 
SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) 
March 22, 2007 
 
Fumito Ishibashi 
 
On the evening of March 8, shock waves passed through junior and 
mainstay lawmakers of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who 
sympathize with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's thoughts and 
convictions. 
 
The reason was that when asked by reporters what he would do about 
 
TOKYO 00001271  004 OF 007 
 
 
the statement released in 1993 by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei 
Kono (Kono Statement) acknowledging that government authorities' 
involvement in recruiting women for sexual servitude, Abe told them: 
"We basically stand by the statement. Our party will launch a 
reinvestigation about coercion. We on the part of the government 
will cooperate with the party as necessary." 
 
Two hours before this comment came out, Nariaki Nakayama, who chairs 
the Parliamentary Council to Consider the Future of Japan and 
History Education, a group of lawmakers from the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), and some group members called on Abe at the 
Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) and called on the 
government to conduct a reexamination of the data, which had formed 
the grounds for the Kono Statement. Should the government decide to 
reinvestigate the data, it would supposedly be confirmed that there 
are no data that show the military or government authorities had 
forced women to serve as prostitutes in military brothels. Reviewing 
the Kono Statement then seemed inevitable. 
 
At the time, Abe expressed his gratitude to Nakayama and the others 
and indicated his willingness to launch a reinvestigation. But 
afterwards, he declared that the reinvestigation would be conducted 
not by the government but by the LDP. This half-baked policy switch 
perplexed the parliamentary council members. Abe's implication was 
that the government would stand back from the frontline of debate on 
the problem of whether to review the Kono Statement. One member said 
angrily: "I felt as if the ladder were taken away from under me." 
Another quipped, "Who in the world put him up to that?" 
 
To avoid confrontation 
 
Abe and Shoichi Nakagawa, currently the chairman of the LDP Policy 
Research Council, together created the parliamentary council in 1997 
when they discovered descriptions of the comfort women situation 
were being included in all history textbooks for junior high school 
students. The question of whether to review the Kono Statement is 
indeed a major subject that affects Abe's very raison d'etre. 
 
Nonetheless, Abe declared at the Lower House plenary session last 
Oct. 3 that he stood by the Kono Statement. This declaration was 
viewed as a significant political compromise, even though in his 
reply before a Lower House Budget Committee session last Oct. 5 Abe 
denied the existence of "coercion in the narrow sense," which means 
the direct involvement of the Imperial Japanese Army in the "comfort 
women" issue. Although Abe felt ashamed (of his announcement that he 
stood by the Kono statement), if he had declared he indeed would 
review the Kono statement, he would have certainly become an easy 
target of criticism for the anti-Abe group in the LDP, starting with 
former LDP Secretary General Koichi Kato, as well as the opposition 
parties, given the political climate at the time. 
 
Why did Abe stop short of deciding to launch a reinvestigation with 
the government's initiative? 
 
One primary reason was his concern about what would happen to the US 
House resolution condemning Japan on the comfort-women issue. This 
resolution concludes the comfort women issue as "one of the largest 
cases of human trafficking in the 20th century." It was initially 
hardly noticed in the United States, however. 
 
But Japan's backlash against the resolution fueled outrage in the US 
media. The March 6 edition of The New York Times in its editorial 
criticized Japan sharply: "What part of "Japanese Army sex slaves" 
 
TOKYO 00001271  005 OF 007 
 
 
does Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe, have so much trouble 
understanding and apologizing for?" Following it, other major 
dailies also gave wide space to articles criticizing Abe one after 
the other. 
 
As of March 8, Abe was being informed through diplomatic channels 
that the resolution would inevitably clear the House. Abe was forced 
to conclude that if the government had declared it would conduct a 
reinvestigation at this point, that would simply add fuel to the 
flames of criticism. 
 
The planned visit to Japan by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in 
mid-April and Abe's own visit to the US set for late April also 
shackled him. But what Abe feared more than that was the possibility 
that a deep-seated anti-US sentiment found among Japan's 
conservatives might ignite and come to the surface. 
 
If the resolution were to be approved by the House, voices 
condemning US troops for their raping of women during the days of 
the occupation of Japan by the General Headquarters of the Allied 
Powers (GHQ) would inevitably arise. Voices charging the US with its 
air raid on Tokyo and its dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki would also arise. Such being the case, the US Republicans 
would not remain mum. Who and which country would chuckle with glee 
at the emergence of such a dispute between Japanese and American 
conservatives? 
 
At noon of March 9, Abe invited two-term lawmakers of his party to a 
luncheon at the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei). During 
the lunch, Yasuhide Nakayama, who led the process of compiling 
suggestions (for the review of the Kono statement), complained: "All 
of us have felt chagrined at the current development." Abe, however, 
went no further than to say, wearing a stern look: "I'd like you to 
fully discuss the matter with Mr. Shoichi Nakagawa. I also will tell 
him to do so." 
 
Japan's inability to rebut 
 
A similar resolution denouncing Japan was introduced five times in 
the US House of Representatives in the past, but every time, the 
resolution was killed. But "there seems to be some difference 
between this time and the past cases," Eriko Yamatani, the special 
advisor to the Prime Minister (for education), said. She was quick 
to notice the difference. 
 
Last September, soon after assuming her post, Yamatani suggested to 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki: "Taking no action would 
lead to fatal consequences." But Shiozaki was slow to act. It was 
not until December when Abe, realizing the seriousness of the 
situation, told Administrative Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi 
and others: "You must rebut thoroughly each time there is criticism 
of Japan if it is not based on facts." 
 
On Feb. 15, however, the US House's subcommittee held a hearing for 
former "comfort women." Irritated by this development, Abe sent 
Special Advisor to the Prime Minister (for Public Relations) 
Hiroshige Seko to the US. 
 
"Lying behind the resolution are Chinese lobbyists. Their aim is to 
drive a wedge between Japan and the US," said Seko, desperately 
appealing to a division director-level official at the US State 
Department who had responded to Seko. Swayed by Seko's strong 
appeal, the official went to (Christopher) Hill, assistant secretary 
 
TOKYO 00001271  006 OF 007 
 
 
of state. Hill later told Seko: "I didn't realize there was such a 
background to the story." Hill appeared very much disturbed. Because 
the matter concerns human rights, conservatives in the US cannot 
extend a helping hand so easily to Japan. It was too late. 
 
Japanese Ambassador to the US Ryozo Kato issued a statement to the 
US Congress, in which he asserted: "The Japanese government clearly 
admitted it was responsible for the comfort women issue and offered 
a formal apology in the name of a top-level government official." 
But Japanese Embassy officials have shown no trace of having given a 
detailed explanation to the US government or the US Congress. Nor 
have they made a rebuttal. Why? The reason is the existence of the 
Kono statement. "As long as the government stands by that statement, 
we can't make any rebuttal," a ranking government official said. The 
Kono statement is not only used as the grounds for the resolution 
but also is the reason why the Japanese government cannot rebut. 
 
Self-remonstrance? 
 
Yohei Kono currently serves as speaker of the Lower House. This fact 
also makes the government reluctant to review the Kono statement. 
Minutes before the vote was taken on the fiscal 2007 budget in the 
Lower House on March 3, there was even the rumor flying around that 
"If the move calling for the review of the Kono Statement gains more 
momentum, Kono might refrain from ringing the bell to open the Lower 
House plenary session." On March 15, Kono expressed displeasure at 
the emerging move to seek the review of the statement, noting, "I 
released the statement based on my convictions. I hope to see it 
taken as is." Many in the government and the LDP are also negative 
about reviewing the statement. One official commented, "Why do they 
bother to make waves?" 
 
While faced with a tough situation, Abe attended the Defense 
Academy's graduation ceremony held in Yokosuka City, Kanagawa 
Prefecture, on March 18. He there quoted a passage of former British 
Prime Minister Churchill's Memoirs: "How can advice seeking caution 
and self-restraint become a major cause for fatal danger? We will 
realize how a middle-of-the road policy adopted in pursuit of a safe 
and calm life is associated with the center of disaster." 
 
Abe then continued: "In an emergency, I don't think it is not an 
appropriate conclusion to add the two together and divide the sum by 
two. It is necessary to make an accurate analysis of the situation 
and make a correct decision in accordance with own convictions." 
These remarks should be rather taken as admonishing himself. 
 
(4) Editorial: Make aid to Africa a model for economic independence 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
March 22, 2007 
 
In the Asia-Africa Conference and the G8 Gleneagles Summit in 2005, 
then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pledged that Japan would 
double its official development assistance (ODA) to Africa. The 
aid-to-Africa project has now gone into full swing. Tokyo signed an 
agreement on yen loans to the African Development Bank in February 
and it also inked in March accords on yen loans for infrastructure 
construction and for poverty reduction to Tanzania and Mozambique. 
Tanzania is the second country that has received debt relief, 
following Senegal in 2005. 
 
Japan increased aid to Africa until the middle of the 1990s, when it 
financed ODA budgets separately from other accounts. Japan has 
 
TOKYO 00001271  007 OF 007 
 
 
hosted the Tokyo International Conference on African Development 
(TICAD), which aims to assist Africa's economic self-support. The 
4th round of TICAD will be held in 2008. 
 
Since the economic situation of sub-Saharan Africa has worsened, 
many countries in this area became subject to debt relief. 
Therefore, the number of countries subject to yen loans was limited 
to Tunisia, Morocco, Kenya and a few other countries. Because of a 
cut in ODA budget, grant aid and technical aid were also reduced. 
 
The Millennium Development Goals were adopted at the United Nations 
in 2000. The World Summit on Sustainable Development was held in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002. Aid to Africa where the poverty 
has become serious was a main discuss issue in the Johannesburg 
Summit. 
 
Infrastructure development in the Asian region has been the pillar 
of Japan's ODA. It is true that Japan's ODA has contributed to the 
region's economic growth, although it was often criticized. However, 
Japan cannot provide the same kind of ODA to Africa, countries in 
which are at different stages of economic development, as it did to 
Asian countries. Japan needs to come up with measures that can be 
applied to African nations. 
 
As part of the government's effort to reform ODA programs, the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) will implement all aid 
programs -- repayable aid of loans, grant aid, and technical 
assistance -- from October 2008. The new system is suited for 
offering aid to Africa where measures for poverty reduction, 
development of human resources, social-infrastructure development, 
and the building of economic foundations have to be implemented 
simultaneously. Fortunately there are many JICA bases in Africa. 
This could be a good chance for JICA to test its policy of placing 
priority on requests from aid recipients. 
 
Japan should provide not only ODA programs such as building roads 
and power, and laying electric power cables that are indispensable 
for economic independence, but also sustainable projects. The right 
way of offering aid is to create bases for economic independence 
through aid projects in the agriculture area, modernization of 
smaller businesses, and promotion of local industries that will 
produce extensive ripple effects in the economy. 
 
Although Japan was the largest aid donor in the world in the 1990s, 
it will become the fifth largest donor in 2010, losing the lead to 
Britain and Germany, according to the OECD's Development Assistance 
Committee's forecast. Unless Japan's financial condition turns 
better, there is no hope that Japan will be able to boost its ODA 
budget. Therefore, Japan should provide quality ODA programs so that 
that its aid will receive recognition. 
 
Former colonial powers have led in providing aid to Africa, but 
their aid programs have not been successful. It is said that their 
assistance has reached its limits. Therefore, Japan will be able to 
show its presence by extending aid projects that help Africa become 
economically independent. 
 
SCHIEFFER