VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0565/01 0861334
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271334Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8636
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000565 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR LEDDY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE 
WEEK ENDING MARCH 23 
 
This is CWC-29-07. 
 
-------------------------- 
REVCON PREPARATORY MEETING 
-------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (U) Ambassador Parker (UK) chaired a meeting of the 
open-ended working group for the Second Review Conference on 
March 23.  The meeting covered the modalities for a possible 
meeting of States Parties and NGOs (discussion continued from 
the February 20 meeting), as well as activities not 
prohibited under the Convention (Article VI).  Parker had 
scheduled the morning and afternoon for consultations, but 
the consultation wrapped up after the morning session. 
Having said that, the statements by various delegations were 
much more robust than February's discussion on destruction. 
 
NGO Meeting 
 
¶2.  (U) In his various interventions, Parker led delegates 
toward a November date for the NGO meeting.  He also 
suggested that discussions on possible funding (from 
voluntary contributions) be discussed with the Bureau and 
then again at a later date, once the details have been worked 
out so that SPs can react.  He also explained that the 
starting list for NGO invitations would be the list of who 
participated in the First RevCon event, adding in new NGOs 
who have shown interest in or contacted the OPCW.  And he 
encouraged delegations to help identify new NGOs. 
 
¶3.  (U) Parker proposed that the TS do the initial 
data-gathering on invitations, that the Bureau discuss this 
plan and its timing in its next meeting, and that the OEWG 
plan to reach its decisions before the summer break.  He 
expressed some concern using "UN lists" of NGOs, as some NGOs 
might be too specialized to make these lists.  Parker also 
stated that regional groups would receive invitations so they 
could help ensure complete coverage.  He also emphasized the 
point that the envisioned presentation by the Scientific 
Advisory Board, as part of its "forward-looking role", would 
be to indicate progress since the First RevCon, rather than 
to present a laundry list of recommendation they have made to 
the TS which have not been picked up. 
 
¶4.  (U) The Indian ambassador expressed their willingness to 
be flexible on a late-2007 date for the NGO meeting, although 
their original preference was for something later.  She also 
expressed their discomfort with the SAB/NGO interface, not 
wanting this session to turn into a chance for the NGOs to 
find fault with the TS by focusing on those SAB 
recommendations that are not picked up by the TS. 
 
¶5.  (U) The Cuban ambassador made a statement on behalf of 
the NAM and China, stressing a full discussion of 
participation of NGOs, encouraging a wide geographic 
representation that focused on developing countries, 
requesting an initial list of NGOs to be invited, and 
ensuring that the issues to be discussed with NGOs be vetted. 
 Cuba later expressed support for the Chair's views on NGO 
identification, invitation, etc., and shared India's concern 
on the SAB portion of the meeting and the Chair's thoughts on 
this. 
 
¶6. (U) South Africa associated itself with the NAM statement, 
and pointed to November 19 as a good date for the NGO 
meeting.  Sweden expressed a preference for the November 19 
date for the NGO meeting.  Mexico supported the possibility 
of a stand-alone NGO meeting in November or December, 
allowing more time for preparation.  He also discussed the 
need for equitable geographic distribution of the 
participating NGOs and proposed preparing a financial plan to 
allow this participation. 
 
¶7.  (U) Canada encouraged the widest possible participation 
by NGOs, pointing to the value of this type of event to 
educate NGOs on the OPCW, in addition to the OPCW learning 
from the NGOs.  In that light, he saw the SAB presentation as 
useful in this education process and encouraged a broad 
 
presentation, perhaps focusing on problem areas. 
 
¶8.  (U) Russia felt that too broad of representation by NGOs 
would be unworkable and expressed support for the Chair's 
original proposal.  Tunisia proposed the creation of a 
special fund from voluntary contributions to support 
participation of representatives from developing countries. 
Turkey thought a more general introduction to the aims of the 
CWC might be helpful to begin the discussions with the NGOs. 
 
Article VI 
 
¶9.  (U) To being these discussions, Parker reminded delegates 
that his list of possible topics for the discussion was meant 
only to spur thoughts and not meant to be exclusive.  He also 
introduced a summary prepared by the TS (dated 23 March 2007) 
entitled "Working Group for the Preparation of the Second 
Review Conference: List of Issues Formally Open." 
 
¶10.  (U) Del deployed guidance on this topic, introducing the 
non-paper, which was distributed to delegations.  In his 
statement on behalf of the NAM and China, the Cuban 
ambassador encouraged discussions on frequency of 
inspections, OCPF site selection, and transfers. 
 
¶11.  (U) The German ambassador suggested that the Second 
RevCon avoid carrying a long list of issues that perhaps are 
no longer relevant, but that the list be prioritized for 
consideration.  They proposed that the top priorities be 
implementation, timely and accurate declarations, inspection 
frequency, OCPF site selection, and verification as a tool to 
confidence-building. 
 
¶12.  (U) The Netherlands ambassador made a somewhat 
philosophical statement on a number of topics: Article VI 
implementation as a shared responsibility of National 
Authorities and the TS; importance of NA interaction with 
industry to assess relevance to the object and purpose of the 
CWC; the role and value of sampling and analysis activities; 
the role of the verification regime in nonproliferation; 
encouraging SPs to assess their national implementation 
measures and provide voluntary feedback to the TS; the 
concern of "wasting" inspections by carrying them out at 
sites that are no longer inspectable or of less relevance; 
and looking to industry as our global partner, working to 
improve contacts with them and proposing an industry advisory 
board to the TS. 
 
¶13.  (U) The UK focused on developments in science and 
technology and how this effects verification.  He also 
mentioned inspection numbers and the need to focus on OCPFs, 
including resources for these and a selection methodology, 
welcoming the DG's announcement during EC-48.  He also 
expressed a need for "better" information in OCPF 
declarations to allow better inspection selections and to 
avoid "wasted" inspections.  He also referenced Jonathan 
Tucker's paper on CWC verification "holes".  (Note: The Chair 
mentioned that the TS was making the Tucker paper available 
on the external server.)  He also mentioned the importance of 
timely and complete declarations. 
 
¶14.  (U) Canada made a rather strong intervention on this 
topic.  They pointed to Articles VI, X, and XI as the 
post-destruction focus of the CWC.  He stated that the Second 
RevCon should do better than the First in addressing industry 
issues.  He proposed the possibility of ad hoc working 
groups, with support of experts, to address various industry 
issues (e.g., change of ownership of plant sites).  He also 
mentioned: disappointment in our inability to agree to low 
concentration levels for 2A/2A* chemicals; desire that we 
find an OCPF site selection methodology that incorporates all 
elements; need for more specific information on technical 
characteristics of OCPF plant sites; need for wide use of 
electronic declarations, taking into account sufficient 
confidentiality; and the importance of Article VII 
 
SIPDIS 
implementation in strengthening Article VI. 
 
¶15.  (U) Mexico expressed his opinion that verification 
 
should be based on concerns, made reference to the DG's EC-48 
announcement regarding the OCPF site selection methodology 
and concerns with the current methodology, and referenced the 
upcoming TS documents about inspection frequency.  (Note: In 
subsequent discussions with the Mexican delegate, del rep 
learned that Mexico's earlier offer to draft some thoughts on 
inspection frequency resulted in a list of documents they are 
requesting that the TS prepare on a number of related topics.) 
 
¶16.  (U) Japan expressed a desire to see progress made on 
many of the topics on the Chair's list, including OCPF site 
selection, sampling and analysis, and declarations.  She also 
noted the low overall inspection rate of industry sites and 
the importance of risk assessment to valuable verification. 
She also mentioned the importance of how confidential 
information is handled to avoid unnecessary criticism of the 
chemical industry. 
 
¶17.  (U) South Africa stated their preference that 
verification issues that remain unresolved should flow 
naturally into the RevCon.  He also mentioned the importance 
of equitable geographical distribution of inspections, the 
need to improve the quality of verification along with 
quantity, and the impact of verification on industry in 
developing SPs.  He also said that lessons learned from 
"wasted" inspections should be used to improve declarations 
in general. 
 
¶18.  (U) The Indian ambassador noted positively that the most 
heavily-industrialized SPs have legislation and other 
implementation measures and that progress has been made on 
initial declarations.  She encouraged continued TS support of 
SPs on initial declarations.  She encouraged continued 
progress on Industry Cluster issues, with unresolved issues 
spilling over to the RevCon.  She said that further TS input 
is needed on increases in OCPF inspections and developments 
in science and technology.  She has concerns that the 
increases in OCPF inspections and supporting information be 
tied together, and emphasized that the idea of risk from 
OCPFs is not defined in the CWC, as it is clearly done for 
Scheduled chemicals. 
 
¶19.  (U) Iran expressed his opinion that there is a clear 
link between Articles VI and XI and that ways need to be 
explored where developing SPs can be helped within Article 
VI.  He stated that the primary focus of the CWC is 
destruction, followed by the peaceful uses within industry. 
He finds the balance hard to make when SPs are lagging in 
their destruction.  He also mentioned the need to address 
Schedule 3 transfers during the RevCon. 
 
¶20.  (U) The Chinese ambassador stated that she sees a need 
to address in the RevCon the balance in the CWC around 
verification.  She also felt a need to discuss in the RevCon: 
timely and accurate declarations; assistance and cooperation 
for developing SPs; careful review of data provided; review 
of inspection experience to date; risk and relevance to the 
CWC; inspection frequency; role of the EC in overseeing the 
verification regime; and outstanding issues (e.g., OCPF site 
selection, 2A/2A*). 
 
¶21.  (U) Russia stated that declarations must be improved. 
He also talked about the impact of advances in science and 
technology and the balance of OCPF inspection numbers with 
destruction through 2012. 
 
------------------------------------- 
POSSIBLE REORGANIZATION WITHIN THE TS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) Gary Mallard (Head, OPCW Laboratory) visited the 
Del to discuss a possible reorganization within the TS that 
is of some concern.  He said there was discussion within the 
TS of the possibility of moving the OPCW Equipment Store from 
 
SIPDIS 
under Technical Support Branch (TSB) to the Operations and 
Planning Branch (OPB) within the Inspectorate.  The Store 
would stay physically at the facility in Rijswijk, but the 
Manager would be moved to the main OPCW building. 
 
Apparently, this was tried in the past and was not 
successful.  There is some interface between the Store and 
the Lab, and this would make that more difficult.  Also, it 
would be difficult for the Store Manager to execute his 
responsibilities from afar. 
 
¶23.  (SBU) The speculation as to the reason behind this 
possible move is that there is concern about keeping a 
D-level position within the Inspectorate for Japan. 
Apparently, there is significant concern that Japan will not 
be able to come forth with a suitable candidate for the 
Director of the Inspectorate upon Ichiro Akiyama's departure. 
 There may be somewhat more certainty in the possibility of 
securing a Japanese replacement for Shigeyuki Urano (Head, 
OPB) upon his departure.  The thought is that, by moving the 
Store and its staff under OPB, there would be enough 
justification for making the Head of OPB a D-level position. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Mallard came to the Del to make us aware of the 
situation and to get advice on how to deal with it.  He said 
that he has been asked by his management to prepare a 
counter-proposal to this change.  Del reps replied that if 
Japan is concerned about maintaining a suitable high-level TS 
position, the more sensible solution is for Japan to find a 
suitable candidate to replace Akiyama.  The Rijswijk facility 
seems to be operating very well, even under the new pressures 
of supporting Schedule 2 inspections with sampling and 
analysis, and the change under consideration is of very 
questionable value. 
 
¶25.  (SBU) If the decision is made to pursue this change, 
this would have to be part of a budget proposal, and would 
likely generate a number of questions from delegations, for 
which it did not appear the TS had good answers.  At a 
minimum, it would be likely that delegates would ask the 
Office of Internal Oversight to assess the need for such a 
change.  Del reps advised Mallard that he might wish to 
convey any of all of these observations as part of TS 
deliberations of this proposed change. 
 
----------------------- 
WEOG DISCUSSION ON IRAN 
----------------------- 
 
¶26.  (U) At the March 20 WEOG, Ambassador Javits raised the 
issue of how to deal more effectively with Iran's 
obstructionist behavior, particularly in light of Iranian 
behavior at the late night EC session of March 16.  The 
Ambassador's comments led to an extensive discussion of the 
issue.  He observed that after it was clear that all of the 
delegations in the EC were on board with the EC report 
language concerning Albanian destruction efforts, it would 
have been helpful if some of our WEOG colleagues had 
intervened to support the compromise language that Russia, 
the U.S. and Albania had supported.  The Ambassador stressed 
that this would have reinforced Iran's isolation and possibly 
led to a quicker resolution of the issue.  It also probably 
would have helped the Iranian del impress upon its minders 
from Teheran the total and complete isolation of Iran. 
 
¶27.  (U) Several delegations including France and Germany 
responded, rather defensively, that they had intervened 
earlier in the debate.  Others including Australia and 
Ireland said that they would have been more inclined to have 
intervened had they known more about the state of play of the 
negotiations.  Their point was that as they did not know the 
exact state of play, they were unsure whether a particular 
comment would have been a help or a hindrance.  Canada said 
that they felt that having more delegations speak up in 
support of the consensus text might have been 
counter-productive, as some NAM delegations that had not 
supported Iran might have felt compelled to support Iran if 
it was felt that WEOG was "ganging up" on a fellow NAM SP. 
 
¶28.  (U) The UK and Switzerland shared the U.S. view that it 
would have been helpful if other delegations had spoken up, 
at a minimum, to have expressed support for the 
Russia/U.S./Albanian text. Switzerland observed that other 
 
regional groups including the GRULAC and Eastern European 
group were also very unhappy with Iran's obstructionism. 
 
¶29.  (U) Almost all of the WEOG delegations agreed that 
greater efforts are needed to be made to keep delegations not 
involved in negotiations on the margins of the EC up to date 
with the state of play of the negotiations.  This would make 
it easier for delegations to offer support in the EC. 
Christer Ahlstrom, the WEOG coordinator, was very supportive 
of taking the initiative to work to keep WEOG dels informed. 
 
¶30.  (U) While a few delegations, most notably France, felt 
that Ambassador Javits was being tough with other WEOG 
delegations for their lack of vocal support, most delegates 
told us  that they believed the Ambassador's intervention was 
timely and led to a  frank yet very productive discussion. 
Time will tell, but hopefully some delegations may be less 
reluctant to speak up in the future.  Past practice has 
always been that delegations are upset at Iran's intransigent 
behavior, but then do not take any action at subsequent 
consultations or ECs.  However, as last Friday's experience 
was a new high (or low), perhaps there might be more of a 
willingness to speak up.  Del will also work harder to ensure 
that other like-minded delegations are up to speed with 
negotiations on the margins so as to facilitate their support 
in the EC.  Finally, as Russia is particularly upset with 
Iran, del will stay in particularly close touch with them and 
see if they can assist in restraining Iran. 
 
¶31. (U) Javits sends. 
BLAKEMAN