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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000504 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR LEDDY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
48TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION (EC-48) 
 
REF: STATE 29839 (NOTAL) 
 
This is CWC-25-07. 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) What promised to be an uneventful EC-48 on March 
13-16 turned into a lengthy session that previewed important, 
upcoming issues.  Iran's tactics have focused the minds of 
delegations on how to keep Iran from delaying work at future 
EC sessions.  The handling of the Albanian destruction issue 
presages future discussions on how to deal with possessors 
who do not meet destruction deadlines.  There also will be 
debates before EC-49 on end-point-of-destruction, with the 
level of intensity depending on what Russia claims as 
destroyed CW on April 29, and whether a draft facility 
agreement and verification plan for Maradykovsky are 
available for EC consideration. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Director General forcefully stated that the 
Technical Secretariat will be looking at what appropriate 
actions it can take within its area of competence to move 
forward on the issue of an improved OCPF site selection 
process.  And as anticipated, Philippine Ambassador Romeo 
Arguelles was elected the new EC Chair, effective May 12. 
While a number of "administrative" items were approved, a 
substantial amount of work was deferred to EC-49 largely due 
to Iranian intransigence.  The rolling backlog of issues will 
make EC-49 more difficult, and if Iranian obstructionism 
continues, will generate a serious problem for future 
sessions.  End Summary. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Delegations have grown increasingly exasperated 
with Iran's obstructionist tactics, and a major topic of 
discussion after EC-48 has been how to prevent such problems 
in the future.  While the primary issue on which Iran kept 
delegations in the OPCW until very late on March 16 was 
report language on Albania, Iran also made life difficult for 
the Germans and Austrians in finalizing report language on 
handling old CW found in Austria.  And it aggravated the TS 
with repeated requests to edit the DG's report on the status 
of possessor states in destroying CW stocks, not resisting 
one last dig by having the document "received" rather than 
"noted" by the EC. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) One new factor which may help in restraining Iran 
in the future is the palpable Russian anger with Iran over 
its delaying tactics on the Albanian report language. 
Russian Amb. Gevorgian was clearly displeased with having to 
engage so extensively with the Iranian deputy, rather than 
the Iranian Ambassador.  Gevorgian was also livid when Iran 
lied about the extent to which Russia failed to bring Iran 
into the discussions about Russian-proposed report language. 
While other delegates have not retained their anger with Iran 
over past delays and obstructionism, there may be something 
different about Russian deputy PermRep Gavrilov stressing 
that "this will not be forgotten" and stating that he is 
instructing Russian delegates not to cooperate with Iran.  In 
short, Iran may have overplayed its hand at EC-48, and the 
U.S. will work with others to see if it will be possible to 
contain Iranian delaying tactics in the future. 
 
------- 
ALBANIA 
------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Having completed destroying 1% and 20% of its 
stockpiles by EC-48, Albania requested a revised date of 1 
December 2007 for its 45% and 100% deadlines and made its 
case during the destruction informals.  As predicted in 
earlier reporting, this was not well received by SPs, due 
primarily to concerns about the legality of making such a 
 
request after the final extension request deadline of 29 
April 2006 and the implied retroactive approval from the CSP. 
Both Russia and Iran expressed concerns about transparency in 
relation to Albania missing its revised deadlines.  After 
taking into account the serious legal concerns expressed not 
only by SPs, but also by the TS (who noted it would be 
impossible to support a draft decision for which there was no 
legal basis), Albania withdrew its request and instead tabled 
national paper detailing its destruction progress. 
 
¶6. (U) At the request of Iran, the paper was received rather 
than noted by the EC.  In what was clearly a play to set a 
strict precedent for the U.S., Iran prolonged negotiations on 
the final report language, the final version of which called 
upon Albania to take measures to redress the situation (a 
clear reference to Article VIII, paragraph 36), requested the 
TS to inform the EC by 25 April 2007 on destruction progress, 
 
SIPDIS 
and noted that the EC would consider the matter at EC-49.  In 
order to get around attempted Iranian edits to the 
laboriously crafted paragraph 5.7 of the report, a paragraph 
5.8 was added that reminded States Parties to fulfill their 
obligations under the Convention. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) While Albania will (hopefully) have completed 
destruction by the June EC, it appears the issue of how to 
address what some delegations view as "non-compliance" will 
not disappear.  The focus of many delegations regarding use 
of Article VII is now under consideration, along with the 
Russian suggestion of using Article XII.  Some delegations 
have advised the U.S. that it would be worth considering and 
offering an alternative to relying on these particular 
Articles, the implication being that it is important to begin 
this process now if the U.S. wishes to avoid being labeled 
non-compliant in 2012.  Otherwise, a continued refusal to use 
Articles 12 or 8 with no alternative action could leave the 
U.S. in a difficult situation. 
 
------------------------ 
END POINT OF DESTRUCTION 
------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (U) There already had been heightened interest well 
before the EC regarding the TS evaluation of operations at 
Maradykovsky.  That interest has continued to grow 
significantly, particularly with the Russian presentation at 
the destruction informals (below).  And with the Russian 20% 
destruction deadline of April 29 looming, WEOG attention on 
the differences between Russian and TS accounting remains 
high.  Inevitably, the WEOG and side-bar discussions have 
focused on the ostensibly similar situation of U.S. 
operations at Aberdeen. 
 
¶9.  (U) There will certainly be more WEOG discussions on this 
matter before the June EC, and we fully anticipate that the 
UK, FRG and France will want to discuss this at the Close 
Allies meeting in May.  The delegation assessment is that if 
Russia indicates its second stage will remain under 
verification and that it will pay any Article IV/V costs 
related thereto, the TS and virtually all SPs will want to be 
able to let Russia claim success at meeting the 20% deadline. 
 Any U.S. effort to block that success will face an uphill 
struggle, if not a rebuff. 
 
------------------------------- 
OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) In his statement, the DG clearly expressed his 
intention of consulting with the Chair, Bureau and the 
facilitator so that the TS could address the technical issues 
involved with the OCPF site selection methodology.  The DG 
emphasized that the work would be done on the areas which lie 
within the competence and authority of the TS.  Facilitator 
Luis Garcia (Spain) is not pleased with the DG's decision, 
and has scheduled two site selection consultations during 
industry week.  Del understands the relevant TS offices 
(Verification and Legal Advisor's Office) are already working 
on the issue, per the DG's request. 
 
 
¶11. (U) The following items are noted in accordance with the 
numbering used in the final report for EC-48. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Item Three:  Statement by the Director-General 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶12. (U) The DG referred to the requirement in the extension 
requests granted to India, Libya, Russia, A State Party, 
China/Japan and the U.S. to issue status reports at 90-day 
intervals.  He hoped his report on how to fulfill that 
obligation is satisfactory.  He spoke at length about the 
status of destruction in these SPs, and noted India's 
destruction should be completed ahead of its revised final 
deadline.  He referred to the problems with the Albanian 
destruction and Italy's request for an extension.  He noted 
that consultations on industry inspections have started under 
CSP chair Dastis and reiterated the need for more OCPF 
inspections. 
 
¶13. (U) The DG drew attention to the submission of two 
status-of-implementation reports for Article X and Article 
XI.  He informed the EC that the EU will provide support for 
another Associate Program.  Implementation support courses 
were held in Liberia, Azerbaijan and Ecuador; courses on 
improving national capabilities were held in Colombia, 
Uruguay, and SPs in North Africa; and a course for first 
responders was held in Trinidad and Tobago in sync with the 
other CWC (Cricket World Cup).  The DG reported the continued 
success of the use of sampling and analysis during Schedule 2 
inspections, noting that the fourth such inspection was 
underway.  (Del comment: Del has since learned that this 
inspection was in India.  End Comment.) 
 
¶14. (U) The DG told delegations Barbados will accede to the 
CWC on April 6, and universality efforts in 2007 will focus 
on remaining non-signatories, particularly in the Middle 
East.  He noted Iraq's efforts toward accession and feels 
they are close to completion.  Pfirter said the ICA Division 
will work on possible options on an OPCW office in Africa and 
noted the departure of facilitator Andres Rugeles (Colombia). 
 The DG spoke at length about the recent chlorine gas attacks 
in Iraq and the continued contributions to be made by the 
OPCW in countering this kind of terrorism.  On budget 
matters, the DG noted a deficit in 2006 of four million Euros 
because of SP payment shortfalls.  This requires the TS to 
closely manage the budget, and utilizing the working capital 
fund should be a last resort.  He said delegations cannot 
have a zero-growth budget and fall short on full and timely 
payment of annual dues. 
 
------------------------------- 
Item Four:  National Statements 
------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (U) Extension requests granted at CSP-11 were the first 
topic in most statements, which emphatically stressed that 
April 29, 2012 is the final deadline for destruction of CW 
stockpiles.   Many said not meeting the deadline would 
adversely affect the credibility of the CWC.  The only 
delegation to mention site visits was the EU.  Another topic 
frequently addressed was the verification regime, in 
particular industry inspections.  Some expressed concern that 
the number of inspections is decided in budget consultations; 
others want to make sure political elements are avoided; all 
wanted a resolution on this matter as soon as possible. 
 
¶16. (U) Another popular topic was Article VII, where SPs were 
happy the program of assistance and cooperation has achieved 
solid results.  The EU linked implementation of Article VII 
with UN resolution 1540.   SPs were pleased at the 
achievements of the universality action plan.  Mexico and 
South Africa - both with female Ambassadors - again discussed 
gender distribution of jobs at the OPCW; South Africa also 
noted the lack of Africans in leadership positions at the TS. 
 As ever, all NAM associated delegations referred to Article 
XI as an important, yet neglected area of implementation of 
 
the CWC and urged the appointment of a facilitator to begin 
consultations and an Action Plan on Article XI. 
 
¶17. (U) Continued support for the establishment of an Africa 
Office was also mentioned in various statements.  Japan and 
China both mentioned Japanese abandoned chemical weapons in 
China.  The DG of Japan's ACW Office shared the national 
statement with their Ambassador, outlining the work completed 
thus far, in particular on ACW found in the Haerbaling 
District in Jilin Province.  He cited the difficult, but 
successful retrieval of ACW in the Zhu Jian River in 
Guangzhou City.  For its part, China continued urging Japan 
to intensify their efforts.  Delegations noted the upcoming 
tenth anniversary commemoration and work on the Second Review 
Conference. 
 
¶18. (U) Amb. Siamand A. Banaa of Iraq (which attended as an 
observer) gave a statement and thanked the TS and delegations 
for their support on the path to accession to the CWC.  He 
condemned the Iraq CW attack in Halabja in 1988, saying this 
event helped lead to the creation of the CWC.  Banaa said a 
search of the former regime's documents found some companies 
who provided the precursor chemicals.  He also cited the 
recent use of chlorine gas in terrorist attacks in Iraq, 
saying they had been funded by neighboring countries.  He 
thanked Amb. Javits for referring to the attack in his 
statement. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Item Five:  Status of implementation of the Convention 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶19. (U) Item 5.1: The EC approved the plan for phase 3 
destruction and verification at the chemical weapons 
production facility for lewisite production at the Open Joint 
Stock Company "Kaprolaktam-Dzerzhinsk", Dzerzhinsk, Russia. 
 
¶20. (U) Item 5.2:  The EC approved corrections to the 
detailed plans for conversion of the CWPF (soman production) 
at the Open Joint Stock Company "Khimprom", Novocheboksarsk, 
Russia. 
 
¶21. (U) Item 5.3: The EC noted the notification from Russia 
of changes at the former facility for the production of soman 
at the Open Joint Stock Company "Khimprom", Volgograd, 
Russian Federation without debate.  Del joined consensus 
after satisfactory answers were received informally from 
Russia in relation to concerns about certain technical 
parameters. 
 
¶22. (U) Item 5.4: The EC noted the Russian notification of 
changes at the former facility for the production of mustard 
gas at Chapaevsk without debate. 
 
¶23. (U) Item 5.5: The EC noted the TS Note on the progress in 
converting the former VX chemical weapons production facility 
at Novocheboksarsk 
 
¶24. (U) Item 5.6: Reports by States Parties.  U.S., Russia 
and India provided oral reports.  The U.S. referred back to 
the presentation by Dr. Hopkins at the destruction informals. 
 The U.S. also commended Russian progress, but highlighted 
its position that TS verification of the second stage of 
destruction is critical, and expressed a hope that the draft 
facility agreement and verification plan for Maradykovsky 
would be made available to delegations without further delay. 
 
 
¶25. (SBU) Item 5.7 and 5.8: Albanian CW destruction.  Noted 
above. 
 
¶26. (U) Item 5.9: DG's Report on progress made by SPs granted 
extensions of deadlines for the destruction of Category 1 CW. 
 Prior to the EC, Iran requested deletion of a reference to 
the U.S. commitment to "complete destruction by 2012, or as 
soon as feasible."  Given the protracted negotiations on this 
point at the CSP, del and TS agreed to remove this particular 
reference.  Further requests by Iran to remove references to 
 
the U.S. detailed plan (the submission of which was 
questioned by Iran and Russia in the run-up to CSP-11) were 
rebuffed by the U.S. and TS, to avoid setting the dangerous 
precedent that factual documents should be opened to 
negotiation.  As a result, Iran requested that the document 
be received rather than noted.  (Del comment:  Iran made 
clear that Tehran intends to pay particularly close attention 
to all future reports on destruction, a factor Washington may 
wish to consider in its review of EC-49/DG.1, which outlines 
the TS thoughts on the final extension request 90-day 
reporting requirement.  End comment.) 
 
¶27. (U) Item 5.10: Indian National Paper.  The EC noted a 
national paper by India entitled, "Status of the Chemical 
Weapons Destruction and Destruction of Chemical Weapons 
Production Facilities" without debate.  Del will follow-up 
with a letter to the Indian delegation asking for a 
clarification about plans for the equipment from the CWDF. 
 
¶28. (U) Item 5.11: Italian OCW Destruction Extension.  The EC 
approved a draft decision for the Italian extension of the 
deadlines for the destruction of its old chemical weapons. 
Germany indicated that while it appreciated Italy's 
transparency, it believes there is an inherent ambiguity in 
the CWC treatment of old and abandoned CW that is open for 
interpretation, and that this should not be considered to set 
a precedent. 
 
¶29. (U) Item 5.12:  Article VII.  The EC noted without 
discussion the DG's report on progress made implementing the 
decision of the CSP-11.  Facilitator Maarten Lak 
(Netherlands) thanked delegations for their support and 
introduced his successor, Kimmo Laukkanen (Finland).  Del rep 
joined in thanking Lak and made the additional points per 
Washington guidance. 
 
¶30. (U) Item 5.13: Article X.  Discussion of the report was 
deferred to EC-49 with a specific request for the facilitator 
to hold consultations on the report, most likely in May. 
 
¶31. (U) Item 5.14: Article XI.  At the request of Iran, the 
EC deferred until EC-49 consideration of the DG's report on 
status of implementation of Article XI. 
 
¶32. (U) Items 5.15-5.19: UK Facility Agreements.  At the 
request of Iran and Russia, the EC deferred to EC-49 
amendments to a UK facility agreement, and three UK facility 
arrangements.  The UK reported in WEOG some progress on these 
in discussions with Iran, but also made it clear that 
deferment of these documents was not a major concern. 
 
¶33. (U) Item 5.20: Schedule 2 Facility Agreements.  The EC 
noted the DG's Note giving a progress update on Schedule 2 
facility agreements.  During preparation of report language, 
Iran asked that the TS be requested to provide an update on 
this report for EC-49, which was accepted. 
 
¶34. (U) Item 5.21: 2005 Verification Implementation Report 
(VIR).  The EC noted the DG's Note on the issues identified 
in paragraph 4 of the Chairperson's summary of consultations 
held on the 2005 VIR.  After the matter was closed, Germany 
intervened to note the importance of speedy conversion of 
CWPFs and updated, meaningful, and correct reports on 
verification implementation in the future. 
 
¶35. (U) Item 5.22: Handling of confidential information by 
the TS.  The EC noted the DG's report on the implementation 
of the regime governing the handling of confidential 
information by the TS in 2006. 
 
¶36. (U) Item 5.23: Corrections to revised specifications for 
two items of approved equipment.  The EC approved a TS note 
on corrections to revised specifications for two items of 
approved equipment. 
 
¶37. (U) Item 5.24:  Austrian OCW.  Germany and Austria 
coordinated extensively with the TS to ensure detailed legal 
and technical briefings by the TS to SPs in the open session. 
 
 The EC approved the proposal for transport of OCWs to the 
CWDF in the FRG, following extensive Austria/FRG side-bar 
discussions with Iran on report language. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Item Six:  List of new validated data 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶38. (U) Item 6:  India asked to defer Tables 2 and 3 to a 
later session, but was willing to approve Table 1. However, 
Russia requested to defer the entire note to EC-49 to allow 
delegations more time to review the data. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Item Seven: Report of the OIO and External Auditor 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶39. (U) Item 7.1: OIO Implementation.  At the request of the 
U.S., the EC deferred action on the DG's report on the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Office of 
Internal Oversight so that consultations could be held before 
EC-49. 
 
¶40. (U) Item 7.2: External Auditor. Similarly, at U.S. 
request, the EC deferred action on a TS Note on the status of 
implementation of the recommendations of the External Auditor 
so that consultations could be held. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Item Eight:  Establishment of an OPCW Office in Africa 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶41. (U) Items 8.1 and 8.2: The EC was briefed by facilitator 
Andres Rugeles Pineda (Colombia), who was thanked for his 
service as he is to depart The Hague. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Item Nine:  Administrative and financial matters 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶42. (U) Item 9.1: OPCW Income and expenditure for 2006.  The 
EC noted the report. 
 
¶43. (U) Item 9.2: Transfer of funds in 2006.  The EC noted 
the DG's note on the transfer of funds in 2006. 
 
¶44. (U) Item 9.3: Adjustment of the DG's gross salary.  The 
EC adopted a decision adjusting the DG's salary so that it is 
in line with UN salaries at the same rank. 
 
¶45. (U) Item 9.4: Proposed alignment of OPCW Staff Regulation 
3.2(a) with the corresponding UN Staff Regulation. At the 
request of the U.S., the EC deferred action until EC-49.  Del 
rep emphasized the request for a TS assessment of financial 
impact of this change. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Item Ten:  Privileges and Immunities 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶46. (U) The EC concluded the agreement between the OPCW and 
Chile on privileges and immunities.  Del rep made the 
statement per Washington guidance. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Item Eleven:  Chairperson and Vice-Chairpersons 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶47. (U) The EC elected Ambassador Romeo A. Arguelles (the 
Philippines - Asian Group) as the Chairman of the EC for the 
term 12 May 2007 to 11 May 2008.  Representatives from the 
following SPs were elected as Vice-Chairs for the same 
period:  Algeria (Africa), Chile (GRULAC), Ireland (WEOG), 
and Russia (Eastern Europe). 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Agenda Item Twelve:  Any Other Business 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶48. (U) Items 12.1-12.4: Chlorine attacks in Iraq.  Amb. 
Javits recalled the remarks in his statement on the 
importance of having the EC include report language 
condemning the terrorist attacks in Iraq using chlorine gas. 
Iran was strongly supportive of such language, and provided 
additional text. 
 
¶49. (U) Item 12.5: Composition of Committee on Relations with 
Host Country. The committee members are the EC Chair, host 
country rep Amb. Lak, DG Pfirter and two members from each 
regional group:  Africa - Algeria and South Africa, Asia - 
Iran and Pakistan, Eastern Europe - Croatia and Russia, 
GRULAC - Guatemala and Mexico, and WEOG - Switzerland and the 
U.S. 
 
¶50. (U) Item 12.6: Composition of ABAF.  The EC approved the 
following changes -- Takayuki Kitagawa vice Chiho Komuro, 
Donggy Lee vice Jae-woong Lee, Ali Reza Haizadeh vice Hadi 
Farajvand and Emily Spencer has resigned. 
 
--------------------- 
DESTRUCTION INFORMALS 
--------------------- 
 
¶51. (U) The TS provided their usual briefings on verification 
activities and declaration related information.  When 
briefing on destruction progress at Maradykovsky, the TS 
confirmed that the composition of the reaction mass was less 
than 0.1% VX, and that the reaction mass was awaiting thermal 
treatment. The TS reported that more than 85% of the bombs 
have been pre-treated, and about 28% have been drained. The 
TS did not/not include the pre-treated munitions or the 
 
SIPDIS 
drained reaction mass in its assessment of total destruction, 
which they reported as being about 10%. Russia, of course, 
continues to assert that it has destroyed more than 17%, and 
that by 26 April 2007 will have completed destruction of 
8,553.4 MT of Category I agent. Russia reported that 
construction is underway for the second train to process 
liquids such as the reaction masses. 
 
¶52. (U) Germany, while commending Russia on its significant 
progress in destruction, commented on the discrepancy between 
the TS and the Russian numbers for completed destruction. The 
U.S. agreed with Germany's statement, and noted that the 
numbers given by Russia are not consistent with its 
understanding of treaty requirements. The U.S. also pointed 
out that it is not claiming complete destruction until the 
second phase is complete, i.e., the reaction mass is 
destroyed. The U.S. also commented that it would like to view 
the (overdue) facility agreement and verification plan. 
 
¶53. (U) Russia responded by saying that Russia's methods 
fully comply with the text of the CWC, as there is no 
paragraph stating that destruction is only complete when the 
reaction mass is destroyed. Russia commented that the DG 
report on progress of destruction has contradictions which 
demonstrate unequal treatment of destruction in different 
SPs, and that the same standards applied for Russia should be 
applied to the facilities at Aberdeen and Newport.  (Note: 
Russia was referring to a difference in terms applied to the 
neutralized VX in both SPs. In the portion of the report 
referring to Russian destruction, the report refers to the 
neutralized agent simply as "reaction mass", while in the 
U.S. portion it calls the agent "neutralized".). 
 
¶54. (U) India reported that it has destroyed 80% of its 
stockpile, and plans to destroy 12% more during its next 
campaign, which will be from 15 July 07 through 15 March 08. 
 
¶55. (U) Albania reported that it had destroyed 20% of 
Category I and 73% of Category II as of 12 March. At the 
destruction informals, Albania informed the delegations that 
it intended to submit a request to extend the 45% and 100% 
deadlines to 1 Dec. to the EC, so as to avoid having the CSP 
approve the extension request retroactively. However, because 
the reasoning behind this choice of dates was not clearly 
articulated, this generated immediate confusion and comments 
 
from other delegations. Russia asked for more detail on the 
operational problems encountered, and wondered why 1 Dec. was 
necessary when Albania has shown that it will actually 
destroy the stockpile much more quickly than that. Russia 
also wondered if it was possible to request an extension on a 
final deadline when the deadline for requesting such an 
extension (i.e., April 2006) has already passed. 
 
¶56. (U) In an attempt to assist the Albanian rep, whose 
command of the English language is a bit shaky, the U.S. 
responded to clarify that Albania had not anticipated these 
issues, even up to the CSP.  It therefore could not possibly 
have made the request by April 2006.  The 1 Dec. deadline was 
just to address legal concerns and provide room for any 
further issues that might be encountered. Russia reiterated 
that the CWC is clear and nothing can be done.  SPs must 
follow the CWC, and legal terms must be fulfilled. 
 
¶57.  (U) Iran agreed with Russia's request for more 
information, and also requested a TS assessment of Albania 
and those helping Albania.  Iran also asked about the last TS 
visit to the site before the CSP, and whether it assessed 
then if Albania would make its deadlines. The DG stepped in 
and responded that these problems arose after the CSP and 
could not possibly have been predicted in advance of the CSP, 
as the problems were connected to the equipment. 
 
¶58. (U) A State Party announced that it had destroyed 83% as 
of 11 March, and will be able to destroy 99.8% (not clear why 
they cannot get this last 0.2% in) by 28 April 2008.  It 
therefore will be able to meet their 100% deadline. 
 
¶59. (U) China and Japan conducted their usual dance, as China 
announced that Japan excavated 97 ACWs in Guandong province. 
However, it was a very difficult and inconvenient operation, 
as over 500 people had to be evacuated, and fishing boats had 
to be moved, etc. China reported that Japan has fulfilled its 
requirements as an abandoner, but has been slow on 
destruction efforts. Japan reported that it hopes to soon 
begin construction of a destruction facility, and that while 
the operation to recover the ACWs from the riverbed in 
Guandong province (which required blocking the flow of the 
river, and thus moving the fishing boats) was indeed the most 
difficult operation, it had gone smoothly. 
 
¶60. (U) Italy reported on the difficulties it had encountered 
with its OCW, and announced that it was submitting a draft 
decision for a request to extend the destruction deadline to 
¶2012. 
 
¶61. (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL