VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDG #0668/01 0822018
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 232018Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7769
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1644
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0745
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 4530
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY 1780
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0019
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/CUSTOMS CARIBBEAN ATTACHE MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEFHLC/HQS DHS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMISTA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SANTO DOMINGO 000668 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR WHA DAS DUDDY, WHA/CAR NICHOLS AND 
SEARBY, INL/LP AARIAS; DEPT PASS DEA FOR APLACIDO; PASS 
ONDCP FOR PATRICK WARD; SOUTHCOM FOR JIATF SOUTH, ALSO FOR 
POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL SNAR KCRM CO HA VE TD DR
SUBJECT: FURTHER ON REGIONAL DRUGS SUMMIT AND CALLS FOR 
INCREASED U.S. SUPPORT IN CARIBBEAN 
 
REF: A. SANTO DOMINGO 0355 
 
     ¶B. SANTO DOMINGO 0597 
 
¶1. (U) Following is an amplified version of Santo Domingo 597 
with addition of U.S. and Dominican positions, new text in 
paras. 10 and 11, and comment. 
 
¶2. (U) Summary.  On March 16, OAS Secretary General Insulza, 
President Preval of Haiti, President Uribe of Colombia, and 
Prime Minister Manning of Trinidad and Tobago joined 
Dominican President Fernandez to sign a non-binding 
declaration on measures to counter threats posed by the 
trafficking of drugs through the Caribbean corridor.  Though 
the declaration carefully avoided specific reference to the 
United States, Preval and Manning used the summit to 
criticize the United States bluntly for a perceived reduction 
of aid in the fight against narcotrafficking.  Fernandez, 
too, noted a perceived reduction in aid, while President 
Uribe stood out as strong supporter of U.S. efforts in the 
region and a critic of European resistance to aerial 
spraying. Representatives from the United Nations, the 
Organization of American States, the European Union 
(Germany), Venezuela, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and the 
United States were invited attendees.  End Summary. 
 
------------------ 
Summit Declaration 
------------------ 
 
-- Academics criticize the United States 
 
¶3. (SBU) While the declaration drafting process began on 
March 13, it was underpinned by the March 12 presentations of 
eight academics and experts speaking in their individual 
capacities.  By and large, this group proved critical of the 
United States.  Typically, presenters noted the United States 
to be the source of demand driving the drug trade, suggested 
the USG was inappropriately fixated on interdiction and 
supply reduction, and claimed that the USG was reducing the 
amounts of counter-narcotics assistance (including funds for 
U.S. demand reduction) in order to fund U.S. military 
commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Particularly noteworthy 
for his criticism was University of Miami Professor Bruce 
Bagley, a recognized expert in international narcotics 
trafficking.  Bagley has been examining the 
Colombia-Dominican Republic drug nexus since at least 1998. 
 
-- Declaration drafts 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Haitian technical delegation headed by National 
Security Minister Martin Joseph submitted a moderately worded 
draft the morning of the 13th, which was set aside.  The 
subsequently submitted Dominican draft declaration 
(Spanish-language text only) was examined by drafters. 
Participating vigorously in the drafting process were 
representatives from the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Venezuela, Columbia, the United States, and the OAS 
Inter-American Drug Control Commission (CICAD), as well as 
independent expert Diana Pardo of contracted organizing 
entity Newlink Political Consulting and Research.  Also 
present during negotiations were representatives from 
CARICOM, France, and MINUSTAH. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Bagley presentation influenced the initial 
Dominican draft, which focused on the reduction of bilateral 
aid to the region, as well as the issue of demand.  While all 
delegations ultimately proved flexible in finding consensus 
on declaration language, the Haitian delegation was notable 
for its initial insistence on the inclusion of language 
regarding the reduction of bilateral aid.  The Dominicans, in 
turn, were slow to come off their initial language suggesting 
the need for "state of the art" technology, specifically 
radars and wiretapping equipment.  Last-minute delays were 
 
caused by Colombia's attempt to rephrase the entire 
trafficking issue as a "global drug problem," given their 
representatives' concern that draft language targeting 
"trafficking" was implicitly directed at Colombia.  Organizer 
Pardo was resistant to the inclusion of language regarding 
supply reduction.  Notably, Venezuelan representatives were 
generally non-political and cooperative, with the U.S. and 
Venezuelan delegations mutually reinforcing many of each 
others' points.  (Note:  This cooperation is encouraging for 
future regional events -- even though the Venezuelan 
delegation spoke privately of a hoped-for future regional 
drugs summit involving President Chavez.)  Interestingly, 
Venezuelan negotiators acknowledged the transit of narcotics 
aircraft through their airspace, but attributed this to 
Venezuela's lack of technical means (i.e., radar) and pledged 
future improvement. 
 
--------------- 
Summit Speeches 
--------------- 
 
-- United States 
 
¶6. (U) In his speech WHA/DAS Patrick Duddy touched delicately 
on Venezuela's place in the trafficking chain with a 
reference to traffickers' "use of small airplanes from the 
northern coast of South America," information that had been 
shared "with the governments of Venezuela, Haiti, and the 
Dominican Republic."  The majority of Duddy's remarks, 
however, dealt with an analysis of the regional drug trade, 
as well as U.S. efforts to disrupt supply and to reduce 
demand. 
 
¶7. (U) Duddy characterized the issue of narcotics as an 
"intertwined problem of demand...and supply" and noted both 
the stabilization of U.S. demand and the expansion of 
European markets.  As evidence of U.S. efforts to counter 
domestic demand, Duddy relayed statistics of a 23 percent 
decline of U.S. teen drug use since 2001, a figure closely 
approaching President Bush's goal of a 25 percent reduction 
of youth drug use by 2006.  As suggested by ONDCP Director 
John Walters and referenced by Duddy, teen drug use is a 
important marker -- it often predicts adult drug use. 
 
¶8. (U) In terms of movement of drugs through the region, 
Duddy noted a probable direct correlation between the success 
of Colombian and Jamaican interdiction and enforcement 
operations, on one hand, and the increased amount of drugs 
transiting Hispaniola, on the other.  This suggested for 
Duddy that "the only viable recourse is to tighten even 
further the cooperation and coordination between our 
governments and law enforcement institutions, both 
bilaterally and through multilateral organizations." 
Speaking of Operation Rum Punch (REF A), though giving it 
that name, Duddy noted the participation of multiple U.S. 
agencies in the interdiction of drug flights to Hispaniola. 
He further mentioned contributions to Haitian police training 
and Coast Guard reform estimated at USD 40 million since 
2004, as well as contributions to MINUSTAH UNPOL.  Speaking 
of U.S. assistance to the Dominican Republic, Duddy declared 
support for Fernandez' police reform initiative to be "the 
single most important element of U.S. aid to law enforcement" 
in the Republic. 
 
¶9. (U) Duddy raised the issue of supply and cultivation in 
regard to successes achieved by intensive aerial spraying 
under Plan Colombia, which Duddy called "an increasingly 
effective tool when coupled with increased economic 
development, expansion of the rule of law, and effective 
actions against narco-terrorist groups." 
 
-- Venezuela 
 
¶10. (SBU) The public remarks of Venezuelan Drug Czar Nestor 
Luis Reverol Torres reprised the non-confrontational approach 
taken by the Venezuelan technical delegation.  Using a 
PowerPoint presentation, Reverol stressed expected future 
improvements in Venezuelan interdiction, largely through the 
introduction of new coastal radar systems. special maritime 
interdiction units, and interceptor aircraft, while stressing 
existing efforts to screen cargo at Venezuelan ports.  He did 
not once mention the United States. 
 
-- Prime Minister Manning 
 
¶11. (U) Manning took rather the opposite tact in his remarks, 
pointedly criticizing the United States directly for 
"abandoning the eastern Caribbean." He declared Trinidad and 
Tobago to be in particular need of external funds, as it is 
"willing but unable to patrol its territory," given a poor 
financial situation caused by a "loss of preferential market 
access and changing patterns in trade."  Calling himself a 
"voice in the wilderness," he said that U.S. policy in the 
region does not support U.S. rhetoric that the eastern 
Caribbean is the "third frontier" in the fight against 
narcotics.  In specific support of this contention he cited 
the recent trip of President Bush to Latin America -- and 
said "the fact that the President did not visit a single 
Caribbean country forces us to pose the issue of how we are 
seen."  Manning also noted the country's supply of 
significant amounts of liquefied natural gas, ammonia, and 
methanol to the United States, with little U.S. reciprocity 
in terms either of attention or of funds. 
 
-- President Preval 
 
¶12. (U) Preval began his remarks by quoting from sections of 
the latest USG report on narcotics (INSCR) regarding Haiti, 
to the effect that "Haiti is a privileged land for 
traffickers" and a "weak state."  This led to a plea to the 
Haitian people for peace, as "political violence breeds 
impunity."  Unlike Manning, Preval continued by stressing the 
regional responsibility for increased cooperation and the 
need for governments to improve education systems, youth 
prevention programs, and opportunities for civic 
participation. 
 
¶13. (U) Preval highlighted his suggestion of a greater role 
for the United States as a "larger consumer country."  Preval 
insisted that the United States must mobilize additional 
resources to attack demand (termed as "consumer networks") 
within its own territory.  He further called on the World 
Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, the European Union, 
and the United States for increased direct assistance, and he 
asked U.S. religious communities and human rights 
organizations to motivate the U.S. government toward action. 
His final call was for all to "work together without 
hypocrisy" and "without accusing each other." 
 
-- President Uribe 
 
14  (U) Speaking forcefully and extemporaneously for roughly 
thirty minutes, Uribe repeatedly expressed Colombia's "will 
to beat illicit drugs in all their dimensions."  He spoke at 
length and favorably regarding aerial spraying, noting "what 
is dangerous is not the scientific protocol of spraying 
itself, but rather the exploitation of the jungle to plant 
drugs (illicit crops) and the chemical precursors used in 
processing." 
 
¶15. (U) In speaking on spraying, Uribe referenced U.S. 
assistance, asked CICAD for additional studies to demonstrate 
the safety of spraying, confirmed that the Colombian people 
were not against the practice, and challenged the European 
Union to fund manual eradication, should they not be able to 
overcome their objections to aerial application of 
 
 
herbicides. He further challenged citizens of "sister 
nations" to come forward with claims regarding 
extra-territorial spraying, stating that "our decision is to 
eradicate drugs, not to have arguments with our neighbors." 
 
¶16. (U) Uribe's remarks strongly backed Plan Colombia and 
suggested that alternative development, while useful, is not 
a prerequisite for eradication operations, as "drugs cause a 
displacement of Colombians abroad that impoverishes the 
nation."  A first step must be the "democratic application of 
force" (alternately described as authority or coercion) which 
he finds "necessary to get the people accustomed to drug 
trafficking to stop." 
 
¶17. (U) Part of this democratic application appears to be the 
air bridge denial program, which he commended and suggested 
be expanded throughout the region.  Another part would be the 
criminalization of narcotics possession, which he intends to 
submit to the Colombian legislature as a proposed 
constitutional reform.  A further component is the frequent 
use of the extradition process, which he asserts the 
Colombian people do not reject (as opposed to drug 
traffickers whom he directly calls "terrorists.") 
 
¶18. (U) For Uribe, the best application of force is 
coordinated.  Accordingly, he calls on the United States to 
coordinate interdiction activities with both Colombia and 
Venezuela and calls on the OAS to help prepare an 
inter-American convention dealing with interdiction. 
 
¶19. (U) Again reiterating Colombia's commitment to eradicate 
narcotics trafficking, Uribe concluded with an outright 
rejection of legalization, using an ecological argument ("Who 
can guarantee that they won't cut down the entire Amazon 
jungle?"), before promising to share whatever Colombian 
resources possible with the region in the fight against drugs. 
 
¶20. (U) Uribe's remarks brought a partial standing ovation 
and were so well received that both Manning and Fernandez 
rose from their seats to shake Uribe's hand. 
 
-- President Fernandez 
 
¶21. (U) Fernandez' remarks were made at the beginning of the 
Summit. Though brief and introductory, they effectively 
"split the baby" by noting U.S. commitment to the 
counternarcotics fight since the early 1980s, but also 
faulting the United States for a reduction in resources 
dedicated following the attacks of September 11.  This 
reduction, as detailed by Bagley, alarms Fernandez; Fernandez 
sees that there has been a significant increase in both 
narcotics use and narcotics-related crimes in the region 
during the last five years.  His solution, proposed in brief 
remarks at the close of the session, was for increased 
regional cooperation and coordination and for the 
international community to make aircraft, ships, radars, and 
other assets available to Caribbean nations through mid- to 
long-term lease or purchase arrangements. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) The general demands of Caribbean governments for 
increased external support in the war against drugs, were not 
new, but they appeared to increase in pitch paralleling the 
increase in criminality in the region.  This summit was 
clearly born out of that demand and, likewise, from the 
desire to cast domestic failings as the responsibility of 
outside entities.  The demand for external support does not 
take into account a critical "ground truth" - the United 
States already provides significant amounts of assistance to 
the region on a continuing basis.  But for the presentations 
 
made by Colombia and the United States, the ultimate message 
of this summit could well have been an incorrect one -- that 
the lack of U.S. interest and support permits the growth of 
narcotics trafficking and crime.  The summit spin reminds us 
that just providing the technical and financial assistance to 
the region is not enough.  Public diplomacy must accompany 
it. The United States must make frequent and public 
reassurances of commitment to the region, an important part 
of which will necessarily involve high-level participation in 
regional summits, as well as visits by prominent persons when 
possible. 
 
¶23. (U) The final text of the official summit declaration in 
English, Spanish, and French has been transmitted 
electronically to WHA/CAR. 
 
¶24. (U)  Drafted by Michael Garuckis. 
HERTELL