Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07QUITO622, Bank Holiday Rumors Provoke Nervousness and Presidential

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07QUITO622.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07QUITO622 2007-03-15 22:15 2011-05-02 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Quito
VZCZCXYZ0014
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHQT #0622 0742215
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 152215Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6567
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6528
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2444
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 1506
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 2060
UNCLAS QUITO 000622 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/AND AND EB/OMA 
TREASURY FOR STEPHEN GOOCH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON PGOV EC
SUBJECT:  Bank Holiday Rumors Provoke Nervousness and Presidential 
Rebuttal 
 
Ref:  A) Quito 587, B) Quito 556, C) Quito 554 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  An unfounded rumor that banks would be closed 
for a "bank holiday" circulated around Ecuador on March 13 and 14. 
According to banking contacts, many nervous clients called the banks 
to ask about the rumor, but actual withdrawals were minimal and not 
threatening to the banks.  President Correa made a special evening 
televised address to dismiss the rumor and assert that it was being 
spread by the political opposition.  Banking operations were 
reportedly normal the morning of March 15.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Consulate Guayaquil first heard of rumors on Tuesday, 
March 13 from a range of contacts in Guayaquil that there would be a 
"bank holiday" in Ecuador.  Since many Ecuadorians had lost money 
during a "bank holiday" provoked by the 1999 banking crisis, these 
contacts had withdrawn funds from their banks.  Subsequent 
conversations with Quito-based banks also support the view that the 
rumors about a bank holiday originated in Guayaquil. 
 
3.  (SBU) On Wednesday, March 14 the rumor had become more 
widespread.  Most of the banks we contacted confirmed that they had 
received numerous calls from clients who were nervous about rumors 
of a bank holiday or changes in banking regulations.  The banks said 
that they told their customers that Ecuadorian law prohibits any 
government official from declaring a bank holiday. 
 
4.  (SBU) The banks we contacted reported that on Wednesday there 
had been some withdrawals, but the magnitude of the withdrawals was 
small and did not put any pressure on their banks.  One contact said 
that interbank clearing data from Wednesday evening did not show any 
danger signals for the system as a whole or any individual banks, 
and that sector-wide liquidity was three times that which is 
"necessary."  As of Thursday morning, one contact said that his bank 
was not seeing any signs of nervousness; this was reaffirmed by 
contacts at the banking association. 
 
5.  (U) The rumors did take on sufficient force, however, that 
President Correa made a public statement on March 14 denying that 
there would be a bank holiday.  Correa also asserted that the rumors 
had been started by the political opposition, namely members of 
congress whose political rights were stripped by the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal (reftels) and fanned through the use of anonymous 
call centers.  Correa also said that the economy is in "excellent 
health," and the most prosperous part of the economy is the banking 
sector which enjoyed record profits.  Minister of Economy Ricardo 
Patino also issued a statement on March 14 that there would not be a 
bank holiday and appeared on morning TV programs on March 15 
reiterating the same message. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (SBU) We believe that the rumors were unfounded.  It is possible 
that the rumors were promulgated by some group that is opposed to 
the Correa administration, but we do not know if there are any 
grounds for Correa's assertion that the defrocked members of 
congress are behind them. 
 
7.  (SBU) While the broad banking system is sound, particularly the 
larger banks which have ample liquid off-shore assets, the rumors 
spread rapidly through a populace ready to believe there could be a 
banking crisis.  Not only did Ecuador suffer a recent banking 
crisis, but in the last two months there has been nervousness about 
the direction of Correa's economic policies.  There was a notable 
drop in demand deposits in the second half of February, although 
deposits largely recovered in March.  Even so, four smaller banks 
have suffered a more pronounced fall in demand deposits - between 12 
to 20 percent, according to data through March 2 (before the rumors 
spread) - and these banks would be particularly vulnerable to 
additional nervousness.  We believe the banking system is 
sufficiently strong that it will survive the closure of one or two 
small banks, but if several small banks failed simultaneously it 
could put pressure on the larger, healthier banks. 
 
7.  (SBU) That so many people were spooked by an unfounded rumor 
will hopefully alert the Correa administration to the importance of 
public confidence in the banking sector and temper the government's 
inclination to impose stricter controls over the banks. 
 
Jewell