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DE RUEHPF #0491/01 0891018
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301018Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8261
INFO RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 0780

UNCLAS PHNOM PENH 000491 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/FO, EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID CB
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DAS JOHN'S APRIL 4-7 VISIT TO 
CAMBODIA 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Eric, your visit to Cambodia comes roughly just 
one month shy of a similar regional trip last year. 
Remarkably, in the intervening period, there have been no 
major bilateral problems and relations between our two 
countries have continued to grow.  Recent positive 
developments and signs of strong USG commitment to Cambodia 
include the opening of the Peace Corps office and arrival of 
PC volunteers earlier this year (you will attend the 
swearing-in ceremony on April 4), the Navy ship visit in 
February (the first in three decades), the first-ever TIFA 
bilateral talks also in February, the announcement that 
Congressional restrictions on USG assistance to Cambodia 
would be lifted in FY07, and a visiting U.S. business mission 
-- the first in recent memory -- that will coincide with your 
stay with us.  Your meeting schedule this time will be 
similar to last year's, with calls on both the Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister.  The PM will be prepared to discuss 
Burma with you; the MFA will likely raise APEC membership for 
Cambodia as well as Cambodia's desire for a UNSC seat in 2013 
-- both issues remain priorities for the RGC.  Nationwide 
Commune Council elections will have taken place before your 
arrival, and you will have the opportunity to discuss the 
preliminary results with a variety of actors.  The Khmer 
Rouge Tribunal is currently at an impasse over disagreements 
between the international judges and the Cambodian Bar 
Association over international defense lawyer fees and 
accreditation with the Bar Association; this issue may not be 
resolved by the time of your visit. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  While we have succeeded in promoting a broader 
bilateral relationship with the RGC over the past year, we 
have not made sufficient progress in moving the RGC towards 
the more politically risky reforms in the democracy and 
governance sector for which we and other donors have been 
pressing over the last decade.  Cambodia is also slipping on 
its trafficking in persons performance and our renewed and 
painstaking efforts to craft a productive 
military-to-military relationship will be imperiled if the 
RGC does not soon focus on our admonitions for improved 
vigilance and falls back to Tier 3.  Despite agreement in 
2006 with Washington negotiators from Treasury, State, and 
USDA on the outstanding bilateral debt owed to the United 
States, the RGC has yet to sign the proposed draft agreement. 
 The RGC has consistently failed to finalize and pass 
much-needed anti-corruption legislation nor is it clear that 
the RGC intends to incorporate suggested changes by donors 
that would ensure the law meets international standards. 
Other key pieces of legislation (anti-TIP, counterterrorism, 
money laundering, wholesale revisions of the criminal and 
civil codes) that have been repeatedly promised to the donors 
and Cambodian public have seen another year of continued RGC 
footdragging. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The US-Cambodian areas of traditional cooperation 
remain strong:  counterterrorism and intel-sharing, MIA 
recovery, Amcit pedophile cases, health (HIV/AIDS and avian 
influenza) and education.  The U.S. market for Cambodian 
textile exports is still a crucial part of Cambodia's 
economy, representing 70% of the country's exports in this 
key sector.  The U.S. component of the garment industry 
represents roughly one-third of the country's overall GDP and 
we are Cambodia's chief trading partner.  While we would also 
like to see more direct U.S. investment in the country, 
corruption and Cambodia's broken judicial system discourage 
many investors.  Chevron is involved in Cambodia's offshore 
oil/gas exploration efforts, with 2009/2010 foreseen as the 
beginning of serious exploitation of these resources.  OPIC 
provides assistance to a local bank for micro-financing 
projects and recently conducted a monitoring visit; there 
appears to be little Cambodian-American business interest in 
aiding the country's development at the moment. 
 
Cambodia as an International Actor 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  With the domestic political situation under the 
strong control of the PM's ruling party, Cambodia has begun 
looking outward and seeks a more visible role in 
international and regional affairs that is consistent with 
the country's limited resources and capacity.  The RGC has 
sent peacekeepers to Sudan (a company of de-miners); during 
the PM's visit to Australia, Hun Sen expressed RGC interest 
(but no commitment as yet) in a gendarme platoon role in East 
Timor.  Cambodia supported Guatemala's bid for the UNSC seat 
in 2006 and as a result of strong Japanese pressure, Cambodia 
has agreed to support a human rights resolution against North 
Korea at the UN. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  On Burma, the PM has taken a more critical public 
 
stance over the regime's intransigence to democratic reforms. 
 The Cambodian National Assembly in July 2006 inaugurated a 
Burma Caucus that included representatives from all three 
parties.  The participation (and blessing) of the ruling CPP 
was instrumental in the launch of the Caucus; previously, the 
PM and National Assembly Chairman Heng Samrin were reticent 
about being too forward leaning on Burma.  Since its 
inauguration, however, the Burma Caucus has been largely 
inactive.  Moreover, the Cambodian government did not back 
the U.S. position during late 2006 in the UN Third Committee 
on the human rights situation in Burma.  RGC officials 
explained that Cambodia, similar to the position taken by 
most other ASEAN countries, wanted to give Burma one last 
chance to respond to the concerns of the international 
community.  A senior MFA official noted that Cambodia needed 
to maintain a "flexible" position on Burma.  During PDAS 
Stephens' January 2007 meeting with the PM, Hun Sen allowed 
that he planned to visit Burma at the regime's invitation in 
spring or early summer, and offered to incorporate USG views 
in his discussions.  Your meeting with the PM will be an 
opportunity to compare notes on the PM's plans; we have 
provided a briefing paper outlining the USG position on human 
rights and democracy in Burma. 
 
Keeping Political Space Open, Human Rights Are Priorities 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The level of political violence in Cambodia has 
fallen since the early 1990s, but there remain serious 
concerns regarding human rights and democratization.  Like 
other countries in the region, Cambodia's leaders have used 
its weak and easily influenced judiciary to pursue legal 
cases against critics and the political opposition.  While 
criminal defamation is no longer a viable weapon for 
silencing dissent, other legal provisions concerning 
disinformation and incitement remain on the books and have 
been used in the past year against journalists and others the 
government has wished to silence.  The PM has had a very 
public falling out with the UNSYG's Special Rapporteur for 
Human Rights for Cambodia, Kenyan constitutional lawyer Yash 
Ghai, due to what the PM considers as unduly harsh criticism 
of the human rights situation in Cambodia.  The PM also 
suggested that the UN close its local human rights office. 
In addition to meetings with NGOs, you will have separate 
meetings with opposition leader Sam Rainsy and newly 
announced political leader Kem Sokha (former human rights 
leader jailed in December 2005 and then released on January 
17) about prospects for democracy in Cambodia. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The U.S. and other international observers from 
diplomatic missions will monitor the local commune council 
elections on April 1; preliminary results should be available 
at the time of your visit.  While some diplomats have 
dismissed the commune elections as unimportant, commune 
councilors indirectly select the country's village chiefs as 
well as the members of the Senate.  The April 1 elections are 
also widely viewed by the political parties as a predictor of 
how voters will cast their ballots in next year's national 
elections in July 2008.  Cambodia's previous three national 
elections have shown improvement during each five-year cycle, 
with diminishing levels of political violence, but 
intimidation and vote-buying continue to be problematic. 
Media coverage is limited to the ruling party and there are 
no campaign finance restrictions.  Prince Norodom Ranariddh's 
October 2006 ouster from the FUNCINPEC party, his creation of 
a new party (and its success in fielding commune candidates 
for the majority of the country's 1,621 communes in the space 
of a few months, and absence from the country due to 
politically motivated lawsuits have marred the April 1 
elections.  The PM and the CPP remain intent on driving 
members of the royal family from politics, and are likely to 
propose legislation prior to the 2008 elections that bars 
royals from politics. 
 
Corruption Remains Endemic 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  In 2006, Transparency International ranked 
Cambodia 151 out of 163 countries in its corruption 
perceptions index; Burma was the only country in Asia ranked 
lower than Cambodia.  There has been continued and widespread 
land grabbing by government officials and the politically 
well-connected.  Uprooted communities from outside Phnom Penh 
trying to seek government redress are often prevented from 
traveling to the city to draw media and public attention to 
their plights.  Enactment of an anti-corruption law has 
dragged on for years, with the government showing little 
inclination to adopt legislation that would lead to strong 
enforcement.  This failure, along with a corrupt and 
 
politicized judiciary, has prevented Cambodia from attracting 
foreign direct investment.  Cambodia's competitiveness 
ranking (103 out of 125 in 2006) is also one of the lowest in 
the world, again due largely to perceived systemic 
corruption.  Rather than embrace the reforms that would 
garner increased investment and the new jobs that would be 
created, the RGC appears to be banking on the future income 
from its as-yet-untapped oil and gas reserves, which should 
come on stream after 2009.  Donors are concerned that the 
current corrupt political environment will lead to misuse of 
future revenues that are badly needed to reduce poverty in 
the country, and you will have an opportunity to hear views 
from the leading IFI representatives in Cambodia on the 
oil/gas issue. 
 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal Impasse 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  The Khmer Rouge Tribunal, formally known as the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), has 
obtained funding from UN member nations, and was poised to 
begin to issue indictments beginning in December 2006. 
However, the ECCC's Cambodian and international judges have 
had difficulties since a disastrous plenary session in 
November 2006 in agreeing on internal rules governing the 
Tribunal's functions and authorities.  Meanwhile, the 
potential defendants continue to age, with one, Ta Mok, 
having died in the past year. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  In January 2006, the ECCC's internal rules review 
committee (comprised of international and Cambodian judges) 
agreed on most outstanding differences regarding the draft 
rules, and a second successful meeting on March 16 suggested 
that all points of controversy had been resolved. 
Nevertheless, the international judges announced in March 
that they would not agree to a plenary to adopt the draft 
rules unless the CBA agreed to rescind its suggested (and 
exorbitant) fee schedule for foreign defense counsel, 
claiming that few international lawyers would agree to pay 
the high rates thereby lowering the pool of available defense 
counsel and undermining defendant's right to competent 
counsel.  In addition, a potential scandal hangs over the 
Tribunal amidst accusations of corruption and kickbacks on 
the Cambodian side.  The international monitoring NGO, the 
Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), broke the story in 
February in referencing an ongoing UNDP audit, and created a 
firestorm of controversy within the court and with the 
Cambodian government.  RGC threats that the government might 
eject the NGO from Cambodia appear to be on the wane, but 
donors and international judges have indicated that any RGC 
interference with the NGO's monitoring role could be a 
violation of the UN/RGC agreement establishing the Tribunal. 
MUSSOMELI