VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPF #0429/01 0750942
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160942Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8205
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0154
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2270
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0404
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0546
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0565
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3140
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2223

C O N F I D E N T I A L PHNOM PENH 000429 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS AND S/WCI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017 
TAGS: PHUM KJUS PREL EAID CB
SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF THE ECCC OR RGC? 
 
REF: PHNOM PENH 422 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Margaret McKean; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  The main donor coordinating body for 
Cambodia's Khmer Rouge Tribunal, the Friends of the ECCC, has 
proven an effective information-sharing group for reviewing 
ECCC progress and donor activities in support of the 
Tribunal's work.  The ECCC's problems since the November 2006 
plenary and issues related to RGC interference, however, have 
highlighted the inadequacy of the mechanism, as presently 
organized by the French and Japanese Embassies.  Both 
missions have shown no willingness to discuss contentious 
issues surrounding court management, the rules debate, 
funding inadequacies, let alone the allegations of corruption 
hanging over the court.  Engaging Japan and France is the 
only way to get their attention.  Some like-minded diplomatic 
missions in Cambodia are willing to request their capitals 
send demarche cables to Tokyo and Paris, and possibly join 
with the U.S. in expressing concern over the lack of donor 
coordination on serious issues related to the ECCC.  End 
Summary. 
 
ECCC Coordination and Limitations of the Friends 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The Friends of the ECCC group of interested states 
was proposed by DPM Sok An at the May 10, 2006 briefing to 
donors as a mechanism for providing advice and support to the 
ECCC.  DPM Sok An also asked that the French and Japanese 
missions consider playing a coordinating role in enlisting 
donors to support such a mechanism.  At a subsequent planning 
meeting by donors, the group decided that Embassy 
representatives at the meetings would be DCMs or officials 
handling the ECCC portfolio.  The notion of Ambassador-level 
meetings was floated but remained a nebulous concept.  The 
group determined that it should avoid infringing on the 
independence of the Tribunal and therefore not debate many of 
the legal issues that would be handled by the court.  That 
was the job of the judges, and the Friends group should focus 
primarily on the working of the court, the administration and 
finances, and whether the court is fulfilling its goal of 
functioning as a model of legal reform for Cambodia. 
Diplomats welcomed the French and Japanese offers to act as 
co-coordinators, with meetings to be held every other month 
and hosted on a rotating basis by the two missions.  At every 
meeting, ECCC staff provide an update of the progress of the 
court, and donors announce various projects in support of 
ECCC activities, particularly those organized by NGOs that 
fall outside the ECCC's management.  As the court began to 
operate in July 2006 and nothing controversial was going on, 
the Friends meetings functioned well. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Since the disastrous November 2006 plenary 
session, however, the Friends meetings have been less useful 
in determining what has been happening with the ECCC and the 
role of donors/interested states.  The two meetings that have 
been held since then provided little opportunity for frank 
discussion as to the differences between the international 
and Cambodian judges over the draft internal rules.  During 
the week-long November plenary, neither the French nor the 
Japanese contacted other missions regarding the threat by the 
international judges to suggest to the UN that support to the 
ECCC be halted.  The Japanese mission, when contacted by us, 
indicated that their Ambassador would try to schedule a 
meeting with DPM Sok An, but a meeting reportedly did not 
take place until the week following the plenary; no formal 
readout was given to other missions. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  During the review committee meeting in January, 
ECCC senior staff recognized at the outset of the meeting 
that the process was off to a poor start.  Fearful of a 
repeat of the November plenary, they contacted OSJI and asked 
if the NGO would fund a trip for former U.S. Ambassador at 
large for War Crimes, David Scheffer, who had a personal 
history with DPM Sok An and was considered a valued 
interlocutor by the RGC and strong proponent of the ECCC. 
OSJI complied, and Scheffer's negotiation with DPM Sok An on 
the most contentious points was largely credited for the 
success that was achieved at that session. 
 
¶5.  (C)  In the meantime, a number of other issues have 
plagued the court:  poor staff morale as a result of the 
delays, inadequate finances, complaints about the UN 
administration of the court, alleged political interference, 
and, most recently, the flap over OSJI and revelations 
regarding corruption allegations at the ECCC.  None of these 
issues has been discussed at the Friends meetings, due to 
presence of ECCC staff throughout the meetings.  Trying to 
engage the Japanese and the French to hold ad hoc meetings 
outside the normal Friends schedule does not work.  OSJI 
organized a briefing in January for a small group of donors 
to discuss in more detail the legal issues with the draft 
rules separating the two sides; we organized a briefing by 
David Scheffer with the same small group so that he could 
discuss his meeting with ECCC officials regarding OSJI 
(reftel).  The Canadian Ambassador recently invited us, the 
UK and German DCMs to a meeting to discuss the limitations of 
the current Friends mechanism.  The Australian Embassy is 
interested in some changes to the existing format, but also 
does not support joint diplomatic engagement. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The next Friends meeting will be March 20 
following the conclusion of the latest review committee 
meeting that ends on March 16.  We are proposing that the 
group discuss modifications to the Friends mechanism that 
will provide opportunities for frank exchanges among donors 
as well as allow the group to be a more proactive vehicle for 
addressing issues that could threaten the ECCC's existence 
(.i.e., possible violation of the 2004 UN/RGC agreement that 
could lead to withdrawal of UN support under Article 28) or 
its credibility.  ECCC judges and staff have noted that the 
donors and interested states would be most effective if they 
could speak with a single voice. 
 
How the French and Japanese View Their Role 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  The French and Japanese positions are fairly 
consistent:  the Friends should not play an activist role; 
individual missions -- if they are so inclined -- can 
intervene with the ECCC or the government, but the Friends 
should not act in any collective diplomatic way.  We agree 
that, for the most part, it is up to the UN and Cambodian 
elements within the ECCC to sort out their internal problems 
and that donor intervention with the ECCC or the RGC should 
only be exercised under rare circumstances as noted in para. 
¶6.  Faced with two situations already where one could 
reasonably argue Ambassadors should have been called together 
to at least consider action, the French and Japanese 
demurred. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Moreover, we note that in the recent OSJI case, the 
Japanese Ambassador reportedly gave his blessing to RGC plans 
to move ahead and evict OSJI from Cambodia.  In a 
conversation with Pol/Econ Chief, the French DCM said that 
the ECCC did not need NGO observers and if OSJI left the 
country, it would not make much difference.  Given that some 
ECCC members as well as David Scheffer believe that an RGC 
decision to close the OSJI office could constitute a 
violation of the UN/RGC agreement, we are concerned that the 
two countries are focusing exclusively on the preservation of 
their bilateral relationship with the RGC in their 
discussions about the ECCC, and are not taking a more nuanced 
approach as co-chairs of the Friends. 
 
¶9.  (C)  The Japanese position is particularly sensitive due 
to the balancing act the GOJ plays with China in Cambodia. 
The Chinese, Sean Vissoth believes, are placing pressure on 
the government with respect to moving forward with the 
Tribunal.  The Japanese want the Tribunal to succeed at 
virtually any cost, and therefore will be loathe to put any 
pressure on the government that might make the RGC accord 
more sympathy to Chinese views.  Defending an NGO that 
publicly has criticized the RGC is anathema to our Japanese 
colleagues, but they do the RGC no favors by encouraging a 
position that may bring consequences from UN/New York without 
at least identifying that possibility to the government.  As 
co-chair of the Friends, we believe Japan and France have 
some measure of responsibility to engage with the government 
or the ECCC if exceptional circumstances warrant the waving 
of a red flag. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶10.  (C)  Absent a push from their respective capitals, the 
French or Japanese embassies in Phnom Penh will not be 
receptive to changing their views on the Friends mechanism 
and their roles as co-chairs.  We would welcome Washington 
views on the possibility of demarching both capitals, and 
would be willing to send suggested talking points to that 
end.  Both embassies will have a change of Ambassador in the 
coming weeks (the Japanese Ambassador is leaving in two 
weeks), so it would be timely to go in before the new 
Ambassadors arrive at post.  Several other missions in Phnom 
Penh have indicated a willingness to suggest joint demarches 
to their capitals.  End Comment. 
 
MUSSOMELI