VZCZCXRO5408
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0258/01 0851232
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261232Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5070
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000258 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: MEETING WITH AHMED DIRAIJ 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 0457 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) 
leader Ahmed Diraij shared his impressions of diplomatic 
moves and countermoves by Chad, Sudan and Eritrea relative to 
the Darfur conflict with the Ambassador March 21.  He 
expected continuing jockeying for position in the week ahead 
among rebel leaders Adam Bakheit, Sharif Hariri and Abdul 
Shafi.  If all went according to plan, Chad President Idriss 
Deby would meet shortly with Sudan rebels in Abeche and the 
SLM would declare its new leadership.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) leader 
Ahmed Diraij met with the Ambassador March 21 for a tour 
d,horizon of Diraij,s political career as an advocate for 
the Darfur region and his thoughts on the current leadership 
impasse among rebel groups.  Although Diraij emphasized that 
his movement did not advocate taking up arms to resolve the 
Darfur crisis, he counted himself among those which 
emphatically rejected the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). 
According to Diraij, the DPA was flawed because it did not 
end the marginalization of the Darfur region; it had 
certainly not created the conditions which would allow the 
over three million Sudanese IDPs in Sudan, and over 200,000 
Sudanese refugees in Chad to return to their homes.  Diraij 
stated that DPA had foundered because the agreement reached 
in Abuja was not consistent with the Declaration of 
Principles.  He argued for returning to the agenda that had 
been agreed upon by the Government of Chad and the rebels. 
Ultimately, the test of the success of any agreement would be 
the return of Sudanese refugees and IDPs to their homes. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Turning to the current diplomatic moves between 
Chad, Sudan and Eritrea, Diraij welcomed the fact that the 
international community now recognized that work was needed 
to bring negotiators back to the table.  The Eritreans had 
been given the nod by the Government of Sudan to mediate. 
(He commented that, for their part, the Eritreans were keen 
to improve their relations with the Government of Sudan, 
which was harboring Eritrean opposition movements).  The 
Eritreans had realized that they needed to bring Chad on 
board because of the movement,s connections with Chad. 
Concerning Libya,s role, the Tripoli meeting had been 
designed to first convince President Deby, then the rebel 
movements, and then to kick off the mediation 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Diraij said that the Sudanese rebels under the 
National Redemption Front (NRF) remain united, but there are 
internal divisions inside the Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SLM).  Diraij said he was &comfortable8 with the mission 
and the declaration of principles of the NRF. But agreements 
must be made to determine leadership and decide on a common 
message for a strong negotiating position.  To strengthen the 
position of the NRF, Diraij asked for USG and international 
assistance for communications support, such as radios and 
newspapers.  Sudanese rebel groups will wield more influence 
and a better bargaining position, Diraij said, if they had 
more military muscle.  He added, &If you want peace, prepare 
for war.8 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Diraij repeatedly emphasized the importance of the 
movements finding a common stand.  He stated that in his 
meetings with Government of National Unity (GNU) Vice 
President Salva Kiir in N,djamena, the latter had stressed 
to him the importance of unity.  The movements &trust him,8 
Diraij stated.  He said the SLM was currently in the field 
working on leadership issues.  Field commanders were to 
organize and decide on a new leader ) most likely Abdel 
Shafi.  But it turned out that there was a larger contest for 
the SLM's leadership ) it could in fact be that either Adam 
Bakheit, or Sharif Hariri could come out on top.  A meeting 
was projected for later in the week in Abeche and President 
Deby would be present.  In addition, Diraij informed the 
Ambassador of plans for a conference for Darfur leaders in 
the southern provincial capital of Juba (in question is the 
conference attendees and date, see reftel).  In addition, 
Eritrea wanted to bring the movements to Asmara for a meeting 
with EU negotiator Pekka Haavisto. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Diraij commented that Justice and Equality Leader 
Khalil Ibrahim was a &difficult8 person, and was 
embarrassing the Chadians by moving around Chad with large 
numbers of armed troops.  According to Diraij, Khalil Ibrahim 
did not agree to meet with Salva Kiir. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In conclusion, Diraij commented that Libya, Chad 
and Eritrea all had interests in the Darfur crisis, but at 
the same time, all wanted peace.  He commented that if these 
countries could be manipulated in the right way, peace would 
return - and - more importantly for the livelihoods of those 
 
NDJAMENA 00000258  002 OF 002 
 
 
in Darfur and in countries bordering Sudan (in particular, 
Eritrea), trade would be reestablished. 
 
Comment 
--------- 
¶8.  (SBU) Diraij's day to day involvement in the leadership 
struggles of the leading rebel movements is not clear.  He 
stated himself that he would like to be the "Nelson Mandela" 
of Darfur and had no leadership ambitions other than to 
assist Darfur escape its impoverished and marginalized state. 
 
 
¶9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
WALL