VZCZCXRO9640
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1396/01 0890655
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300655Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8767
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3922
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2328
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2015

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001396 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: KPRF: PEOPLE POLITICS THE KEY TO SUCCESS 
 
REF: MOSCOW 1067 
 
MOSCOW 00001396  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary:  The Communist Party of Russia's (KPRF) 
broad-based and somewhat unexpected success in the March 11 
regional elections (reftel), despite a minuscule campaign 
budget, is attributable to the survival of its party machine 
and a socialist message that resonates with voters.  Although 
likely to be increasingly pressed by For A Just Russia (SR -- 
the Kremlin's left wing party) and to a lesser extent the 
newly-populist Union of Right Forces (SPS), KPRF has become 
more appealing to voters disillusioned with United Russia's 
monopoly on power.  The KPRF's popularity is especially 
visible in cities, where United Russia's (YR) administrative 
resources are less effective.  Even if KPRF can capitalize on 
growing dissatisfaction, it has no chance to de-throne United 
Russia in the December Duma elections, but it may nibble at 
SR's numbers.  Although the KPRF improved its standing on 
March 11, that is unlikely to do much for party Chairman 
Gennadiy Zyuganov's third run at the presidency in 2008.  End 
summary. 
 
-------------------- 
KPRF's March Success 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Although estimates vary, it is clear that in the 
March 11 regional elections, the KPRF enjoyed a noticeable 
increase in support in almost all regions when compared to 
the 2003 Duma elections.  On March 11, KPRF averages 
increased to 15 - 20 percent across the fourteen regions from 
the 10 - 15 percent it received in 2003.  (KPRF's better 
numbers in March are partially explained by the traditionally 
lower turnout for the regional elections.  This is thought to 
work to the advantage of the KPRF, which is believed to have 
more disciplined voters.)  A campaign budget of just 25.4 
million RUR (USD 1 million) -- 24 times smaller than that of 
the Kremlin-sponsored United Russia party -- forced the KPRF 
to rely on disciplined regional deputies and central 
committees to get the KPRF message to the regions. As Orel's 
KPRF representative Vasiliy Ikonnikov underscored to us on 
March 15, KPRF's relative success was a tribute both to its 
superior organizational skills and a sign of people's 
unhappiness with YR's track record in areas such as housing 
services and pensions. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  KPRF leadership was particularly pleased with its 
success in cities.  In Omsk and Orel, the party snagged over 
thirty percent of the vote, while in the Komi Republic's 
second city, Ukhta, it polled 17 percent (2.5 times its 2003 
results).  All, according to Ukhta KPRF head and 
newly-elected legislator Anatoliy Ostroglazev, without the 
benefit of money and administrative resources.  While KPRF 
won just 24 percent of the vote to YR's thirty percent in 
Samara, it easily bested SR's sixteen percent to finish 
second.  KPRF Central Information Technology Center Head Ilya 
Ponomarev reported that the KPRF had done much better across 
the fourteen regions in cities, and less well in rural areas; 
a difference he sourced to the more effective use of 
"administrative resources" by Kremlin parties in the 
countryside.  Mercator Group Director Dmitriy Oreshkin 
concurred that the less manageable cities had blunted United 
Russia's edge in administrative resources. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  SR International Department Director Mikhail 
Demurin told us that he had been "very impressed" with KPRF's 
performance on March 11. He was convinced that the KPRF had 
won a significant part of the youth vote.  Young KPRF 
sympathizers came from families whose parents were academics 
or intellectuals and whose status had dropped considerably 
during the 1990s transition, he said.  Demurin surmised that 
the youth who are suffering the effects of "botched" 
education reform voted KPRF, as well.  Komi's Ostroglazev 
also traced KPRF's success to the youth vote, claiming that 
50 - 55 percent of KPRF's Komi's totals had come from 18 - 30 
year olds.  KPRF interlocutors all see increasing support 
from young people, who are having difficulty educating their 
children, finding housing, and who face poor employment 
prospects. 
 
---------------------- 
Not Resting on Laurels 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU)  At its March 24 party convention, KPRF Deputy Chief 
Ivan Melnikov enumerated the party's goals in the lead-up to 
the December Duma elections.  Melnikov described the 
left-positioned SR as the KPRF's chief challenge, and 
exhorted members to target it by highlighting its support of 
 
MOSCOW 00001396  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
United Russia policies.  With forty percent of voters backing 
Kremlin parties and twenty percent already committed 
"protest" voters (KPRF and LDPR supporters), Melnikov tasked 
the KPRF faithful to proselytize among the remaining, 
economically-straitened forty percent of the electorate by 
convincing it that the KPRF will better serve their interests 
than SR Chairman Sergey Mironov. 
 
---------------- 
KPRF's Obstacles 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU)  Voters' Club Strategic Head Stanislav Kulakov 
disagreed that KPRF's success could be traced to superior 
organizational skills and disaffected youth.  He instead 
cited the Kremlin's desire to provide a manageable release 
valve for disgruntled voters. KPRF was "harmless."  It had 
been in the Duma for years and had accomplished nothing, 
which made it acceptable to the powers-that-be. 
 
¶7. (SBU) KPRF interlocutors are guardedly positive in 
conversations with Embassy about Chairman Gennadiy Zyuganov, 
but there are frequent rumors that he is seen by insiders as 
a drag on the party. Demurin suggested that the KPRF may have 
peaked with the March 11 elections, a possibility he traced 
to the Chairman's limited public appeal and the party's 
failure, under Zyuganov, to fully exploit traditional bases 
of support, like the trade union movement. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (SBU)  If the accounts of interlocutors are correct, the 
March 11 elections suggest that KPRF may be in the middle of 
a limited revival, fueled by voters opposed to United Russia 
and, to a much lesser extent, dissatisfaction among youth. 
Earlier assertions by KPRF contacts that the party was 
recovering in the cities may have been borne out on March 11. 
 Still, KPRF urban voters are neither sufficiently numerous 
nor notably very loyal, and might be co-opted by even a 
slight improvement in living conditions before the next 
elections.  Also arguing against a further surge in KPRF's 
popularity is the alleged intention of the "managers" of 
Russia's democracy to see SR further improve on its March 11 
election performance, which saw it over the seven percent 
threshold in 13 districts a mere four months after being 
created. 
RUSSELL