VZCZCXRO2209
OO RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1007/01 0681657
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 091657Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8108
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3845
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 1971
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2269

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 001007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM SOCI PINR RS
SUBJECT: SECOND KREMLIN PARTY, "FOR A JUST RUSSIA," DEBUTS 
IN MARCH 11 ELECTION 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 307 
 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 261 
     ¶C. MOSCOW 656 
     ¶D. MOSCOW 868 
     ¶E. 06 MOSCOW 13071 
     ¶F. YEKATERINBURG 10 
     ¶G. YEKATERINBURG 18 
     ¶H. 06 YEKATERINBURG 405 
     ¶I. ST. PETERSBURG 31 
 
MOSCOW 00001007  001.4 OF 004 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The campaign for elections, which will take place in 
fourteen regions March 11, has been marked by much the same 
behavior that has marred previous contests; refusal to 
register parties in some contests, the liberal use of 
"administrative resources" to support Kremlin favorites and 
discourage others, and uneven access to the media.  Changes 
to the law on extremism have made opposition parties 
reluctant to go on the attack, and the media careful in 
reporting it when they did. The second, Kremlin-licensed 
party, For A Just Russia (SR), will debut in fourteen 
regional elections on March 11.  They are widely viewed here 
as a dress rehearsal for the December State Duma contest and 
the presidential succession to follow.  SR has had ample 
resources, media play, and a greenlight from President Putin, 
but resistance in the regions has complicated its emergence. 
It remains to be seen if SR has succeeded, in the mere four 
months since its creation, in establishing itself as a party 
of the left, which would allow it to siphon votes from its 
rivals, and set the stage for the managed, two-party system 
seemingly envisaged by the Kremlin.  End summary. 
 
Fourteen Elections 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) On March 11, elections will be held in fourteen 
regions of Russia:  the republics of Komi and Dagestan; the 
regions of Leningrad, Moscow, Murmansk, Omsk, Orel, Pskov, 
Samara, Stavropol, Tomsk, Tyumen, and Vologda; and the city 
of St. Petersburg. In every election except Moscow region, 
St. Petersburg, and Dagestan, voters will cast two ballots; 
one for their favorite political party, a second for their 
preferred "single-mandate" candidate. The March 11 contests 
are widely seen here as a dress rehearsal for the December 
State Duma elections and the presidential succession to 
follow. 
 
New Rules 
--------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) This set of elections is the first to be held since 
the election law was significantly amended in 2006.  Among 
the key new provisions: 
 
-- the "against all" block on the ballots has been removed, 
depriving voters of the direct opportunity to express their 
unhappiness with the candidates and political parties to 
choose from; 
 
-- minimum voter turnout laws were abolished, meaning that 
elections will be valid, even if few voters go to the polls 
in any regional election.  (Because elections were scheduled 
in Dagestan, Komi, the Moscow and Vologda regions before the 
amendments were adopted, the minimum voter turnout 
requirement remains valid there.); 
 
-- parties not represented in the State Duma must submit a 
monetary deposit or collect thousands of valid signatures in 
order to qualify for the ballot in each region; 
 
-- an amendment to the law on extremism has made it difficult 
for candidates to engage in criticism of opponents. 
 
Who's Playing? 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Eighteen parties attempted to qualify for the March 
11 races, but the number of parties registered in any given 
regional contest ranges from five to eight.  Only four 
parties --United Russia (YR), For A Just Russia (SR), the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), and the 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), were registered in 
all fourteen races. Patriots of Russia (PR) is registered in 
 
MOSCOW 00001007  002.4 OF 004 
 
 
ten of the twelve contests it attempted to qualify for and 
the Union of Right Forces (SPS) is competing in nine of the 
thirteen contests for which it attempted to register. 
(Embassy understands that a PR court case is still pending in 
Stavropol as of March 9.) Yabloko suffered most in the 
registration process.  It attempted to register in ten 
regions, but is on the ballot in four. More importantly, 
Yabloko was excluded from the race --in St. Petersburg-- 
where polls and past performance suggested it would fare best. 
 
Kremlin Party Has The Advantages 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) It is a foregone conclusion that the Kremlin-cozy 
United Russia party will finish first in all fourteen races, 
but the waning appeal of politicians too long in power, voter 
apathy, and the appearance of a second, Kremlin-anointed 
venture --For A Just Russia-- have led observers and the 
party itself to expect that YR will garner fewer votes than 
in the October 2006 regional elections.  (In the nine 
contests held in October, YR on average won 46 percent of the 
vote.  According to the March 9 Vedomosti, YR is expecting an 
average 44.9 percent on March 11.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Giving YR a "leg up" on March 11 is an official 
campaign war chest of USD 21 million, access to so-called 
"administrative resources," and the use of "locomotives" 
(popular national or regional politicians) at the top of YR's 
party lists.  (YR is not alone in its use of "locomotives." 
SPS's Nikita Belykh tops his party's list in each of the nine 
regions where it is competing.  The LDPR's populist Chairman 
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy is leading for his party in some of the 
fourteen races at stake.) SR trails YR in the 
campaign-finance category, with USD 15.2 million, while 
Yabloko has a mere USD 1.3 million at its disposal, and the 
KPRF, USD 877 thousand. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Interlocutors in the regions have tended to focus 
their complaints more on YR's access to "administrative 
resources" than its advantage in campaign money. 
Administrative resources range from campaign advantages that 
in the West would be seen as the prerogatives of incumbency 
to recourse to other, less savory election tools.  Each of 
the fourteen regions has seen numerous visits by high-ranking 
GOR and YR officials during the course of the campaign and 
the line between GOR and YR accomplishments has often been 
blurred in order to improve the party's image with voters. 
YR's campaign staff has been seriously augmented with the 
addition of regional officials who have been pressed into 
part-time or full-time service. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Much of the regional media has in effect stumped for 
the Kremlin's favorite party.  Although regional contacts 
from other parties tell us they have generally been given the 
minimal print and broadcast media access mandated by law, 
their modest exposure is dwarfed by the media attention 
allotted YR-connected visitors from Moscow and the 
additional, paid political advertising that YR and SR 
campaign chests can finance.  In one case where a party 
--Yabloko in St. Petersburg-- posed a limited threat it was 
removed from the ballot.  Interlocutors in the regions also 
allege that YR-loyal factory, farm, and office directors will 
urge their employees to vote United Russia and, especially in 
the rural regions or factory towns, work overtime to ensure 
that their urgings are heeded. 
 
The Also Rans:  SR 
------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) While YR seems to have all of the advantages, and 
appears to have left little to chance in its efforts to prove 
that it can deliver the vote and continue to enjoy the 
Kremlin's favor in the future, question marks remain.  The 
greatest unknown is the prospects for the "second" Kremlin 
party, SR.  SR is new to the national scene (it was formed at 
the end of October 2006) and the product of a messy merger of 
three political parties and their sometimes mutually 
antagonistic local leaders.  While the party has been given a 
greenlight by President Putin, resistance at the local level 
from politicians unaccustomed to fostering controlled 
competition and unable to decipher signals from the Kremlin, 
have complicated SR's debut.  Most expect the party to cross 
the necessary threshold in all fourteen districts, but refuse 
to speculate further.  Representation in each of the regions 
at this point should be sufficient for SR, which has its eye 
 
MOSCOW 00001007  003.4 OF 004 
 
 
on the December State Duma elections. 
 
¶10. (SBU) In clearing a place for itself, SR has co-opted 
territory previously owned by the KPRF, PR and, to a lesser 
extent, LDPR. Observers have forecast from the beginning that 
SR's task would be in part to marginalize the Left.  The 
March 11 results should show to what extent it has succeeded, 
and they should indicate as well to what degree SR has 
positioned itself as an alternative to YR.  Many here believe 
that the creation of SR was a step on the way to establishing 
a managed, two-party democracy, and they predicted an 
artificial competition between two "opposition" parties in 
fact joined at the hip. SR indeed enjoys many of the 
advantages of YR: 
 
-- It has ample campaign funds.  (It was able to pay the 
often hefty registration deposit in all fourteen regions, in 
that way avoiding the problems encountered by parties whose 
meager financial resources forced them to gather signatures 
in order to qualify for the ballot.) 
 
-- It has easier access to the national media than its 
competitors in the opposition, in part because a number of 
SR's leading lights like SR Chairman Sergey Mironov occupy 
high office.  (Mironov is Chairman of the Federation Council.) 
 
-- It has President Putin's blessing. 
 
¶11. (SBU) On the other side of the ledger, however, Russia's 
governors and other prominent politicians have largely backed 
YR, leaving some mayors and other, lesser local politicians 
to stump for SR.  The Kremlin, while giving the nod to SR, 
appears to have provided it with little of the active 
assistance available to YR.  Finally, although SR is the 
result of the merger of three, already existing parties, it 
is under pressure to show results in elections occurring a 
mere four months after its creation; a difficult task, even 
for an "establishment" opposition party in a very managed 
environment. 
 
The Other Also Rans 
------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The other parties competing with SR for second 
place are the KPRF and LDPR.  In the March 2006 regional 
elections in eight regions, before the advent of SR, the KPRF 
finished second six times, which LDPR and Rodina each snagged 
one second-place slot.  Although short of funds, riven with 
disagreements, ideologically adrift, and charisma challenged, 
KPRF remains the only genuine national party in Russia, with 
grassroots and a pedigree.  Its voters --pensioners-- go to 
the polls.  How it will fare will hinge on SR's success with 
the left. 
 
¶13. (SBU) SPS was buoyed by its December 2006 second-place 
finish in the December 2006 Perm elections, where it won over 
sixteen percent of the vote.  As has been noted, however, its 
success was likely traceable to Party Chairman Belykh's 
lifelong ties to the region and does not predict what may 
happen on March 11.  Handicapping the efforts of the more 
Western-leaning parties (SPS and Yabloko), in addition to the 
resources ranged against them, has been their own inability 
to cooperate in order to maximize their results. 
 
¶14. (SBU) LDPR remains a one-man show, and Zhirinovskiy has 
stumped for his party in all fourteen elections.  He remains 
the voice of the Russian redneck, and his ability to get a 
significant minority to go the polls is not in doubt. 
Possibly playing to LDPR's advantage is the number of 
elections this time around in Siberia and Russia's North, 
fertile ground for the disaffected. 
 
The Voter 
--------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) In a March 9 press conference, Central Election 
Commission Chairman Aleksandr Veshnyakov predicted that voter 
turnout on March 11 would equal that of the previous 
elections, about 36 percent.  With the elimination of the 
minimal voter turnout requirement, the prospect of invalid 
elections has been averted, whatever the number of ballots 
cast on election day.  Interlocutors in the regions largely 
expect March 11 to be a "pensioners election," and each party 
has tailored its platform and campaign rhetoric accordingly. 
A certain number of ballots will be cast by self-interested 
 
MOSCOW 00001007  004.4 OF 004 
 
 
civil servants.  The young, as usual, are expected to largely 
stay home.  Polls suggest that the continued popularity of 
President Putin and general satisfaction with the current 
state-of-affairs should translate into widespread voter 
apathy and an endorsement, by those who vote, of the status 
quo.  The deployment of adminstrative resources will 
reinforce that tendency. 
RUSSELL