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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000810 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PHUM PINR PREL
SUBJECT: POLITICAL PUNDITS PLACE ORTEGA GOVERNMENT ON 
YELLOW ALERT (C-AL7-00063) 
 
REF: MANAGUA 0242 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli.  Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Six of Nicaragua's leading political 
analysts concur that the Ortega administration has already 
reached "yellow alert" status and that President Ortega's 
primordial objective is to consolidate power.  Over breakfast 
at the Ambassador's residence, they lauded our government's 
approach towards Ortega, and believe it may prevent him from 
falling exclusively under Venezuelan President Chavez' orbit 
of influence.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Over breakfast hosted by the Ambassador on March 
28, six of Nicaragua's leading political analysts, whose 
political inclinations span Nicaragua's political spectrum, 
discussed their respective assessments of the Ortega 
administration thus far.  Guests included 
Conservative-leaning Gabriel Alvarez, a constitutional 
expert; Sergio Garcia Quintero, a Liberal-dissident jurist; 
Luis Humberto Guzman, former National Assembly president and 
Christian Democrat; Cairo Manuel Lopez, a constitutional 
expert, president of NGO Pro Justicia, and a Social 
Christian; Alejandro Martinez Cuenca, an economist, director 
of economic think-tank FIDEG, and a member of the FSLN; and, 
Carlos Tunnerman, a Sandinista dissident involved in the NGO 
Movimiento por Nicaragua (MpN), former Minister of Education 
during the 1980s Sandinista regime, and one-time ambassador 
to the United States during the same period. 
 
U.S. Policy on the Mark, Aid Should Target the Poor 
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¶3.  (C) Initiating the conversation, Martinez Cuenca 
(Reftel), thanked the Ambassador for the invitation and our 
policy vis-a-vis the Ortega government.  He termed our 
approach the best means to prevent President Ortega from 
using the pretext of a "hostile U.S. government" as 
justification to fall exclusively within Venezuela's orbit of 
influence.  He offered that our lack of public reaction to 
Ortega's occasional anti-U.S. rhetoric is helpful, and 
encouraged us to ramp up the promotion of our assistance 
programs so people are more aware of our support.  Martinez 
Cuenca, who commented that the USAID insert in the March 26 
editions of the two dailies La Prensa and El Nuevo Diario was 
an effective step towards this end, also suggested we 
dedicate more of our assistance to help the needy. 
 
¶4.  (C) Garcia Quintero, who advises the Japanese on their 
assistance programs, underscored the importance of "donor 
branding" so that the people recognize the origin of the 
donations and can effectively monitor project implementation. 
 Tunnerman referred to Secretary Leavitt's medical training 
initiative as a valuable project because it targets the rural 
poor.  Lopez suggested we increase our exchange programs and 
other public diplomacy activities, while Guzman underscored 
the importance of our military assistance and 
counternarcotics support. 
 
Yellow Alert 
- - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) Martinez Cuenca's view that Ortega administration 
actions have triggered a "yellow alert" drew vigorous nods of 
approval from his colleagues.  Tunnerman ventured that the 
Ortega government's actions are bordering on "orange." 
Alvarez added that in some respects Nicaragua had reached the 
"yellow alert" stage before the November 2006 national 
elections, as voting results were manipulated to alter the 
composition of the National Assembly to favor Ortega and 
fellow political pact mate Arnoldo Aleman.  He criticized 
Nicaraguans and the international community for not having 
insisted that the Ortega-Aleman-controlled Supreme Electoral 
Commission (CSE) issue the final election results -- polling 
center by polling center -- which could have helped detect 
the fraud. 
 
It's all about Power, the Battle between Democracy and 
Authoritarianism 
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- - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) The analysts were unanimous in their view that 
President Ortega is an astute, wily, street-smart, 
caudillo-style politician who adeptly manipulates popular 
sentiment and pits both his supporters and enemies against 
one another to maintain the upper hand.  Tunnerman remarked 
that this time around, a more "pragmatic" Ortega has shed his 
socially-minded ideology and is now driven purely by his 
desire to consolidate power in the hands of his inner circle 
- namely himself, wife Rosario, and their offspring.  The 
1980s Sandinista government was run by a junta, not Ortega 
alone, reminded Tunnerman.  Rosario was relegated to a minor 
role, but now she commands daily operations, explained 
Tunnerman. 
 
¶7.  (C) Tunnerman added that while the Sandinistas of the 
1980s were committed to a "social project," this time around 
Ortega possesses no clear government plan and is driven 
exclusively by his unquenchable thirst for power, akin to the 
Somoza regime.  He postulated that President Ortega will use 
whatever means at his disposal to legalize and legitimize his 
actions to convince observers that he remains within a 
democratic framework.  Thus it is understandable that today's 
Ortega will court foreign and domestic capital -- even 
sweet-talk potential U.S. investors -- while completely 
discarding the rule of law.  Lopez remarked that wealthy 
Sandinistas who support the new government will also do their 
utmost to protect their business interests and seek new 
foreign business partners. Alvarez conjectured that what is 
at stake is no longer a matter of left versus right; rather, 
the struggle is between authoritarianism and democracy. 
 
Economic Decline Could Become Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 
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¶8.  (C) The analysts shared the Ambassador's concern that 
Nicaragua's economy shows signs of deterioration, and a 
downturn could become a self-fulfilling prophecy that 
President Ortega would exploit to impose a more 
authoritarian, market-hostile, economic model.  Martinez 
Cuenca enumerated a decline in housing starts, a slowdown in 
investment, private sector reluctance to restock inventories, 
the country's unresolved energy crisis, and a looming drought 
that could cause serious water and power shortages as areas 
of special concern.  If these trends continue, they could 
ultimately spark an economic crisis -- in a soon as 60 days 
-- that Ortega would use to "justify" the imposition of a 
more authoritarian economic model, he warned. 
 
Limits on Ortega Will Kick in as the Euphoria Wanes 
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¶9.  (C) Lopez predicted that as Sandinista euphoria over 
their victory abates, the FSLN's internal struggles for party 
control will escalate.  It will also become increasingly 
evident to the public that most of Ortega's cabinet ministers 
are mediocre and ill-prepared to resolve Nicaragua's 
problems.  And, while Venezuela can provide oil and other 
material goods to Nicaragua, it cannot offer the technical 
expertise of more developed countries that Nicaragua so 
desperately needs.  Guzman observed that Ortega's powers in 
some ways are more limited this time around, as he no longer 
enjoys the "social hegemony" of the 1980s and international 
limitations, including the IMF will check him. 
 
Social Apathy, Divided Opposition Advantage Ortega 
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¶10.  (C) The analysts agreed that widespread social apathy 
combined with the political opposition's lack of direction 
advantage Ortega and his race to consolidate power.  Garcia 
Quintero dwelled on what he termed the "indefinable 
idiosyncrasies" of Nicaragua's social dynamics that can 
propel mercurial Nicaraguans from "the sublime and heroic to 
the ridiculous" in no time.  He believes that most 
Nicaraguans resist displaying their "confrontational heroism" 
of the 1980s and prefer now to let someone else make the 
first move. 
 
¶11.  (C) Despite the pervasive consternation, the analysts 
evinced various shades of optimism.  Tunnerman was hopeful 
that groups like Movimiento por Nicaragua (MpN) can help 
contain Ortega and defend the country's embattled democracy. 
He reported that students from the Polytechnic University 
recently asked the MpN to help arrange a rally on 29 March in 
protest of the Ortega government's poor performance thus far. 
 (The MpN recently issued Ortega a failing report card for 
his government's poor performance during the first 60 days). 
While all guests agreed that civil society can play a pivotal 
role in curbing Ortega's excesses, Garcia Quintero argued 
that political opposition parties, not civil society, should 
lead the charge.  Lopez countered that in an ideal scenario, 
political parties should set the course; however, given their 
lack of focus and disingenuousness, they are not yet up to 
the task. 
 
100 Days the "Drop-Dead" Mark 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12.  (C) Martinez Cuenca shared with the group his message to 
the Ortega administration that he will reserve judgment on 
its performance until it passes the 100-day mark.  He invited 
his colleagues to join him in sharing their assessment with 
the public at that point. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶13.  (C) Daniel Ortega's motives have not really changed -- 
his blind ambition for power is by no means a recently 
acquired trait.  Rather, he altered his tactics, adopting a 
conciliatory demeanor during the election campaign and 
pre-inauguration periods after his confrontational approach 
failed -- and specializing in double discourse since January 
¶10.  We will encourage these and other political pundits to 
put together a forum to mark the Ortega administration's 
first 100 days and to publish their assessments. 
TRIVELLI