VZCZCXYZ0022
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0668/01 0712257
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 122257Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9437
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000668 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL PINR
SUBJECT: THE FIRST 60 DAYS - ORTEGA PRESSURES MEDIA 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 241 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 466 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 585 
 
Classified By: Ambassador P. Trivelli for reason 1.4b 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  President Ortega's attitude and actions 
towards the mainstream media in the first 60 days of his 
administration have raised doubts about his commitment to 
freedom of expression.  Sounding more like an attack plan 
than a government communications strategy, First Lady Rosario 
Murillo's Communication Strategy labels the mainstream media 
as "hostile" and warns that it will "mount a misinformation 
campaign" against the Sandinistas that must be "confronted." 
Her strategy reveals her intention to use only 
Sandinista-friendly media to ensure her messages are 
"published in an uncontaminated and direct manner."  In one 
of her first public moves as Coordinator of the Counsel for 
Communications and Citizenry, Murillo centralized control of 
all ministry media budgets and announced spending will be 
reduced by 50 percent as an "austerity measure."  Ortega's 
mounting verbal attacks and maneuvers against the media all 
suggest he is executing Murillo's plan.  Ortega's promise to 
dedicate 20 percent of each Sandinista National Liberation 
Front (FSLN) deputy's discretionary social program budget to 
support journalists has further divided the National 
Journalist's Association via debate over the ethics of such a 
move.  Journalists fear that Ortega's recent hostility 
towards the media may harden anti-press attitudes and trigger 
more direct threats or violence, and recent criminal code 
reforms contain vague language about penalizing 
"unauthorized" use of "private" information.  On the bright 
side, Ortega's aggression towards the media may be helping to 
unify the liberal opposition forces who are keenly aware of 
the potential danger posed by restricting freedom of the 
press.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Murillo's Media Strategy - Message Branding & Control 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Shortly after the January 10 inauguration, the 
Ortega administration introduced a revised national seal 
(escudo) -- designed by the First Lady -- and mandated that 
all official government correspondence and communication, 
including government projects and job announcements published 
in the daily periodicals, use this new seal.  Based on the 
triangular form of the official seal, the added campaign 
slogans and pastel pink and blue colors gave the revised seal 
the unmistakable stamp of the FSLN.  Political opposition 
leaders immediately condemned, and eventually blocked, 
official use of the seal as unconstitutional, but many viewed 
it as a harbinger of things to come.  Within days of taking 
office, Ortega was already attempting to blur the lines 
between party and State, essentially "re-branding" the State 
as the FSLN.  Many government entities are continuing to use 
the Murillo seal despite the legislative ban, but the 
government appears to be taking care to use the official 
national seal on documents that involve legal or official 
matters tht could be challenged in the courts. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) On February 1, Murillo, the Coordinator of the 
newly formed Counsel of Communication and Citizenry, 
circulated, strictly for internal use only, a copy of her 
Communication Strategy to other members of the Counsel 
(septel).  In the rambling seventeen-page document, eerily 
reminiscent of Ortega's presidential campaign strategy of 
Peace and Reconciliation, Murillo labels the larger media 
organizations as "rightist" and "hostile" to the Sandinistas 
and emphasizes the need to control national and international 
public perceptions by controlling published images and 
messages.  Murillo states that "there will be strong 
opposition to our project from the media of the right" and 
that "they will mount a misinformation campaign against it" 
which the Sandinistas must "predict in order to successfully 
confront."  To control the government's messages, Murillo 
writes that "we will use our media so that our messages are 
published in an uncontaminated and direct manner, as we did 
during the campaign." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The leaked strategy elicited consternation and 
criticism from main stream media organizations such as 
Channel 2 TV, La Prensa newspaper, and even the left-leaning 
El Nuevo Diario newspaper, all who fear that Murillo's direct 
references to "our media" and the "hostile right" betray an 
underlying media prejudice that could polarize the media 
environment.  Following the leak, Murillo publicly stated 
that the media's right is to obtain information related to 
the government's activities, but warned that the government's 
right is to see the "truth respected and the truth published" 
and that the media "must correct its mistakes." 
 
¶5.  (C) COMMENT:  From the tone and wording in Murillo's 
Communications Strategy, there seems to be little doubt that 
she regards the established mainstream media as a threat to 
Ortega that should be controlled.  Ortega and Murillo's 
actions leading up to, and following, the internal release of 
the Strategy would indicate that it is being implemented. 
This cable attempts to identify and outline what we believe 
are some of the Strategy's implementation mechanisms during 
the first 60 days of the Ortega administration.  END COMMENT. 
 
Phase I - Exclude the Opposition Media 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) During Ortega's campaign - managed by Murillo - media 
access was tightly controlled, and FSLN-affiliated media were 
granted preferential access to Ortega.  Right-leaning media, 
such as La Prensa and Channel 2, were often excluded or had 
to rely on Sandinista journalists for information or 
instructions.  Since Ortega took office in early January, 
these journalists have repeatedly complained to Public 
Affairs officers that they are being excluded from official 
information and events, and that potential government sources 
are specifically being instructed not to talk to them. 
Embassy press officers have directly witnessed Murillo using 
Sandinista-affiliated media as interlocutors with other media 
at events and employing Sandinista news outlets as "official 
press" for the administration, especially before the 
inauguration and during the first few weeks of the new 
administration. 
 
¶7.  (U) In an open letter from La Prensa to President Ortega 
published on March 2, highlighting the newspaper's growing 
concern about Ortega's attitude towards the media, La Prensa 
points out that Ortega signed the 2001 Declaration of 
Chapultepec which prohibits restrictions to freedom of the 
press.  Chapter five of the agreement states "Censoring in 
advance, restrictions on the circulation of the media or 
their divulging of information, the arbitrary imposition of 
information, the creation of obstacles to the free-flow of 
information, and limitations to the free exercising and 
mobility of the press are in direct opposition to the freedom 
of the press." 
 
Phase Two - Control the Purse Strings 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (U) At the behest of Murillo, on January 29, Treasury 
Minister Alberto Guevara, circulated a confidential memo to 
all ministers, vice ministers and the presidents of the 
autonomous State agencies stating that Murillo's Counsel of 
Communication would henceforth coordinate and authorize all 
government publicity expenditures and travel, totaling just 
over 90 million Cordoba (US$ 5 million).  (NOTE:  Nearly all 
private media derive some percentage of their revenue from 
government-paid advertisements such as job announcements, 
calls for proposals, etc.  END NOTE.)  Murillo, angry that 
the memo was leaked, justified the decision as part of a 
government "austerity program" that would re-direct up to 
fifty percent of the publicity budget to schools, medicine, 
hospitals, low income housing and other programs to benefit 
the poor.  She emphasized that only necessary campaigns -- 
such as those in environment and health -- would be financed. 
 
 
¶9.  (U) Following the announcement, Ortega indirectly lashed 
out at La Prensa and Channel 2 by claiming that "eighty 
percent of the state's advertising budget is concentrated in 
the two big media (companies)."  In a more measured tone, 
Murillo indicated that she intended to "break the habit of 
financing the big communication media" which "respond to 
another vision of our country that does not benefit the 
majority" in favor of "communication from the people to the 
people" as articulated in Murillo's Communication Strategy. 
 
¶10.  (U) Murillo's memo evoked an immediate reaction from 
both left and right-leaning independent press, who fear that 
Ortega and Murillo will use the budget as a tool to control 
the media.  In response to Ortega's "eighty percent" claim, 
La Prensa, in its Open Letter of March 2, declared that it 
received just 13 percent of the state's publicity budget in 
¶2006.  Senior La Prensa and El Nuevo Diario managers publicly 
stated that their papers will not be seriously hurt by the 
potential cut-back, but stressed that smaller independent 
print and radio media, which are more dependent on 
government-sponsored advertising revenue, will be 
significantly affected. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The reaction by opposition forces in the National 
Assembly was equally strong.  Deputies and legal experts 
claim that Murillo's move violates Law 290, Law 438, and 
Article 130 of the Constitution.  According to Law 290, 
counsels created by the Executive cannot handle finances and 
cannot make decisions which belong to the ministries (ref. 
A).  Article 11 of Law 438, the law of probity, states that 
the spouse of a public servant -- in this case the President 
-- is not eligible to exercise public functions (Ref. C). 
Article 130 of the Constitution establishes that no one 
within the State powers can name functionaries who have close 
relationship to them.  Thus far, however, the National 
Assembly's protests and legislative maneuverings seem to have 
had little affect on the First Family. 
 
¶12.  (C) Despite the direct impact on their public 
communications budgets and independence, the ministers have 
voiced little to no public opposition to the plan.  In 
private, National Assembly opposition leaders, including 
representatives from the Sandinista Renovation Movement 
(MRS), opined that the ministers were selected for their 
loyalty to Ortega and will not wield any real power (Ref. B). 
 The sudden removal of Glenda Ramirez Noguera -- who was seen 
as a moderate with independent ideas -- as Minister of the 
Family after only 21 days may serve as an example for other 
ministers contemplating ministerial independence. 
 
Phase Three - Damage the Media's Public Image 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (U) On February 20, during the closing ceremonies of a 
meeting with 615 members of the National Police, Ortega 
launched phase three of his attack on the media by implying 
that the media is robbing money from the State through tax 
exonerations.  Ortega labeled the media as "fat" and "getting 
fatter" and scoffed that the media are "enriching themselves 
doing business, not charity or cultural work."  Ortega very 
shrewdly linked his argument to public security by claiming 
that such exemptions take money from State coffers that would 
have otherwise been spent buying gas for the police.  Several 
times during his speech, Ortega called on the media to listen 
to their "consciences" and their "hearts" and to pay their 
taxes. 
 
¶14.  (U) Since delivering his exoneration speech, Ortega has 
continued and broadened his attacks.  On February 22, Ortega 
directly criticized La Prensa for running a cartoon in 
reference to Ortega's appointment of Cardenal Miguel Obando 
as coordinator of the Counsel of Peace and Reconciliation, 
calling it "disrespectful" and "a dirty campaign."  On 
February 27, while announcing that he would ask the National 
Assembly to cancel exonerations for the media, banks, and 
social organizations, Ortega again singled out the media for 
attack -- especially La Prensa and Channel 2 -- when he asked 
how "in a country so small and with so much poverty" could 
"the two largest media receive US$ 22 million in exonerations 
in 2006?" 
 
¶15.  (C) The media have attempted to counter Ortega's claims 
by publishing exoneration facts and figures and highlighting 
the legal precedent for exonerations.  In 2004, the most 
recent year for which official figures are available, the 
media sector accounted for only 1.6 percent of the State's 
total exonerations.  In clear contrast to Ortega's claim that 
La Prensa and Channel 2 received US$ 22 million in 
exonerations in 2006, budget experts estimated that total 
exonerations for the media sector ranged from 40-50 million 
Cordoba (US$ 2.2-2.7 million).  Both Article 68 of 
Nicaragua's Constitution and point 7 of the 2001 Declaration 
of Chapultepec, signed by Ortega, allow for the tax-free 
importation of certain materials used in print production 
such as ink, newsprint, machinery, and parts.  Using this 
legal basis, opposition leaders in the National Assembly have 
sharply criticized Ortega's demands to cancel the media's 
exoneration rights.  (NOTE: Ortega's argument, while 
dramatically over-stated, has a valid basis.  Media contacts 
have privately admitted to public affairs staff that all the 
major media do import "extra" supplies for their for-profit 
printing businesses. END NOTE). 
 
¶16.  (C) COMMENT: As with Ortega's earlier claim that the two 
largest media received 80 percent of the government's 
advertising revenue, his exoneration claim is completely 
unfounded.  Ortega is attempting to polarize public opinion 
against Channel 2 and La Prensa -- the "belligerent right" 
referred to in Murillo's Communications Strategy -- by 
painting them as heartless, greedy businesses willing to 
sacrifice public safety and to keep Nicaragua poor in order 
to make a dollar.  It is unclear at this point if the media's 
counter-strategy of publishing objective facts and figures 
and explaining the legal basis for exoneration will defuse 
Ortega's attempt to rally public opinion against them.  The 
media is concerned that the public may view their 
counter-protests as the complaints of spoiled children being 
told "no" for the first time.  A review of over fifty reader 
comments on the recent articles related to Murillo's strategy 
document and the exoneration issue show roughly the same 
proportion of support for the Ortega/Murillo position as 
Ortega received in the presidential elections, indicating 
that his loyal Sandinista base is listening.  END COMMENT. 
 
Phase Four - Blur Lines Between Criminal and Journalist 
Activities 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - 
 
¶17.  (U) With the publicity budget and exoneration issues 
still under heated discussion, Ortega has thrown an 
additional log on the fire - Penal Code reform.  Two articles 
of the proposed new code - Articles 194 and 197 -- have 
evoked strong reactions from ALN deputies in the National 
Assembly, the media, and human rights organizations, citing 
concerns over freedom of expression.  Article 194 establishes 
prison sentences of six months to two years for anyone 
intercepting, divulging, or distributing any communication 
deemed "private by judicial authorities."  Further, the 
article would penalize those who distribute or reveal 
"important information" with sentences of one to three years 
in prison.  Article 197 says that persons who find themselves 
in legitimate possession of private written or recorded 
communications would face 70-100 days in prison if they 
published such materials without authorization.  However, the 
article stipulates that this penalty would not apply to 
"matters in the public interest." 
 
¶18.  (SBU) FSLN and Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) 
deputies claimed that these two articles are part of the 
current Criminal Code and that journalistic sources would not 
be affected "as long as they don't pass information of a 
private character."  Further, these deputies insisted that 
the interception of telephone calls, telegraphs, or other 
forms of communication "have nothing to do with the 
activities of the media."  They also stated the belief that 
these articles would help curb the Nicaraguan press' 
proclivity for "red news" -- showing victims of violent 
accidents and crimes on television -- by requiring 
journalists to obtain permission from victims' families 
before publishing photographs or video.  (COMMENT: In this 
sense, the Nicaraguan media is its own worst enemy.  Because 
professional standards are low and there is a lot of 
overly-sensational and, at times, completely inaccurate 
reporting, the media has handed Ortega ammunition to use 
against it.  END COMMENT). 
 
¶19.  (U) Despite such assurances, ALN deputies, media 
organizations, and civil society groups have expressed 
serious doubts about the reforms, stating that a law based on 
subjective or arbitrary determination of the private or 
public nature of information leaves the door wide open to 
corruption and political manipulation.  As such, there would 
be no guarantees of freedom of expression. 
 
Phase Five - Divide and Conquer 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶20.  (U) In the wake of the financial uncertainty created by 
Murillo's centralization of government publicity budgets and 
Ortega's goal to cancel exonerations, Ortega signed an accord 
on March 1, Nicaraguan National Media Day, with the 
Nicaraguan Journalists Association (CPN) promising upwards of 
3 million Cordoba (US$ 177,000) to journalists.  Under the 
12-point accord, each of the 38 Sandinista deputies would 
dedicate 20 percent of their 420,000 Cordoba (US$ 23,333) 
budget for scholarships and social programs to a fund for 
journalists administered through the CPN.  Because the CPN is 
comprised of two distinct journalist associations, however, 
the announcement of the accord triggered conflicting 
reactions. 
 
¶21. (SBU) BACKGROUND NOTE: About 70 percent of CPN's members 
are from the Nicaraguan Journalists Union (UPN) and 30 
percent from the Association of Nicaraguan Journalists (APN). 
 APN is generally associated with the political right.  While 
both the APN and UPN include journalists from all walks, many 
more employees of the large media organizations such as 
Channel 2 TV and La Prensa are APN-affiliated.  APN 
journalists tend to be better trained and have higher 
professional standards.  UPN is generally associated with the 
political left and includes a myriad of smaller news 
organizations which have historically been more flexible in 
the application of professional ethics.  END NOTE. 
 
¶22.  (U) The APN journalists have criticized the accord on 
several grounds.  First, they see it as an attempt to 
legitimize the probably illegal appointment of Murillo as 
Coordinator of the Counsel for Communication and Citizenry by 
honoring her as a signatory to the document.  Second, because 
the funds would come exclusively from the FSLN deputies, they 
believe there is a serious risk to journalistic objectivity. 
Third, journalists could lose credibility with the public if 
they were perceived or proven to be beholden to one political 
party.  In contrast, the UPN -- the majority voice in the CPN 
-- supports the accord because it could offset the potential 
revenue loss caused by the consolidation and reduction of 
ministry publicity budgets. 
 
¶23.  (C) COMMENT:  As witnessed in the political campaign, 
the Sandinistas' ability to keep the ALN and PLC divided was 
devastating to the Liberals.  With the CPN accord, Ortega may 
be attempting to divide the media to the same effect. 
Although the media has traditionally been sharply divided 
along political lines, this move is perhaps the most 
dangerous because it could change the nature of the division 
from political/ideological to personal if journalists in 
favor of the accord see those opposed to it as threatening 
their livelihood.  This perception could fuel further 
polarization among the media and erode professional standards 
as the market becomes more cut-throat.  A media so divided 
would be much easier to manipulate to both misinform and 
distract attention from key issues that require vigorous 
public debate and scrutiny.  Unfortunately, according to 
public affairs officers, there appears to be little appetite 
among media organizations to unify and work together despite 
clearly understanding the danger of remaining divided.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
Emboldening the Masses 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶24.  (U) According to media reports and public affairs 
contacts, since the start of Ortega's verbal attacks on the 
media, journalists have reported growing hostility and an 
increase in the number of personal threats.  There is concern 
that Ortega's overt verbal attacks on the media are perceived 
as tacit approval to carry out individual acts of violence 
and threats against journalists.  During the last week of 
February, Jaime Arellano from Channel 10 reported receiving 
death threats and discovered the lugnuts on his car had been 
loosened after making some hard-hitting comments against 
President Ortega, while journalist Moises Absalon from 
Channel 23 also reported loosened lugnuts.  Continued 
hostility towards mainstream media could also discourage 
advertisers from placing ads for fear of tarnishing their own 
images in the public eye, further hurting the mainstream 
media companies. 
 
¶25.  (C) COMMENT:  By demonizing the mainstream media -- 
linking "greed" to public safety problems and the country's 
poverty -- while promising to deliver "uncontaminated and 
direct" messages to the people, Ortega and Murillo may be 
attempting to foment public resentment towards and rejection 
of the mainstream media.  This focus could serve to both 
"soften up" the public, making it more receptive to Ortega's 
message, and create self-censorship among mainstream 
journalists worried about reprisals.  Further, attacking the 
media could fuel public perceptions that "controls" or 
"limits" on "irresponsible" media should be allowed.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
Silver Lining - Opposition Unifying in National Assembly 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶26.  (SBU) Through his use of a broad spectrum of measures to 
attack and potentially weaken the press, Ortega is providing 
opposition forces ample opportunity to unify.  Murillo's 
appointment as coordinator of the Counsel for Communication 
and Citizenry was roundly condemned by opposition members in 
the National Assembly who view her appointment as illegal. 
Although the ALN, MRS, and PLC caucuses are not unanimous in 
their disapproval of Ortega's tactics, all are cognizant of 
the potential danger posed by restricting press freedom.  The 
ALN and MRS have been in lock-step in opposing each step 
taken against the media with the exception of the accord 
signed between Ortega and the CPN, which MRS deputy Victor 
Hugo Tinoco characterized as having "positive value" while 
ALN deputies were sharply critical.  On the exoneration 
issue, PLC deputy Wilfredo Navarro and others joined the MRS 
and ALN in supporting exoneration for the media and 
questioning Ortega's intentions.  There is a growing 
realization among deputies that the National Assembly is the 
"Front Line" against Ortega (Ref B). 
TRIVELLI