VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0627/01 0672329
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 082329Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9391
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000627 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EAID KDEM NU
SUBJECT: CSE OFFICIAL CLAIMS ELECTORAL COUNCIL SERIOUS 
ABOUT REFORMS 
 
REF: 06 MANAGUA 2665 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Rodrigo Barreto, Chief of Staff of 
Nicaragua's Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), claims that most 
CSE magistrates are ready to implement desperately needed 
electoral reforms, but the Council requires donor assistance 
to move forward.  The reforms would center around the 
issuance of new citizen ID/voter registration Sx~'pQsuccess of the cedulation effort prior to the 2008 municipal 
elections.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) CSE Chief of Staff Rodrigo Barreto requested a meeting 
with poloff on March 7 to discuss the CSE's plans for 
electoral reforms and request the participation of the 
Ambassador in a meeting with CSE president Roberto Rivas. 
Barreto explained that Rivas has convinced most of the CSE 
magistrates to support the modernization of the cedulation 
process and has even, through Sandinista magistrate Castillo, 
obtained the benediction of President Ortega.  (Comment: The 
CSE is technically an independent branch of government, but 
Rivas would never make any progress without the approval of 
the Sandinistas, who control most of the key positions in the 
CSE.  End Comment.) 
 
¶3. (C) According to Barreto, the power of Sandinista 
magistrate Emmet Lang, who many regarded as the real power in 
the CSE before the elections, has seriously deteriorated. 
Barreto commented that Lang's power plays, political ambition 
(he wants the CSE presidency) and staunch opposition to 
modernization has alienated the other magistrates.  Lang 
considers that he "delivered the elections to Ortega" by 
manipulating the cedulation process, Barreto said. 
Consequently, Lang feels betrayed by Ortega's refusal to give 
government positions to his cronies, or even grant him an 
audience.  Barreto claimed that Lang initiated the current 
wave of strikes by the CSE rank-and-file using his influence 
with the employees' unions to "show Ortega he still counts." 
 
¶4. (C) Regarding the reforms, Barreto explained that Rivas 
plans to focus on the modernization of cedulation and the 
civil registry because the political parties, donors, and 
civil society essentially agree on what needs to be done in 
this area.  The CSE would start with complete digitization of 
civil registry records (a birth certificate is required to 
obtain a cedula) and the professionalization of the 
registrars, who are currently municipal employees commonly 
influenced by the political affiliation of the mayor.  New 
cedulas with a biometric identifier (thumb print) and other 
security features would concurrently be issued to form the 
basis of a new, "clean" padron.  (Note: The current padron is 
inflated by about 30 percent with ineligible entries.  End 
Note.)  The whole process would be implemented under the 
guidance of an international organization such as IFES. 
 
¶5. (C) Barreto admitted that the issuance of new cedulas 
would not be completed before the 2008 municipal elections, 
forcing the CSE to use an "auxiliary padron" for voters using 
the existing documents.  He insisted, however, that the CSE 
is "serious" about distributing the new cedulas and is 
willing to work with civil society groups and international 
NGOs to accomplish this task.  He also claimed that the CSE 
will implement safeguards to prevent citizens from voting 
twice with two different cedulas. 
 
¶6. (C) Having obtained consensus from the magistrates and the 
President, Rivas is eager to meet with key donors to seek 
approval and funding.  A loan of 6.2 million euros from Spain 
will only cover about half of the CSE's necessary expenses, 
Barreto noted.  Local IFES director Rafael Lopez Pintor 
called after the meeting with Barreto to emphasize that 
Rivas' is committed, but the CSE must begin implementing the 
new systems by April to avoid jeopardizing the municipal 
elections.  Lopez Pintor commented that the CSE would need an 
additional $9 million to implement the planned reforms. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: The success of the CSE's reforms will depend 
on donor financing, which is in turn contingent upon 
transparency.  Before the elections, Rivas walked a tightrope 
between donor and civil society demands for openness and the 
desire of certain elements of the PLC-FSLN political pact 
(including Lang) to cloud and stall the highly politicized 
cedulation and vote counting processes.  Too often Rivas 
 
allowed Lang to stonewall and shun observer groups -- as 
evidenced by the CSE's continued refusal to publicly release 
the final vote counts of individual tables -- hence Barreto's 
eagerness to explain Lang's eclipse by opposing forces.  We 
and the other election donor countries plan to hear Rivas out 
and give him a  chance to show that the CSE has taken a new 
tack and is ready to seriously approach electoral reform. 
TRIVELLI