VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLO #1062/01 0791109
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201109Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 2407
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2214
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1004
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2833
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 3335
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1019
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2519
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

UNCLAS LONDON 001062 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER TBIO CA FR GM IT JA RS UK EUN
SUBJECT: BTEX FORENSIC EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKSHOP CATALYZES G8 EFFORTS AGAINST BIOTERRORISM 
 
REF: A. STATE 8958 
     ¶B. 06 STATE 112285 
     ¶C. 05 STATE 230244 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The UK and Germany co-hosted, with 
U.S. co-sponsorship, the G8 "Forensic Epidemiology 
Workshop," in London March 13-15, 2007 (Ref A). 
Although the U.S. was the primary source for workshop 
design and facilitation, all three nations worked 
collaboratively to plan and execute the event.  The 
highly successful workshop combined principles of 
public health, epidemiology, and law enforcement in 
investigating suspected bioterrorism -- and brought 
together for the first time public health, law 
enforcement, and foreign affairs officials from all G8 
nations plus the EU/EC.  Incorporating innovative 
tabletop exercises, the workshop was an important 
first step in strengthening communication and 
collaboration both across sectors and across borders. 
Importantly, the dynamic workshop stimulated the 
first-ever public declarations of support from Germany 
and other G8 partners for the ongoing work of the G8 
Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX).  Germany also noted 
publicly the synergy with extant G8 Counterterrorism 
efforts through Roma-Lyon -- a critical step in moving 
forward with G8 efforts to combat bioterrorism.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) The UK and Germany co-hosted, with U.S. co- 
sponsorship, the G8 "Forensic Epidemiology Workshop," 
in London March 13-15, 2007 (Ref A).  Although the 
U.S. was the primary source for workshop design and 
facilitation, all three nations worked collaboratively 
to plan and execute the event.  The highly successful 
workshop combined principles of public health, 
epidemiology, and law enforcement in conducting 
concurrent criminal and epidemiological investigations 
of suspected bioterrorism threats or incidents -- and 
brought together for the first time public health, law 
enforcement, and foreign affairs officials from all G8 
nations plus the EU/EC.  Incorporating U.S.- and UK- 
designed tabletop exercises along with plenary 
sessions and country presentations on joint law 
enforcement-public health investigations, the workshop 
was an important first step in strengthening 
communication and collaboration both across sectors 
and across borders.  The Chairs' Summary (para 9) 
highlights, in particular, the workshop's formidable 
political and policy achievements in catalyzing G8 
partners to an enhanced commitment to combating 
bioterrorism; a full USG report on the workshop itself 
will follow via septel. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
SEA CHANGE IN G8 VIEWS OF BIOTERRORISM EFFORTS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Since initiating at Sea Island in 2004, the 
G8 efforts to combat bioterrorism through the G8 
Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX), the U.S. has 
usually been the primary or, at times, only voice 
within the G8 pushing for continued work in this 
critical area of counterterrorism cooperation. 
Various G8 partners have supported the U.S. in this 
(most notably Canada, Germany, and Japan), but most G8 
partners have typically been more passive partners -- 
reacting to U.S. initiatives but rarely if ever 
proactively engaging in G8 efforts to prepare for or 
respond to bioterrorism.  But, the Forensic 
Epidemiology Workshop in London represents a 
pronounced shift in G8 support for BTEX's continued 
work.  The UK decision in late 2006 to co-host the 
workshop was the first step in this shift -- and was a 
direct result of FBI and HHS/CDC discussions with 
their UK law enforcement and public health 
counterparts who, in turn, encouraged their colleagues 
at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to 
take action.  Together, the U.S. and the UK approached 
Germany about co-hosting the workshop (given the 
German G8 Presidency).  According to German officials, 
Germany came on board somewhat reluctantly and unsure 
of the potential value of this work.  The months of 
preparatory work -- involving collaboration among law 
enforcement, public health, and foreign affairs 
 
officials from all three countries -- set the stage 
for the dynamic and successful workshop and, 
significantly, German and British forceful 
declarations of support for BTEX's ongoing efforts, 
which also recognized the unique multi-sectoral nature 
of BTEX initiatives. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) All G8 nations sent robust, thoughtfully 
composed delegations for the Workshop.  While not 
every delegation included all three sectors (law 
enforcement, public health, foreign affairs), all 
delegations participated actively and extensively in 
every aspect of the workshop -- including the three 
tabletop exercises focused on the themes of: (1) 
intersectoral information sharing, (2) overt 
bioterrorism attack, and (3) covert bioterrorism 
attack.  Notably, for the first time ever, Russia sent 
an appropriate delegation from Moscow for a BTEX 
event, including two foreign affairs officials from 
the MFA's New Threats (counterterrorism) division, and 
two public health experts.  While it was clear that 
countries are at varying levels of sophistication in 
intersectoral collaboration in bioterrorism-related 
investigations, it was equally clear that the workshop 
(particularly the innovative, interactive tabletop 
exercises) stimulated great interest in ways to 
develop such multi-sectoral capacity -- and strong 
linkages were forged between sectors and across 
borders on these issues.  Although not an official 
host, the U.S. was clearly seen as the leading force 
both in this workshop and in this work in general -- 
and the workshop participants drew particularly on the 
combined expertise of the eight U.S. facilitators from 
the FBI, HHS, and CDC.  These U.S. facilitators, along 
with several UK counterparts (from Scotland Yard and 
the Health Protection Agency) and two German 
facilitators with infectious disease backgrounds, were 
responsible for bringing a diverse group of technical 
and policy officials through a complex, interactive 
series of exercises and plenary sessions.  Their 
design and preparation paid off handsomely in a 
smoothly run workshop that stimulated energetic 
discussion, recognition of the concrete importance of 
multi-sectoral collaboration, and, importantly, 
declarations of G8 nations' support for the importance 
of BTEX's continued work. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
FIRST TIME PUBLIC DECLARATIONS OF SUPPORT FOR BTEX 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) At the German-hosted reception during the 
workshop, the German head of delegation (Alexander 
Olbrich) emphasized in his toast that the workshop 
reinforced for Germany the critical importance and 
value of G8 efforts to combat bioterrorism through 
BTEX's work.  Olbrich and the UK's Sarah Broughton had 
each indicated, in earlier conversations, strong 
Russian resistance to continued support for BTEX under 
the G8 Nonproliferation Directors' Group (NPDG), and 
Olbrich took the dramatic step of indicating that as 
far as Germany was concerned, BTEX work would continue 
and expand in 2007 -- if not through NPDG then through 
G8 counterterrorism (Roma-Lyon) efforts or other G8 
channels.  Germany's remarks generated quite a buzz 
among G8 delegations, and many sought out the U.S. 
head of del (Marc Ostfield) for consultation about 
U.S. ideas for next steps for BTEX, including creating 
a G8 BTEX tabletop exercise on Food Defense (Ref B), 
and, most notably, the possibility of moving G8 BTEX 
work to the Roma-Lyon channel where it would have 
greater synergy with extant G8 counterterrorism 
efforts.  It was clear that not only were Germany, the 
UK, Japan, and France making strong declarations of 
support for BTEX, but that they were interested in 
exploring ways for BTEX to become a Roma-Lyon 
subgroup.  Acknowledging that BTEX never had much 
traction within NPDG, these delegations -- composed 
primarily of MFA non-proliferation officials -- were 
motivated to find a better G8 fit for BTEX to further 
the G8 agenda on combating bioterrorism. 
 
 ¶6.  (SBU) It is worth noting that Olbrich also 
stated in his toast that G8 BTEX efforts were "valued- 
 
added" and not redundant with the bioterrorism work in 
the Global Health Security Action Group (GHSAG), the 
coalition of Health Ministers of the so-called "G7 
plus Mexico."  In subsequent conversations, officials 
from the UK, France, and Japan echoed Olbrich's 
sentiment about BTEX.  In fact, a UK health official 
expressed the opinion that the G8 forum was 
particularly productive because BTEX includes foreign 
affairs, law enforcement, agriculture, and other 
sectors beyond just health.  Such sentiments help 
enhance G8 nations' support for BTEX's continued work. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) On the workshop's final day, Broughton 
arranged for Esther Blythe of the FCO's 
counterterrorism division to meet with Ostfield and 
Lindsey Hillesheim of the U.S. delegation.  Blythe 
expressed clear UK interest in constituting BTEX as a 
subgroup of G8 Roma-Lyon efforts, and offered that the 
UK could possibly co-sponsor with the U.S. such a 
proposal at the upcoming Roma-Lyon meeting in Berlin. 
Separately, Olbrich had likewise indicated that he 
would talk with his Roma-Lyon counterparts in the 
German foreign ministry to advocate for continuing 
BTEX work under the auspices of Roma-Lyon 
counterterrorism efforts.  Japanese and French 
officials signaled that they, too, would be having 
similar conversations in Tokyo and Paris.  (NOTE: 
Canada had, almost two years earlier, signaled its 
awareness of BTEX synergy with G8 CT efforts and had, 
as far back as December 2005 (Ref C), switched its 
representative for BTEX from a nonproliferation 
official to a counterterrorism official with 
responsibility for Roma-Lyon efforts.  Russia, 
meanwhile, had indicated to UK and German officials 
its disdain for BTEX in NPDG channels.  However, 
Russia, by sending MFA CT officials to the Workshop, 
has possibly signaled its openness to G8 work on 
bioterrorism and to continuing BTEX in Roma-Lyon 
channels. END NOTE.) 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Thus, in addition to being an important and 
concrete example of valuable interagency teamwork 
involving FBI, HHS, CDC, and State, the Workshop was 
an invaluable catalyst for a deepening commitment 
within the G8 for further efforts to combat 
bioterrorism.  Since 2004, the U.S. has sought to keep 
BTEX and G8 bioterrorism-related work alive through 
the somewhat passive (on this issue) UK G8 Presidency 
of 2005, and the resistant (on this issue) Russian G8 
Presidency of 2006, the dynamic bioterrorism workshop 
last week created the perfect venue and opportunity 
for Germany to signal its strong support for BTEX. 
Germany has now indicated its interest in hosting 
follow-on G8 bioterrorism-related work in Berlin later 
this year, along with the next BTEX policy meeting in 
¶2007.  German support has, likewise, helped encouraged 
enhanced Japanese interest -- of particular importance 
because Japan takes up the G8 Presidency in 2008. 
Japanese officials are now contemplating the 
possibility of hosting in 2008 the proposed G8 BTEX 
Food Defense Tabletop Exercise (Ref B).  The U.S.'s 
exemplary interdisciplinary and interagency teamwork 
in developing the Forensic Epidemiology Workshop has 
helped solidify the groundwork for potentially two 
solid years of support for collaborative G8 efforts to 
combat bioterrorism. 
 
¶9.  (U) BEGIN TEXT OF CHAIRS' SUMMARY. 
 
G8 FORENSIC EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKSHOP, 13-15 MARCH 2007: 
CHAIRS' SUMMARY 
 
The G8 held a workshop from 13-15 March 2007 to share 
perspectives on the importance of a coordinated 
approach by public health professionals, law 
enforcement, and other agencies in conducting joint 
epidemiological and law enforcement bioterrorism 
investigations and to recommend ways to pursue and 
promote such an approach more widely. 
 
This was the first multi-sectoral meeting for public 
health, law enforcement and foreign affairs officials 
in the G8 framework on this important topic. 
Participants came from all G8 members as well as a 
 
representative from the UN as an observer. 
 
Within G8 countries levels and experience of joint 
investigations varies.  Participants heard examples of 
where joint working had been used in the past 
successfully and discussed the potential benefits of 
joint working. Participants agreed that joint 
investigations add value and are beneficial. 
 
Participants shared perspectives and experiences on 
collaborative efforts by law enforcement and public 
health officials to investigate suspected bioterrorism 
incidents. Through three table-top exercises and 
plenary discussions, workshop participants shared and 
discussed national law enforcement and public health 
policy and procedural issues in order effectively to 
identify, assess, respond to a bioterrorism/weapons 
attack and to enable a prosecution. All delegations 
presented their current experience of joint working 
between law enforcement and public health. 
 
Participants considered potential impediments to law 
enforcement-public health collaboration, and agreed 
that it would be useful to develop effective 
strategies to address them within a nation and among 
G8 nations. 
 
The workshop emphasized the international dimension of 
bioterrorism and noted that some lines of 
communications exist on the law enforcement side by 
using Interpol offices but that bilateral contacts are 
currently the primary mechanism.  On the public health 
side there are also bilateral contacts and the 
established reporting and alarm systems of the WHO, 
designed primarily for natural diseases. 
 
Participants agreed that to pursue effective forensic 
epidemiology through law enforcement-public health 
collaboration to assist with investigations into 
bioterrorism and other relevant incidents it was 
necessary at a national level to: 
 
-- Identify all the relevant public bodies responsible 
for investigating crimes affecting the public's 
health, as well as those responsible for investigating 
the cause of infectious diseases and preventing their 
spread and create networks to enable collaborative 
investigations; 
 
-- Develop and implement or refine procedures or 
arrangements for conducting joint investigations on 
potential biological terrorism incidents or other 
public health problems resulting from criminal or 
other intentional actions; 
 
-- Identify ways to strengthen the capacities of 
public health and law enforcement official public 
bodies related to joint investigations of bioterrorism 
events, such as:  disease surveillance and reporting; 
laboratory capacities for testing and identifying 
biological terrorism agents; training law enforcement 
and public health representatives to understand the 
priorities of epidemiologic work on a crime scene; and 
developing common procedures for the safe collection 
of samples and to maintain a chain of custody that 
fulfills both the requirements of jurisdictional 
prosecution as well as laboratory and medical 
practice. 
 
Internationally, it would be beneficial to identify 
regional and international organisations that can help 
to build networks and procedures towards enabling 
collaborative investigations. 
 
 
Participants agreed that the workshop was very useful 
and a successful exchange of views and experiences in 
national and international co-operation of law 
enforcement and public health.  It provided insights 
and ideas that may provide information for improving 
national systems or agreeing best practices. 
Participants agreed that further work in the G8 
grouping on forensic epidemiology and other topics 
relevant to bioterrorism would be valuable.  The 
successful outcome of this workshop is an incentive to 
 
continue close co-operation of G8 members in the 
Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX) to improve G8 common 
efforts in combating bioterrorism. 
 
END TEXT OF CHAIRS' SUMMARY. 
 
¶10.  (U) This cable has been cleared by the USG BTEX 
delegation. 
 
Visit London's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm 
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