VZCZCXYZ0027
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0696/01 0721944
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P 131944Z MAR 07
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UNCLAS LA PAZ 000696 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL
SUBJECT: EL ALTO: YOUNG, POOR, AND A POLITICAL FORCE 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) El Alto, Bolivia's fastest growing and second 
largest city, celebrated its 22nd anniversary March 6.  The 
average Alteno, as residents of El Alto are called, is young, 
poor, indigenous, and a recent migrant to the city.  To many 
observers, El Alto appears to be the most capitalist city in 
Bolivia; over 40 percent of residents are self-employed. 
Paradoxically, despite their capitalist exterior, Altenos 
form a significant part of President Evo Morales' base; he 
enjoys an 80 percent approval rating in El Alto.  However, 
positive approval ratings do not guarantee that Altenos will 
remain tranquil.  El Alto's strategic location next to 
Bolivia's capital means that its protests can cripple La Paz. 
 Altenos, encouraged by local radical organizations, forced 
President Carlos Mesa to resign in June 2005 despite a 
greater than 50 percent approval rating.  President Morales 
recognizes that he cannot take the city for granted, so he 
visits El Alto frequently and is quick to offer government 
handouts, such as the USD $50 million package he unveiled 
March 3.  Morales and El Alto appear to have entered into an 
unspoken contract; Morales must periodically deliver much 
needed services and in exchange Altenos promise their 
support.  This cable is the first in a series that will 
highlight the challenges facing El Alto as well as its 
importance to Bolivian politics.  End Summary. 
 
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El Alto Demographics 101 
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¶2. (U) El Alto, Bolivia's fastest growing city (with its 
population exploding by 30 percent since 2000), celebrated 
its 22nd anniversary March 6.  El Alto has surpassed its 
neighbor, the capital La Paz, as Bolivia's second largest 
city with over 860,000 inhabitants.  Altenos are primarily 
indigenous.  Over 75 percent consider themselves Aymara; five 
to seven percent self-identify as Quechua.  Over 60 percent 
of residents are under 25; the average age is 22.  Many older 
Altenos are ex-miners who moved to El Alto after the GOB 
closed state-run mines in the 1980,s. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Per the 2001 census, over 70 percent of Altenos are 
poor.  More than 50 percent suffer from inadequate access to 
potable water, sewage, electricity, and health services.  The 
city currently only has three hospitals.  A police presence 
is also seriously lacking.  Poloff recently visited the 
city's only detective squad, which consists of less than 30 
investigators and solves only very rarely any crimes.  Not 
surprisingly, Altenos often resort to vigilantism to resolve 
differences.  The city's tremendous growth, tiny tax base, 
bureaucratic inefficiency, and corruption contribute to the 
dearth of services.  Coupled with the municipal government's 
inability to cope with the city's runaway growth, previous 
GOBs traditionally neglected El Alto.  Altenos, rightly or 
wrongly, view racism as the principal cause of this neglect. 
 
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El Alto Economics 101 
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¶4. (SBU)  To the outsider, El Alto appears to be the most 
capitalist city in Bolivia. Over 40 percent of Altenos are 
self-employed.  Many work informally as small merchants, and 
indeed free market competition in El Alto is so severe that 
it undercuts faith in capitalism.  The constant influx of 
people and foreign products to El Alto results in fierce 
price competition.  Price deflation is a common complaint 
amongst older vendors, who state they work longer hours for 
less money because of the ever-increasing supply of sellers. 
 
¶5. (U) Strategically located next to the capital, El Alto is 
home to La Paz's airport and is the transit point for all but 
one of the major highway's linking La Paz to the rest of 
Bolivia.  While officially divided into nine districts, the 
city consists of 550 plus neighborhoods, each with its own 
neighborhood association.  Most neighborhoods have sprung up 
without municipal government approval, so a neighborhood 
association's primary role is to pressure the municipality to 
provide access to services.  Association leadership is 
generally leftist and radical, and leaders function as 
old-style "ward bosses."  Membership in neighborhood 
associations is obligatory, as is following the leadership's 
orders.  Since the municipal government lacks authority in 
many areas, the FEJUVE (Federation of Neighborhood 
Associations) exerts significant control over citizens. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
El Alto in National Politics: A Focal Point for Resistance 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Paradoxically and despite the fiercely capitalist 
tone of economic life, Altenos form a significant part of Evo 
Morales' base.  He enjoys 80 percent (or higher) approval 
ratings in El Alto.  (Note: Some argue that Morales' 80 
percent support is not a coincidence given the city is 80 
percent indigenous and that Morales has locked up the 
indigenous vote.  End Note).  Many of El Alto's self-employed 
used to work for state-run companies that were privatized in 
the 1980s and 1990s; Morales' nationalization policy is 
popular because workers remember the steady wages and 
benefits of state-run companies, and contrast this "golden 
age" with the fierce competition and declining living 
standards of El Alto's free market system. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  El Alto is often the focal point for resistance to 
the GOB.  Positive approval ratings in El Alto do not ensure 
a president's ability to maintain order there.  El Alto's 
strategic location means that well-organized demonstrations 
can completely cut off the capital.  Leftist organizations 
like the FEJUVE and the El Alto chapter of the Central Obrera 
Boliviana (COB) frequently urge their followers to protest 
against and encircle the GOB.  Altenos were protagonists in 
the 2003 and 2005 protests that toppled presidents Gonzalo 
Sanchez de Lozada and his successor Carlos Mesa.  President 
Mesa resigned in June 2005 despite a higher than 50 percent 
approval rating. 
 
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Comment 
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¶8. (SBU) Having himself led Altenos to protest and oust 
previous governments, Morales does not take the city for 
granted.  Morales and El Alto appear to have entered into an 
unspoken contract; Morales must periodically deliver 
services, like his March 3 plan to invest close to USD $50 
million in El Alto. (USD $25 million is slated for home gas 
hook-ups; USD $10 million for sewage improvements; and an 
additional USD $5 million for expanded access to potable 
water).  In return, Altenos give Morales their support. 
 
¶9. (SBU) A recent poll identified El Alto as the "least happy 
city in the southern cone."  Given the political pressure El 
Alto can wield, we can expect to Morales to continue to look 
after its interests.  As El Alto's municipal council 
president stated March 3, "El Alto has been, and will be the 
vanguard, the support and the base of all the changes you are 
leading, and we will respond if necessary to defend these 
changes . . ."  With that in mind, Morales has also proposed 
reducing the voting age to 16.  Given the city's young 
population, this could translate into tens of thousands of 
additional Altenos voting for Morales and his MAS party in 
future elections.  End Comment. 
GOLDBERG