VZCZCXRO2687
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0459/01 0811559
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221559Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6586
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000459 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT:  AMIS CEASEFIRE COMMISSION WEEK OF MARCH 19: SECOND CHAMBER 
IMPASSES AND VERIFICATION EXERCISE 
 
REFS: (A) KHARTOUM 0395 
 
      (B) KHARTOUM 0438 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) SLA-Minawi raised objections to the African Union Mission 
in Sudan's (AMIS) potential restructuring of the CFC Second Chamber, 
contending that the proposals may violate the DPA.  Carjackings 
remain a persistent threat, and AMIS is seeking input from all key 
stakeholders on means to mitigate the problem.  The CFC continued 
process-related discussion of the Sudanese government's plan to 
disarm the Janjaweed, committing to an initial timeline to advance 
the program.  No specific ceasefire violation cases were considered, 
though parties previewed several recent incidents.  The CFC 
Secretariat confirmed that verification of factions' areas of 
 
SIPDIS 
control - both signatory and non-signatory - have commenced and may 
be completed by early April.  End summary. 
 
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OBJECTIONS PERSIST TO CFC RESTRUCTURING 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) SLA-Minawi Ceasefire Commission (CFC) Representative Adam 
Ali War continued to protest AMIS' proposed restructuring of the 
CFC, which would include fewer total reps per faction in the sectors 
and a reduction in Monthly Subsistence Allowance (MSA) (Reftels). 
Notwithstanding AMIS Force Commander Aprezi's assertion that Minni 
had already agreed to CFC reconfiguration, SLA-Minawi 
representatives argued that cutting back the number of 
representatives constituted a violation of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA).  (Note: Article 25, paragraph 233 of the DPA 
stipulates that "AMIS shall increase the number of its military 
observers, particularly from the Parties...so that it is better able 
to cover the territory of Darfur..."  The DPA, however, does not 
prohibit a right-sizing of CFC representatives.  End Note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Responding to War's objections, the Force Commander 
explained that the CFC restructuring decisions were taken in 
Khartoum at the AU political level and that there was "nothing I can 
do to reverse them."  Several CFC observers recommended that the 
Parties raise their complaints through the appropriate channels in 
Khartoum should they wish to revisit the issue.  (Comment: The Force 
Commander's sidestepping of responsibility for the CFC restructuring 
is only partially valid.  Embassy Poloffs attended the international 
stakeholders meeting in Khartoum on March 11 in which AMIS made 
recommendations regarding CFC streamlining.  Donors agreed with 
AMIS' proposal to reduce the rate of individual MSA but provided no 
input and took no decisions on the number of CFC signatory 
representatives per sector.  End Comment.) 
 
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VEHICLE SNATCHERS 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Carjackings remain a concern throughout Darfur, impeding 
the efforts of the humanitarian community, UN, AMIS and even the 
Government, which filed a complaint alleging SLA-Minawi's 
culpability for the carjacking of a National Intelligence and 
Security Service (NISS) vehicle in Ed Daein, South Darfur.  After a 
lengthy and heated exchange between SLA-Minawi and Government 
representatives - with occasional interventions by international 
observers - the two sides agreed to resolve the matter between 
themselves "as DPA partners."  The discussion, however, prompted the 
Force Commander to ponder aloud how AMIS might serve as a catalyst 
to bring all stakeholders together to contemplate solutions to the 
carjacking problem.  CFC participants agreed that AMIS should reach 
out to the UN, humanitarian community and other relevant parties to 
invite them to brainstorm and strategize on ways to mitigate the 
trend in vehicle thefts; this meeting will be held on March 28. 
 
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JANJAWEED DISARMAMENT 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Responding to the U.S. observer about the current status of 
efforts to advance the Sudanese government's Janjaweed disarmament 
plan, the Force Commander remarked that he intended to first hold 
AMIS-Government consultations on the plan, then to present the 
findings and recommendations to the broader CFC group for its review 
and input.  The UN observer noted his organization's preference to 
be involved in the review process from the start and offered the 
assistance of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
technical experts.  CFC participants agreed that the AMIS-Government 
consultations should be completed and ready for presentation to the 
larger group by April 4.  (Comment:  AMIS has discussed the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000459  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Janjaweed disarmament plan for months with no substantive progress. 
As much as the Sudanese government may be unwilling to implement the 
plan, AMIS has demonstrated little commitment to undertaking a 
serious review of the proposal or organizing the international 
community to expedite the process.  The Department should tap DDR 
experts to analyze the GoS plan and develop concrete recommendations 
for its improvement.  End Comment.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
FEW CASES, VERIFICATION IN TRAIN 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) No specific ceasefire violation cases were raised the week 
of March 19, though SLA-Minawi previewed an incident involving the 
killing of at least two of its soldiers, allegedly by Sudanese Armed 
Forces, in the vicinity of Saiyah, North Darfur.  SLA-Minawi 
representative Colonel Ahmed Gardiya Khamis attempted to solicit a 
more in-depth discussion of the case, but the CFC First Vice 
Chairman stopped him.  He noted that the item was not on the agenda 
and that no one in the CFC had received the statement of complaint 
outlining the incident.  The matter will be referred to Sector Six 
for investigation.  (Note: SLA-Minawi Security Arrangements 
Committee representatives provided a statement of the alleged 
killings to S/CRS Poloff on March 20, who advised them to raise the 
issue in the appropriate Sector sub-CFC, which is responsible for 
carrying out the investigation and forwarding, as required, the case 
to the Headquarters CFC.  End Note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Force Commander noted that all sectors have been tasked 
to complete verification of parties' areas of control by April 2, in 
accordance with the requirements (not the timeline, however) of the 
DPA's security arrangements provisions. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶8. (SBU) The relative calm throughout Darfur was reflected in the 
paucity of ceasefire violations raised over the previous week. 
Still, major and minor hurdles remain unresolved in improving CFC 
capacity.  The Sudanese government continues to reject the 
deployment of non-signatory representatives to the Sector level, 
stalling the Second Chamber concept and preventing an established 
channel of communication to non-signatories to facilitate ceasefire 
violation investigations and humanitarian access.  Now that the 
international community had pledged to pay CFC reps - both signatory 
and non-signatory - at reduced levels, it should turn its concerted 
attention to pressuring the Government to allow the presence of 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and SLA/Non-signatory Factions 
(SLA-NSF) members at AMIS sector headquarters and group sites. 
Another snag in the CFC's functioning - and, in fact, AMIS 
operations throughout Darfur - is the ongoing strike by AMIS 
language assistants, who have not received MSA since December.  In 
the interim, an interpreter employed by Post has been filling in at 
the CFC meetings.  Finally, genuine and visible progress in 
executing a realistic Janjaweed disarmament plan is a prerequisite 
for advancing the peace process in Darfur; high-level political 
attention should be re-focused on this particular facet of the DPA. 
End comment. 
 
HUME