VZCZCXRO2001
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0445/01 0810534
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220534Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6550
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000445 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT: CFC Week of March 12 - SLA/Minawi Takes Responsibility for 
Killing and Seeks Help 
 
REF: (A) KHARTOUM 00396 
 
 (B) KHARTOUM 00409 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Force Commander announced that the next Joint 
Commission would not be held in El Fasher because of insecurity but 
did not suggest a date or an alternate venue.  He discussed the new 
arrangements in the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) with a drop in MSA 
payments and a reduction in numbers to streamline the organization 
and make way for the deployment of the Second Chamber, which he 
continues to hope the Sudanese government will approve.  Aprezi will 
give the factions two weeks to verify their sectors and hopes to 
present a comprehensive sector verification map at the next Joint 
Commission.  Aprezi said that the Government has offered to take 
back responsibility for Graida from the SLA/Minawi.  The report on 
the March 5 killing of the two AMIS soldiers clearly pins 
responsibility for the deaths on SLA/Minawi, which Aprezi said is 
corroborated by one of the wounded soldiers and was conceded by 
Minawi himself.  In a sidebar meeting with international observers, 
Aprezi discussed a private meeting he and AMIS leadership had with 
Minawi, who he said is desperately seeking help to hold his faction 
together.  Aprezi in turn asked for the international community to 
take a stronger interest, as "without Minni, there is no DPA."  End 
Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
EL FASHER NOT SAFE ENOUGH FOR JC 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Aprezi had just returned from three days in Khartoum where 
he said he held meetings with Minni Minawi, the GOS Senior Military 
Command, the international community, and AMIS leadership.  He 
announced up front that the next Joint Commission meeting would not 
be held in El Fasher due to insecurity.  Until the Sudanese 
government can provide a safe and secure environment here, he said, 
we will not risk bringing in VIPs to attend.  He then intimated that 
there were some AMIS politics involved in this decision but did not 
elaborate. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Aprezi said that there was a high-level Sudanese government 
delegation in El Fasher looking at how to improve security and 
better coordinate among the various players here.  He mentioned 
problems in the coordination with the Western Command that the 
delegation from Khartoum would help with. 
 
------------------ 
CHANGES IN THE CFC 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Aprezi briefed the group on changes that had been agreed to 
by the international donors and the faction leadership in Khartoum 
on the functioning of the CFC (Ref A).  He said the mission support 
allowance would be cut to $1,000 per month at headquarters and $500 
at the group sites.  The international donors agreed to fund this 
amount and to pay the arrears through February, with the new amount 
staring on March 1. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The number of representatives at the group sites would be 
reduced, but there were still two options for how to do so, pending 
approval from the Government for the deployment of the Second 
Chamber. Both options would have two persons per faction in the CFC 
headquarters but differ on representation at the group sites: 1) Two 
representatives from each faction at the eight sector headquarters 
or 2) Representatives only in Nyala, El Fasher, and Geneina in 
anticipation of the change to three sectors.  In either case, 
factions would only have representatives in the sub-sectors in areas 
where they have verified control or where their faction has 
constituents.  Aprezi hopes that both options will include 
deployment of the non-signatories for the Second Chamber, which is 
still pending Government approval. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Aprezi said that he prefers the three sector option, which 
would have the CFC organized in parallel to changes that will be 
made to the AMIS layout when the two new battalions arrive, which he 
anticipates in the coming months.  He also said he will lay down new 
rules for the faction representatives.  First, there will be 
mandatory rotation, with no rep exceeding one year in a sector. 
Second, the factions will recommend people for the CFC, but once 
their names are forwarded, their status and responsibilities will be 
clearly spelled out in a contract with the Chairman.  He said this 
should stop the proliferation of breakaway factions that put forward 
new representatives and will keep standards high.  Third, the 
standard operating procedures will be enforced, and there will be no 
pay for reps who are not actively pursuing their function. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The SLA/Minawi rep asked if there was still any room for 
 
KHARTOUM 00000445  002 OF 003 
 
 
discussion and the FC answered that since the proposal had already 
been briefed to the faction leaders, no.  The GOS rep questioned 
whether the new proposal was in keeping with the letter of the DPA 
and urged that it be reviewed a last time with that in mind. 
 
--------------------------- 
SECTOR VERIFICATION SET OUT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) With regards to the sector verification exercise that was 
started recently, Aprezi said he will not discuss it further but 
plans to clearly spell out how it will be conducted.  He will 
formally write to the factions and give them two weeks to complete 
their plotting for verification.  AMIS will roll it all together in 
time for the next Joint Commission. 
 
--------------------------- 
GOVERNMENT TO "TAKE" GRAIDA 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) We then discussed the security situation in Graida in the 
wake of the killing of the two AMIS soldiers on March 5.  The FC 
said that he has received a letter from the Sudanese government 
stating that if SLA/Minawi does not secure Graida, the Government 
will take it by force.  He said that SLA/Minawi has stated at 
different times that it would be willing to give Graida up, and 
pointed out that with the two additional battalions Graida will be a 
battalion headquarters so AMIS would also have the option of 
securing the town.  SLA/Minawi rep asked how the GOS can threaten to 
"take Graida," and asked if this would be a violation of the DPA. 
He said he would raise it with his leadership.  The Government 
representative said that Sudanese forces had pulled out of Graida 
when asked to do so by SLA/Minawi, but acted on the assumption that 
SLA/Minawi could secure the town.  Since they have failed to do so, 
it is time to revisit the arrangement. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Force Commander then accused SLA/Minawi of being the 
only faction that is not taking responsibility for its areas. 
SLA/Minawi representative cited a recent threat against the deputy 
head of the party, but Aprezi cut him off by stating that he knows 
this was actually "Minni on Minni" violence.  He urged SLA/Minawi to 
be honest about its lack of control in an area like this and to 
allow the Sudanese government or AMIS to take over. 
 
------------------------------- 
KILLING OF AMIS SOLDIERS BY SLA 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The only violation we considered was the killing of two 
AMIS soldiers in Graida on 5 March 2007.  The report is titled 
"Investigation Report on the Attack on AMIS personnel and Snatching 
of Vehicle Reg AMIS 242 in Graida by SLA(MM) soldiers on 5 March 
2007."  SLA/Minawi is listed as the "who" in the introduction, and 
under "why" it states "the SLA(MM) soldiers act was intentional to 
kill AMIS personnel and snatch the vehicle."  The opinion section 
states "the attack of SLA(MM) soldiers against AMIS personnel and 
property in Graida was done intentionally.  This deliberate attack 
carried out by a group of SLA(MM) soldiers against AMIS constitutes 
a major violation of the DPA."  It recommends the sanctioning of the 
faction, bringing the perpetrators to justice through national or 
international criminal courts, and condemning the act in the media. 
There is a statement by the SLA/Minawi sector representative that 
suggests some other group carried out the act to sully the 
reputation of SLA(MM) but oddly he also signed the report which 
names his faction as the guilty party. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Force Commander explained that days after the incident 
SLA/Minawi said they had located the vehicle and asked AMIS to come 
pick it up.  The Force Commander declined to do so, saying he wants 
the perpetrators not the vehicle.  He said he brought the wounded 
soldier back with him when he returned from Khartoum, and the 
soldier knows the SLA/Minawi soldiers who carried out the attack by 
sight.  When the SLA/Minawi representative challenged the Force 
Commander on the issue of blame, the Force Commander dismissed his 
challenge by stating that he had already discussed it with Minni 
Minawi himself, who conceded that his faction was responsible.  The 
Force Commander then asked to meet separately with the UN, EU, and 
U.S. observers.   (Note: Per Ref B, Minawi denies that he conceded 
SLM responsibility.  He claims that his offers to conduct a joint 
AU/SLM investigation to identify and detain the attackers were 
rebuffed by the AU, including Aprezi.  End note.) 
 
----------------- 
MINAWI IN TROUBLE 
----------------- 
 
KHARTOUM 00000445  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Force Commander briefed S/CRS Poloffs privately about 
the discussion he, DPA Implementation Chief Sam Ibok, and Acting 
Head of Mission Mukaruliza had had with Minawi.  Minawi conceded to 
him that his organization is in trouble.  When they were fighting, 
Minawi said, they had other ways of supplying themselves, which is 
how they were able to sustain 45,000 men in the field.  Now they are 
down to a handful.  Minawi reportedly told the Force Commander that 
he has trouble maintaining control over his areas.  He said that the 
day after he had met with his commanders on a recent trip to Darfur, 
they stole two vehicles. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Aprezi said there is widespread concern in AMIS 
headquarters over the state of the Minawi faction.  Aprezi told us 
that the sentiment among AMIS leadership is "if there is no Minawi, 
there is no DPA."  When confronted with the evidence on the March 5 
attack on AMIS, Minawi reportedly came clean and admitted it was his 
people who carried out the attack, but said he simply does not have 
the material resources to keep his men on his side.  The Force 
Commander said Minawi cited a figure of 25 vehicles configured for 
heavy weapons that have gone over to the National Redemption Front 
(NRF) with defectors over the past several months.  Aprezi said he 
wanted to do a side bar meeting with the international community to 
stress that Minawi needs help, and if we do not help him, "the DPA 
will be dead." 
 
¶15. (SBU) We then discussed the various initiatives for humanitarian 
assistance to the faction, the first tranche of which went out 
earlier in the week.  Aprezi mentioned that LTG Ismet, the "land 
forces commander for Darfur" was in El Fasher to help improve 
security here and General Al-Dabi may be coming out as well to work 
these issues.  He thought they might be helpful interlocutors in 
making these same points, since the Government is responsible for 
carrying out the program of non-military aid to the factions. 
 
HUME