VZCZCXRO0246
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0438/01 0791401
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201401Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6537
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000438 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT:  CFC VISIT TO ABECHE: MGS CONSTRAINTS AND JEM INTRANSIGENCE 
 
REF: (A) KHARTOUM 00396 
 (B) KHARTOUM 00304 
 (C) KHARTOUM 00331 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) Members of the AMIS Ceasefire Commission traveled to 
Abeche, Chad to receive an operations update from the local Military 
Observer Group Site (MGS) Commander and to engage the JEM 
leadership.  The MGS faces severe logistical constraints, including 
transportation and communications, which hamper its ability to 
function effectively.  JEM officials reiterated their continued 
adherence to the N'djamena (Humanitarin Ceasefire Agreement) HCFA, 
rejection of the DPA, and demands to be consulted by the AU on a 
range of ceasefire- and political process-related issues.  The visit 
offered another window on the AMIS Force Commander's strengths and 
weaknesses and underscored the limitations of AU political capacity. 
End Summary. 
 
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MGS ABECHE NEEDS HELP 
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¶2. (SBU) On March 18, the Abeche MGS Commander briefed members of 
the Ceasefire Commission (CFC), including AMIS Force Commander Luke 
Aprezi, CFC Secretariat staff and the EU and U.S. observers, on the 
group site's operations and constraints.  The MGS mission to liaise 
with Chadian and French forces, monitor cross-border refugee 
movement and security around their camps, and maintain awareness of 
rebel and militia activities is severely constrained by numerous 
logistical and administrative challenges.  The MGS Commander 
outlined the lack of communications (no Internet connectivity - AMIS 
relies on UNHCR or local French forces to send email - and only one 
satellite phone), transportation challenges (only eight operational 
vehicles, few spare parts and scant helicopter support), and other 
operational obstacles (broken generators, inadequate medical 
support, poor accommodations, and insufficient funds to pay rent and 
utility bills).  The MGS and Protection Force (PF) Commanders both 
voiced their dissatisfaction that their troops had not received 
Mission Support Allowance (MSA) since November 2006, further eroding 
morale.  The AMIS Force Commander, somewhat defensively, chided the 
MGS Commander for his "incomplete reports" but pledged to try to 
improve the group site's logistical and administrative posture. 
(Note: PAE support does not extend to Chad, leaving the MGS to fend 
largely for itself.  End Note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) The MGS Commander also noted that the border monitoring 
force envisioned under the Sudan-Chad Tripoli Agreement was being 
established.  He remarked that Libyan forces - no mention of the 
type, numbers or specific equipment - have already arrived in Abeche 
and are using vehicles with AU (vice AMIS) markings.  (Note: The CFC 
Vice Chairman, French Brigadier General Sintes, noted to S/CRS 
Poloff that French forces in Abeche informed him that at least 20 
Eritrean military personnel are currently in El Geneina, also as 
part of the Tripoli border monitoring force.  End Note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
JEM UNYIELDING IN ITS VIEWS ON DPA, POLITICAL PROCESS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Following the MGS Commander's briefing, members of the CFC 
met with Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) political leaders 
Tadjadine Bechir Niam, Osman Ahmed Godul and Ahmed Tugod Lissan. 
Force Commander Aprezi noted that this was his first encounter with 
the JEM officials and proceeded to describe his efforts to bolster 
the effectiveness of the CFC, including through the creation of a 
Second Chamber for non-signatories.  Aprezi summarized recent 
decisions taken in regards to streamlining the CFC and hurdles still 
facing the body (Ref A).  He emphasized his desire for 
"inclusiveness" in the CFC and urged JEM participation in the Second 
Chamber, which collapsed in mid-February (Ref B). 
 
¶5. (SBU) Niam, who serves as the JEM spokesman, representative to 
the AU and member of the Joint Commission (N'djamena HCFA), began 
his opening salvo by reiterating JEM's rejection of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) and its insistence that the 2004 N'djamena HCFA 
remain the cornerstone of JEM-AMIS relations.  He complained that 
since the signing of the DPA, AMIS had excluded JEM from meaningful 
participation in the CFC and Joint Commission.  Niam argued that the 
signing of the DPA did not abrogate the HCFA, and that without any 
operational or political mechanism to communicate, JEM would remain 
opposed to AMIS engagement.  The JEM spokesman, becoming 
increasingly agitated, laid the blame for "anarchy in Darfur" on the 
shoulders of AMIS, which he accused of complicity with the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000438  002 OF 002 
 
 
Government of Sudan.  Furthermore, he rejected the Force Commander's 
CFC proposals to distribute JEM representatives only at Sector 
headquarters and in areas where they exercised some measure of 
control.  (Note:  As the Government continues to refuse the 
deployment of non-signatories to the Sector level, JEM's views on 
the FC's proposition is a moot point.  JEM insists that it is 
entitled to representation throughout Darfur, as specified under the 
HCFA.  End Note.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) JEM Senior Negotiator and Chief of External Affairs Ahmed 
Tugod Lissan reinforced Niam's arguments and emphasized JEM's 
perception of AMIS' "failure to consult" and deliberate attempts to 
exclude the rebel group.  He demanded that JEM representatives 
return to the field and asserted that the Force Commander's plan to 
place representatives only in MGS areas where they exerted control 
would lead to more in-fighting as rebel groups vied to expand their 
territories.  He endorsed Niam's recommendations to AMIS, namely to 
(1) improve consultations with JEM; (2) formalize correspondence in 
writing, to include the CFC proposals; (3) reconsider the 
functioning of the CFC and immediately redeploy JEM representatives 
throughout Darfur; and (4) de-link implementation of the ceasefire 
with the issue of DPA signatories versus non-signatories and 
"concentrate on saving lives." 
 
¶7. (SBU) Lissan noted that JEM was prepared to facilitate AMIS' 
mission as long as the rebel group had a seat at the table in 
accordance with the HCFA.  He declared that the perpetually delayed 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) field commanders' conference in Umm Rai 
(Ref C) would lead to greater divisions within the movements, 
postulating that at least three groups would emerge, led 
respectively by Sharif Hariri, Khamis Abdallah and Ahmed Abdul 
Shafi.  Lissan did not give any indication of JEM outreach to SLA 
rebels, though he claimed that both groups were ultimately united in 
their objectives.  He suggested that the international community 
should sponsor a joint military-political conference rather than 
just one for field commanders, as they lack political experience and 
will only further confuse the situation. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Regarding efforts by the AU-UN Joint Mediation Support Team 
(JMST) to facilitate political dialogue with the non-signatories, 
Lissan rejected the participation of AU Special Envoy Salim Salim 
and DPA Implementation Team Chief Sam Ibok.  "I have nothing against 
them personally," the JEM leader claimed, "but we cannot accept them 
as they are the ones responsible for the DPA."  Lissam clarified 
that he did not oppose the AU's role in political mediation, just 
those individuals associated with the Abuja negotiations. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9. (SBU) The visit to Abeche provided another window on Force 
Commander Aprezi's strengths and weaknesses.  Over the past six 
months, he has demonstrated sincerity in reaching out to the JEM and 
SLA Non-Signatories Factions (NSF), meeting with their 
representatives on a regular basis, traveling to their strongholds 
(in Umm Rai, Jebel Moon and Abeche), and pressing the Sudanese 
Government to accept the non-signatories' return to the Sectors. 
His proactive approach, however, also underlines the deficiency of 
AU political capacity and the linkages between the organization's 
political and military branches.  Neither the Deputy Head of Mission 
nor his lone political officer in El Fasher attended the meeting 
(both have been repeatedly ill or otherwise absent) and there were 
awkward moments when the FC was drawn into political territory. In 
contrast to his predecessor, Aprezi has demonstrated an interest in 
hearing first-hand his subordinates' problems.  However, he 
continues to delve into the weeds (e.g., giving a lengthy lecture on 
the necessity of documenting the MGS's generator failure) and is 
unwilling to delegate decision-making authority to the appropriate 
staff officers. End Comment. 
 
HUME