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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM437, STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM437 2007-03-20 13:53 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0219
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0437/01 0791353
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201353Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6534
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000437 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU EAID PINS MARR PHUM
 
SUBJECT:  STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SUDAN TO THE SUDAN CONSORTIUM Khartoum, 20 
 
SIPDIS 
March 2007 
 
ΒΆ1. (SBU) Following is the text of remarks given by Acting Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan Mr. Taye 
Brooke-Zerihoun to the Sudan Consortium on March 20, 2007. Further 
consortium reporting will follow septel. 
 
(Begin Text) 
 
Mr. Chairman, Honourable Ministers and Delegates. Ladies and 
Gentlemen, 
 
Thank you for the invitation to update this important meeting on 
progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
since this Consortium last convened a year ago. 
 
Since then, much of the spotlight of international attention, and 
indeed the attention of many of us, has focused on events in Darfur 
- and for good reason. The UN Mission in Sudan has devoted 
substantial resources to supporting the political process for peace 
in Darfur, delivering and/or planning the first two phases of UN 
support to AMIS - the Light and Heavy Support Packages - as well as 
planning with the African Union for the transition to a hybrid 
peacekeeping operation. But it needs to be stressed that these 
efforts make sense only if they are undertaken in the context of a 
meaningful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The 
CPA remains the bedrock for sustainable peace in Sudan. We must 
invest in it, and urge the Parties to do likewise. Only then will 
Sudan be able to return to peace and realize the tremendous 
Potential of its people. 
 
The CPA is not simply a bilateral power-sharing deal. It provides 
for constitutional reform, for new national institutions that 
respect human rights and the diversity of Sudan's people. It 
provides for decentralization of government and fiscal reform, to 
help ensure communities benefit from their own resources and combat 
the tensions between centre and periphery that have often been at 
the root of instability and conflict in the country. The CPA calls 
for reconciliation between peoples, and for the parties to work in 
good faith to address the outstanding differences between them. This 
complex Agreement, which put an end to one of the longest and 
bloodiest conflicts in Africa, needs and deserves the sustained 
attention and support of the international community more than ever 
before. 
 
Mr. Chairman, a little over two months ago, on 9 January, we marked 
the second anniversary of the signing of the CPA. Although progress 
continues to be made in implementation of the Agreement, there is 
wide-spread concern that the "spirit of Naivasha" has been largely 
absent. For the most part., the Parties have co-operated in those 
areas of implementation that shore up their respective positions. 
But there remains profound mistrust between them as was publicly 
aired in Juba on 9 January. 
 
Some of the progress made in CPA implementation is noteworthy. On 
the power-sharing agenda, almost all of the commissions provided for 
in the Agreement have now been established. In October, the National 
Constitutional Review Commission was revitalized, with a mandate to 
prepare the legal instruments necessary to give effect to the CPA. 
The National Assembly has approved some important 
legislation, including the law establishing the Civil Service 
Commission to help increase representation of Southern Sudanese in 
national institutions. 
 
Equally, there has been progress on wealth-sharing. On 9 January, 
the two Central Banks jointly launched a new currency, the Sudanese 
pound, in line with the requirements of the CPA. After long delays, 
the National Petroleum has agreed on its rules of procedure, 
although it has yet to convene officially. On the other hand, the 
Commission responsible for overseeing transparent fiscal transfers 
to the state level the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and 
Monitoring Commission - has begun its work. 
 
On the security agenda, the conventional cease-fire has been 
respected by the parties except for the serious clashes in Malakal 
in November last year, which were unprecedented in intensity since 
the signing of the CPA. There have also been localized and sporadic 
acts of violence, often attributed to the indiscipline of soldiers 
or militia. In all cases, the Cease-fire Joint Military Committee 
and its network of Area Cease-fire Committees have succeeded in 
preventing escalation of security incidents. Redeployment of the 
Sudanese Armed Forces from Southern Sudan is also making good 
progress, and completion of the redeployment by 9 July this year 
will be an important milestone. 
 
However, peace is not simply the absence of conflict. It is much, 
much more. The apparent mistrust between the Parties has implied a 
 
KHARTOUM 00000437  002 OF 003 
 
 
lack of commitment to genuine partnership and to the qualitative 
objectives of the CPA: political inclusion, democratic governance 
and protection of human rights. It has also constrained the 
effective functioning of seminal institutions like the Assessment 
and Evaluation Commission (AEC) and the Ceasefire Political 
Commission, among others. 
 
Progress on the security protocol has suffered as well. The 
formation of Joint integrated Units is behind schedule. Although the 
parties have recently agreed on a common doctrine, most JID units on 
the ground are at best co-located but not yet integrated. Other 
Armed Groups continue to exist long after the deadline for their 
integration into one or the other party or their disbandment. 
Moreover, some OAGs are still switching allegiance, perpetuating 
instability and insecurity, and fuelling suspicion about proxy 
forces. 
 
Two years after the signing of the CPA, Abyei, Southern Kordofan and 
Blue Nile have not received the attention they deserve. There is 
still no agreement on an interim administration for Abyei or on its 
boundary. Demarcation of the North-South border, itself is behind 
schedule, although the responsible Committee has recently made some 
progress in its activities. The situation is further complicated by 
worrying reports of increasing militarization in the Abyei area, 
even while both parties continue to restrict the movement of UN MIS 
and its ability to monitor the cease-fire zone. 
 
In Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, although both states now have a 
constitution and an executive, there has been little progress 
towards delivering the integrated administration and reconstruction 
assistance envisaged in the CPA. A number of civil disturbances in 
recent months reflect the frustration of the people of those areas. 
It is vital for all of us, and the parties in particular, to pay 
more attention to those areas and consider how best we can 
contribute to their stability. 
 
UNMIS continues to support the CPA in all its aspects, including 
through monitoring of the cease-fire, and through participation in 
key commissions, notably the Ceasefire Political Commission. The 
mission also provides technical support in the areas of disarmament 
and demobilization, police development, rule of law, human rights, 
refugee and IDP returns, and local reconciliation, as well in the 
wider dissemination and popularization of the CPA. 
 
Two years after the signing of the CPA, public expectations for 
greater stability, improved services, and enhanced livelihood 
opportunities, remain high. The delivery of these and other peace 
dividends requires a significant commitment on the part of the 
Parties, and the sustained support of the international community. 
In this regard, donor support is critical, and the contribution of 
this Consortium is of the utmost importance. 
 
Notwithstanding these problems and challenges, the achievements made 
so far in Southern Sudan are encouraging. Economic development has 
accelerated as movement of people increases and trade routes 
re-open. Through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (South), UN agencies 
have finalized arrangements to support government capacity building, 
judicial reform, water and sanitation, infrastructure development, 
livestock and the census in Southern Sudan, and more projects are in 
the pipeline. The slow process of design, approval, appraisal and 
preparation of grant agreements required for the projects funded 
under the MDTF current arrangements indicate a compelling need to 
introduce a more flexible mechanism in the MDTF to respond to urgent 
recovery and development needs. The agreed concept of two windows in 
future trust fund arrangements for Darfur should help us move faster 
to economic development in Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan, Blue 
Nile and in the East as well. 
 
Two years ago, the active engagement of many states represented here 
helped to bring about the signing of the CPA. The commitment of 
donors to support peace through well-targeted development and 
reconstruction assistance is a key provision in the Agreement. 
Today, that same level of engagement is more crucial than ever. 
 
Let me conclude by sketching some priorities for the balance of this 
year. First, 2007 will mostly be the year of the security protocol. 
We must see Joint Integrated Units full)' formed and redeployment 
completed. DDR programming must get off the ground in earnest and 
donors' contributions to this effort will be critical. 
 
Second, there must be further progress on implementing the CPA in 
key areas, including agreement on an administration for Abyei, and 
development of integrated services and equitable development for 
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000437  003 OF 003 
 
 
Third, we will need to begin to focus this year on the preparations 
for elections in 2009. Free and fair elections do not begin at the 
ballot box. A political environment that realizes the general 
principles of the CPA and the Interim Constitution must be created. 
Also, technical preparations including for a national census and a 
voter registration process would need to be accelerated. 
International support to these preparations is of vital importance, 
including through technical assistance to the Electoral Commission 
and capacity-building for political parties who must re-engage with 
their constituencies and develop programmes that reflect the needs 
of the people. 
 
We all very much hope that the conflict in Darfur will find a 
political solution this year. Peace in Sudan is indivisible. The 
next steps towards implementation of the CPA, including the holding 
of elections in 2009, would be greatly influenced by the political 
stability and security of the whole country. That is why the joint 
UN/AU initiative to re-energize the political process and bring 
non-signatories on board is so important and deserving of the full 
cooperation and support of all stakeholders. 
 
The CPA is the only vehicle for achieving the ambitious goals set by 
the Parties at Naivasha to bring about long-term peace, stability 
and sustainable development for all the people of Sudan. We must 
recognize and credit the Parties for continuing to declare their 
commitment to the Agreement and its principles, even when - more 
often than not - the road ahead looks pot-holed and perilous. 
 
We must therefore not relent from urging the Parties to adhere to 
their commitments, and should continue to work with them to 
facilitate the full and timely implementation of the CPA. Sudan's 
immediate neighbours and the wider international community have a 
critical role to play and contribution to make in supporting the 
Parties efforts on post-conflict reconstruction. The UN Mission and 
the wider UN family in Sudan are prepared to cooperate with and 
support the efforts of this Consortium in our shared objective to 
help Sudan realize the tangible benefits of peace, stability and 
development. 
 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
 
(End Text) 
 
HUME