VZCZCXRO4706
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0396/01 0730839
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140839Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6456
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000396 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT:  SHOW ME THE MONEY: MAKING THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION 
FUNCTION 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) held a March 11 
meeting to inform and seek input from the international community on 
the functioning of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and efforts to 
re-energize the Second Chamber for Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
non-signatories.  There was consensus among the international 
community that payments to CFC representatives should be reduced. 
AMIS asserted that the mid-March Joint Commission meeting scheduled 
for El Fasher would be delayed and occur elsewhere, on account of 
"unstable" security conditions in Darfur.  The Force Commander 
professed that he was unable to give a timeline on the completion of 
the areas of control exercise or AMIS re-configuration into three 
sectors.  End summary. 
 
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STRENGTHENING THE CFC AND SECOND CHAMBER CHALLENGES 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Acting AMIS Head of Mission Monique Mukaruliza convened 
international partners March 11 in Khartoum to provide an update on 
the status of the CFC and hear international views on 
recommendations to strengthen the mechanism.  AMIS proposed reducing 
each of the DPA signatories representation to two representatives 
per faction at the CFC headquarters in El Fasher and one 
representative at each of the 31 Sector HQ and Military Group Sites 
(MGS).  By this configuration, the total number of CFC 
representatives would equal 198.  AMIS recommended cutting the 
Monthly Subsistence Allowance (MSA) for CFC officials to $1000 (from 
$4900) at the CFC HQ level and to $500 (from $2700) at the Sector 
levels.  The international community expressed universal support for 
the reduction in the MSA.  (Note: Until recently, MSA for CFC reps 
and AMIS forces were backlogged as the UK and Netherlands - which 
provide the funding - attempted to reconcile numerous accounting 
discrepancies.  The excessive MSA payments have had a distorting 
effect on the CFC, creating incentives for participation because of 
lucrative salaries rather than the ability to examine ceasefire 
violations or access respective areas of control.  End Note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Noting the warped incentives created by the MSA, AMIS 
proposed creating clear terms of reference for the CFC 
representatives and rotating them on a six-month basis.  S/CRS 
Poloff and other diplomatic officials noted the problems this might 
create in terms of continuity and capacity.  He suggested that it 
would be more effective to devise one-year agreements with each CFC 
representative that would be renewable in consultation with the AMIS 
Force Commander and account for performance.  AMIS concurred with 
these recommendations. 
 
¶4. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander Aprezi summarized the challenges 
facing the CFC Second Chamber, including the non-payment of MSA 
since August 2006; the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Non-Signatory 
Faction (NSF) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)/Peace Wing's 
insistence on adhering to the modalities of the N'djamena 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (vice the DPA); and the absence of 
Government consent to allow non-signatory deployment to the Sector 
level.  Aprezi proposed various schemes to distribute 
non-signatories at different levels throughout Darfur, though each 
remains predicated on Government approval.  S/CRS Poloff noted the 
lack of progress on the issue since the February 7 Joint Commission, 
in which nearly every participating delegation pressed for the 
Sudanese government's acquiescence, and recommended that key 
countries (U.S., UK, Norway, Netherlands, Canada, Germany, France, 
Egypt) - in conjunction with AMIS, the UN, League of Arab States and 
EU - launch an immediate renewed, unified effort to gain Government 
agreement.  Without non-signatory representation within the CFC 
structure, ceasefire violation investigations and facilitation of 
AMIS or humanitarian access into SLA/NSF or JEM-controlled areas 
will remain difficult if not impossible. 
 
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AMIS FEELING BESEIGED 
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¶5. (SBU) In a brief security update, the Force Commander 
characterized the situation in Darfur as "unstable," as manifested 
by continued carjackings, tribal fighting and specific attacks on 
AMIS personnel.  Aprezi's sense of besiegement was clear as he 
recounted a series of events targeting AMIS, including the robbery 
of a Finance Officer on February 28, the killing of two soldiers in 
Graida on March 5, and the theft of property and arms from a 
helicopter patrol near Kulbus on March 7.  AMIS placed the blame for 
the Graida attack squarely on SLA/Minawi.  Mukaruliza said that she 
intended to address the matter with Senior Assistant to the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000396  002 OF 002 
 
 
President and SLA leader Minni Minawi, demanding that he hand over 
the perpetrators.  In this vein, Head of the DPA Implementation Team 
Sam Ibok urged the international community to publicly, but 
even-handedly, hold the rebel movements to account, implying that 
without this pressure the factions would be more likely to operate 
with impunity and decline participation in the peace process. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Responding to questions about AMIS re-organization Aprezi 
professed his inability to predict when the peace-keeping force 
might be reconfigured to three Sectors.  "This must be a joint 
decision with the UN," he explained.  On the issue of AMIS 
verification of factions' areas of control, the FC again punted, 
remarking that it was impossible to complete the exercise without 
the consent of the non-signatories and greater stability in Darfur. 
Both Ibok and Mukaruliza countered Aprezi's assertion, contending 
that more could be done in this effort, that hard deadlines should 
be provided to all the groups (including non-signatories), and that 
the Force Commander should present a clear timeline at the next 
Joint Commission meeting. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶7. (SBU) While AMIS' increased engagement on the CFC issue with the 
international community is a positive step, it does little to change 
the fundamental truth that without SLA/NSF and JEM representation at 
the Sector level and Sudan's consent to allow such a move, the 
mechanism will continue to be inhibited in carrying out effective 
cease-fire investigations and in maintaining open lines of 
communication with non-signatory factions.  A concerted and 
synchronized effort by the international community to persuade the 
Government to change its position may be the only way forward in 
enhancing the viability of the CFC, which remains at the heart of 
advancing any real prospects of DPA security arrangements.  End 
comment. 
 
HUME