VZCZCXRO4085
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0395/01 0721615
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131615Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6454
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000395 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT: CFC HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR SUPPORT FOR SLM/MINAWI 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Cease-fire Commission (CFC) activities the week of 
February 26 highlighted the continued need for non-military 
logistical support to the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)/Minawi. 
This support would divert his men away from the extortion and 
banditry that is an all too common line in the daily Darfur security 
sitreps and show the other factions that "peace pays."  The Sudanese 
government and SLM/Minawi held a meeting in late February under the 
auspices of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to plan for 
humanitarian assistance, but it is not clear whether and when the 
assistance will begin.  End Summary 
 
¶2. (SBU) CFC members met with Minawi during his trip to Darfur the 
week of February 19 and received a read-out on his meeting with 
international non-government organizations (INGOs) at AMIS 
headquarters on February 21 from EU representatives.  SLM/Minawi CFC 
representative Adam Ali War said that Minni's trip to Darfur had two 
purposes: 1) educate field commanders about the importance of 
ensuring humanitarian access and protecting NGOs, and 2) take stock 
of popular support for the DPA.  Some 44 persons attended the 
meeting with INGOs, including representatives from the UN Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS), the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), the 
World Food Program (WFP), the UN Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), and Relief 
International.  An EU observer characterized Minawi as "evasive" and 
"accepting no responsibility for SLM indiscipline" while suggesting 
that there were many armed groups in North Darfur, most of which are 
tribal and cannot be identified.  MSF-Spain then asked who was 
responsible for civilian actions in the absence of state authority, 
and Relief International stressed that INGOs would only work where 
commanders accepted responsibility.  Minawi answered that the "SLM 
was not responsible for civilian elements." 
 
-------------------------- 
EXTORTION IN TAWILA MARKET 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The theme of SLM/Minawi lacking resources and control 
played out in several of the 12 cases brought to the CFC this week. 
One goes back to November when SLM/Minawi fighters reportedly 
attempted to collect 500 dinars in "protection" money from a 
shopkeeper who refused to pay and drew his sword to make his point. 
The SLM/Minawi commander's statement to the CFC concedes that 
"everybody here knows that we collect the money from the traders for 
providing security while they are sleeping at their homes, and we 
stay awake right through the night guarding their shops and all of 
Tawila area because everybody knows that we don't have salary or 
money resources."  He went on to explain that they were demanding 
not 500 dinars, but merely 200.  The case was a minor infraction 
that would not have come to the CFC, but it provided a useful window 
on Minawi's lack of a stable resource base and the resulting 
problems. 
 
------------------- 
ATTACK ON AMIS CAMP 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The CFC also reviewed an attack on MGS Umm Baru near Tine 
(Sector 5) on December 4.  The facts of the case are not definitive, 
but it appears that a Sudanese government soldier came to the MGS 
base complaining that he was captured by SLM/Minawi fighters in the 
MGS area and relieved of his boots and winter coat.  Later that 
night, a group of three SLM/Minawi fighters shot at the base, 
hitting several tents and bathrooms over the course of three hours 
in what the MGS investigators believed were shots fired "directly 
against the camp intending to randomly kill." The MGS managed to 
capture one of the SLM/Minawi perpetrators during the night.  They 
later released him to the local commander. 
 
--------------------- 
KILLING IN KAZANJEDID 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Another report before the CFC involved the killing of 
Abdallah Ibrahim Juma in late October 2006.  The MGS Shaeria in 
Sector 8 concluded that "the deadly act was carried out by soldiers 
of the SLM/Minawi party," and criticized the SLM/Minawi 
representatives in the area for failing "to facilitate the 
investigation process."  As a result of the attack, the report says, 
"SLM/Minawi soldiers have been forced by GOS to leave Kazanjedid." 
They recommended various methods of reconciliation with villagers 
and urged party representatives to be more involved in AMIS tasks as 
facilitators.  The perpetrators have apparently fled. 
 
--------------------- 
CLASHES IN UMM DURMAN 
 
KHARTOUM 00000395  002 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) A January 7-8 incident in the village of Bahr Umm Durman, 
60 kilometers south-west of El Fasher, in Sector 8 was also briefed 
to the CFC.  S/CRS Poloff suggested that the CFC headquarters 
element should pay a visit to the site to see if the parties had 
resolved the underlying issues.  On March 1, the Sudanese government 
representative, SLM/Minawi representative, EU, UN, and U.S. 
observers accompanied an AMIS headquarters team to meet with the 
sector team at the village.  The incident involved the killing of a 
young man at a water point, the burning of a truck, and a group of 
bandits who fortified themselves in the village of Bahr Umm Durman. 
These events led to an attack on the village by SLM/Minawi soldiers 
that left as many as 30 villagers and five SLM/Minawi soldiers dead 
and dozens more wounded. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The SLM/Minawi faction in that area is little more than an 
armed gang.  The "bandits" according to the investigative report 
were "former fighters of SLA(MM)."  It appears that the fighting was 
between SLM/Minawi and a breakaway faction, with civilians caught in 
the crossfire.  Acccording to the Popular Committee head, the 
SLM/Minawi faction arrived to expel the bandits but went on to 
ransack the village, stealing pieces of the town's water pump, the 
television from the community center, personal items from homes, and 
considerable livestock.  "We want our stuff back," he told him.  A 
visit by Sudanese government and tribal leaders from El Fasher to 
mediate between the parties following the incident produced an 
amicable ending and convinced the villagers to stay put.  Resentment 
remains toward the SLM/Minawi, however, which the Sheikh said is no 
longer allowed near the village.  Since the Sudanese government is 
also barred, it leaves the village without security. 
 
¶8. (SBU) S/CRS Poloff was able to talk to some of the SLM/Minawi 
fighters and asked the commander about one who appeared younger than 
¶14.  The SLM/Minawi CFC representative said he had told them not to 
allow the younger fighters to come to meetings with international 
observers.  But he lamented, "they are the most fearless fighters 
and the commanders like them.  They are hard to keep out of our 
forces."  The others had no uniforms, no evidence of a chain of 
commander, and no clear sense of purpose.  It was difficult to see 
how they could be effective at keeping order in the area, and easy 
to see how they could get into so many scrapes with villagers. 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment: The issue of humanitarian and non-military 
logistic support for SLM/Minawi is an urgent one.  AU DPA 
Implementation head Sam Ibok appealed to the international community 
to respond.  Providing this support will accomplish multiple 
objectives: (a) demonstrate the benefits of having signed the DPA 
and encourage other splinter groups to adhere to the accord; (b) 
encourage greater discipline within SLM/Minawi by reducing the 
temptation to resort to banditry or other illicit activities; (c) 
strengthen the linkages between the Sudanese government and the 
rebel groups, and (d) pave the way for integration of SLM/Minawi and 
other Declaration of Commitment (DoC) elements into the Sudanese 
Armed Forces (SAF).  Without addressing this issue in the near term, 
we can expect to continue to see SLM/Minawi cited as a source of 
instability within the CFC and throughout Darfur.  End comment. 
 
HUME