VZCZCXRO4069
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0394/01 0721614
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131614Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6452
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000394 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT:  DPA SIGNATORIES CLAIM HELP NEEDED NOW 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Ongoing frustration at the lack of Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) implementation boiled over in El Fasher as signatory 
factions forcibly entered the USG-funded Peace Secretariat to demand 
that their concerns be addressed.  The factions claim that their 
soldiers are "starving" and in dire need of humanitarian assistance. 
 Having committed to the DPA and no longer relying on raiding 
Sudanese Government forces to re-supply, the factions intimated that 
their only option may be returning to the bush.  The USG should 
support the formation of the Logistics Coordination Committee (LCC) 
of the DPA to provide a mechanism for international assistance to 
the signatories.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Leaders of the political arms of the Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SLM)/Minawi, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)/Peace 
Wing, and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Free Will met with S/CRS 
Poloffs on March 6 to convey their mounting frustration with the 
lack of DPA implementation, the dire need for humanitarian 
assistance for their fighters in the field and their apologies for 
brusquely barging into the Peace Secretariat the previous day, with 
some movement members carrying weapons.  The faction leaders, all of 
whom participate in the joint Sudanese Government-DPA Signatories 
Security Arrangements Committee, complained that without sufficient 
resources - including office space, vehicles, access to computers 
and basic supplies - they cannot promote the DPA to their 
constituencies nor carry out their respective obligations. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The factions observed that the Sudanese government 
succeeded in carrying out its strategy of co-opting rebel groups, 
only to leave them "high and dry."  Additionally, with little or no 
support forthcoming from AMIS, the factions have become increasingly 
desperate for sustenance and resentful toward AMIS.  S/CRS Poloffs 
concurred that no one, including the international community, was 
pleased with the pace of DPA implementation and that the underlying 
problems that led to conflict in Darfur would only be exacerbated 
without the goodwill of the parties to fulfill their commitments. 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) The SLM/Minawi representative explained that another factor 
in the groups' dissatisfaction related to recent attempts by the 
Sudanese government to distribute humanitarian assistance to the 
signatories.  Through consultations at the Security Arrangements 
Committee, the Sudanese government agreed to provide varying 
quantities of sorghum, sugar, cooking oil, lentils, and salt to the 
factions.  According to the signatory representatives, they showed 
up to receive their supplies in El Fasher only to discover that 
media was present to document the event.  The movements refused to 
accept the humanitarian assistance, rationalizing that the Sudanese 
government would use the media to create propaganda that would 
tarnish the image of the rebel factions.  Furthermore, the movement 
leaders explained that the quantities offered by the Government were 
inadequate and that there was no AU or UN presence at the event to 
provide transparency and act as an impartial observer.  Meeting 
these conditions - no press, greater quantities and an AU or UN 
witness - would be necessary for the movements to accept Government 
humanitarian aid.  In the absence of assistance from the government, 
AMIS or the international community, the leaders implied, the 
movements might have little choice than to return to the bush and 
re-supply themselves through force.  (Note: The movements claimed 
that their respective counterparts in both South and West Darfur 
received supplies in late February from the Sudanese government 
without press or problems.  End Note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) S/CRS Poloffs protested the signatory factions' uninvited 
and armed intrusion into the USG-funded Peace Secretariat on March 
7, where the movements congregated following their aborted attempt 
to receive Sudanese government supplies in El Fasher.  Frustrated 
with AMIS' apparent lack of interest in witnessing and facilitating 
the Government logistics delivery, the factions went in search of a 
place to gather and to vent their frustrations.  After a verbal 
confrontation with AMIS staff at the Peace Secretariat, the rebels 
proceeded to the Force Commander's office to air their grievances. 
The movement leaders apologizedt S/CRS Poloffs for their rash 
behavior at the Peace Secretariat and affirmed their understanding 
that no weapons would be brought onto the premises.  (Note:  The 
fact that the movement leadership was not aware of the Peace 
Secretariat - despite a representative from each non-signatory 
 
SIPDIS 
faction being assigned there - underscores the groups' lack of 
internal organization and coordination, which is illustrated in 
other examples ranging from control over local commanders to 
arranging humanitarian access.  End note.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: The signatory movements' increasing frustration 
with the Sudanese government and AMIS regarding the delay in DPA 
implementation has the potential to drive many of them out of the 
peace process.  Besides further complicating the political and 
security landscape, additional defectors would make implementation 
of even the most superficial DPA-related activities less likely and 
 
KHARTOUM 00000394  002 OF 002 
 
 
less credible.  It is difficult to assess the factions' claim that 
their "forces are starving in the field."  However, without taking 
supplies from the Government by force--their previous logistics 
mechanism--they must now look to new sources. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment continued: Desperate for resources, many of the 
rebels are freelancing in banditry or other illicit activities (like 
vehicle theft or hijacking food convoys).  The DPA provision for 
non-military logistical support was raised by AU DPA Implementation 
Team head Sam Ibok at the February 7 Joint Commission meeting and 
has been discussed in the context of the Ceasefire Commission.  In a 
February 10 diplomatic note to the AU, Senior Assistant to the 
President Minawi requested that AMIS establish the Logistics 
Coordination Committee (LCC) called for in Article 28 of the DPA. 
This body is intended to act as a joint mechanism involving the AU, 
the UN, the movements, and international donors to assess the 
logistical needs of the signatory factions, procure the items, and 
distribute them.  Within the framework of USG legal restrictions on 
provision of food aid to combatants, the LCC could be an expeditious 
instrument to allow the U.S. to provide in-kind assistance to the 
rebel signatories while also maintaining some influence on how the 
supplies are disseminated.  End comment. 
 
HUME