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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM331, ELUSIVE SLA COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM331 2007-03-02 11:36 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3200
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0331 0611136
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021136Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6341
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000331 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO AU UN SU
 
SUBJECT:  ELUSIVE SLA COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) commanders 
conference in North Darfur remains indefinitely postponed as the 
various factions attempt to resolve internal differences and 
persuade additional key military leaders, such as former G-19 leader 
Adam Bakhit, to participate in the process.  Several commanders 
continue to remain optimistic that the gathering will occur in the 
coming weeks and that they will succeed in forming a leadership 
council, which will play a principal role in a broader political 
conference and the selection of more coherent leadership.  While 
security has been stable around the concentration of field 
commanders in North Darfur, the UN Department of Safety and Security 
(UNDSS) has indicated that the Sudanese government is growing leery 
of the conference's continued delays.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) The conference in North Darfur to unite the disparate 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatory factions remains on hold 
pending the resolution of internal disputes and attempts to bring in 
key players from Chad.  SLA-Non-Signatory Faction (SLA/NSF) 
Ceasefire Commission (CFC) representative Colonel Abdu Ismael told 
S/CRS Poloffs that he remains in contact with the SLA commanders in 
North Darfur, has informed them that they are losing credibility 
with the international community, and does not intend to continue to 
run interference for the group if they continue to delay the 
conference.  Abdu chastised the field commanders for the numerous 
announcements, delays, and cancellations and said that he fears his 
own credibility is suffering. 
 
3. (SBU) Local civil society leaders with direct connections to SLA 
commanders in the field say that the non-signatories are aware both 
of the negative perception created by the continued delays and the 
diminishing patience of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).  The SLA 
commanders are also attuned to "avoiding another Haskanita" that 
will lead to greater divisions (including along tribal lines).  For 
that reason, they have continued to seek the involvement of key 
commanders such as Adam Bakhit and Saddiq Burra, who have so far 
favored alignment under Chadian auspices.  (NOTE: The extent of 
contact between the commanders in North Darfur and the 
non-signatories in Chad remains unclear, as does the level of effort 
being pursued to convince them to unite under a single SLA banner. 
Abdu does not believe Bakhit will participate, and other contacts 
have indicated Darfurians' wariness of the National Redemption Front 
(NRF) and its connections to Chad.  END NOTE.) 
 
4. (SBU) Abdu and other interlocutors contend that the conference 
may still occur in the coming weeks, with approximately 300 military 
leaders in the area near Umm Rai.  Abdu explained that the field 
commanders had developed a format that would only exclude the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).  The end result of the 
conference, he held, would be the formation of a representative 
military council, which would play a principal role in a future SLA 
political conference and the selection of a more cohesive 
leadership.  In the expected eight to ten week period between the 
commanders' conference and the broader event, the SLA would focus on 
restoring full humanitarian access throughout their areas of 
control, according to one local civil society leader who remains in 
contact with field commanders.  He added that this period would be 
used to form a Preparatory Committee to lay the groundwork for the 
general conference, to establish a negotiating team.  Rebel 
commanders have already conveyed a desire to hold any future 
political dialogue somewhere in Europe (Norway was specifically 
mentioned), where Sudan's neighbors are less likely to meddle. 
 
5. (SBU) Colonel Abdu noted no problems with security in the area 
where the commanders have convened in North Darfur - both because 
the SLA are present in force and because of the negative 
international backlash that would follow a SAF attack.  UNDSS, 
however, has indicated that the GoS is "annoyed" with the delays in 
the non-signatories conference--which the SAF claims could be cover 
for an extended military strategy session--and that the possibility 
of armed confrontation between the groups could increase.  (Note: No 
major clashes between Government and rebel force have occurred since 
early January.  End note.) 
 
HUME