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Viewing cable 07KABUL998, COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR OFFICE OF WEAPONS REMOVAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL998 2007-03-27 02:56 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #0998 0860256
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270256Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7078
UNCLAS KABUL 000998 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/A, PM/WRA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT ASEC AFIN AF
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR OFFICE OF WEAPONS REMOVAL 
AND ABATEMENT TEAM 
 
REF: STATE 32123 
 
1.  U.S. Embassy Kabul welcomes and grants country clearance 
for Stuart Harris, Marcus Carpenter and Lauren Frese to 
travel to Afghanistan April 3-5 2007, per reftel.  All 
travelers who possess U.S. Department of State badges should 
bring their ID for identification purposes and to obtain an 
Embassy ID. Control officer is Todd Bullock, UNCLAS email 
address: Bullockjt@state.gov; CLASSIFIED e-mail: 
BullockJT@state.sgov.gov telephone number: (93) 0798-018-941. 
Stuart Harris, Marcus Carpenter and Lauren Frese all hold TS 
clearance. 
 
2. (SBU) Threat Assessment Guidelines: 
 
a.  The security environment in Kabul and throughout 
Afghanistan is dangerous.  There is continued potential for 
attacks against U.S. citizens and interests in Afghanistan. 
Terrorists do not distinguish between official and civilian 
targets.  Terrorist actions may include, but are not limited 
to, rocket attacks, suicide operations, assassinations, 
kidnappings, hijackings, shootings or bombings.  Potential 
exists in Kabul and the rest of the country for 
demonstrations, riots, bombings, and other violent actions 
against U.S. citizens and interests. 
 
b.  Visitors are advised to maintain a level of vigilance and 
to heighten their security awareness while at post.  American 
citizens have been victimized by vehicle-borne explosives and 
roadside bombs within the last year.  Occasional rocket 
attacks in the vicinity of the Embassy compound are 
unpredictable and random.  There have been incidents of 
carjackings and robberies directed against NGOs, journalists 
and diplomats carried out by aggressive and armed persons. 
The proliferation of weapons on the street is extensive. 
Host country and ISAF forces have had some success in making 
arrests and seizing weapons.  However travel outside of Kabul 
remains extremely dangerous in many places, and travel within 
Kabul after dark should also be avoided.  Due to restrictions 
on travel and limitations on available resources, TDY 
travelers should be prepared to expect delays and possible 
cancellations of events in Kabul and of proposed out-of-Kabul 
travel. 
 
c.  All personnel are required to attend a RSO Security 
Briefing after arrival.  Verification of security clearance 
level is required prior to the issuance of an identification 
card.  Persons who will require unescorted access in the 
controlled access areas (CAA) are responsible for ensuring 
that security clearances are transmitted to post prior to 
their arrival. 
 
d.  The U.S. Embassy maintains a 2400 curfew.  However, 
changes in threat conditions may result in an earlier curfew 
on a temporary basis.  The RSO must clear any travel outside 
of the city, as well as any proposed travel after dark. 
Travel during daylight hours is permitted, but must be 
performed in an armored vehicle.  Anyone traveling off the 
compound must sign out on departure and back in upon 
returning to the compound.  Personnel are advised to carry a 
radio or cell phone to maintain contact in the event of an 
emergency. 
 
e.  Though the compound has been checked for mines and 
unexploded ordinance (UXO), there remains the remote 
possibility that a UXO or mine could remain.  While in 
Afghanistan, do not touch anything suspicious, avoid picking 
up souvenirs, and immediately report any suspicious device to 
RSO personnel.  Outside the compound, red rocks are uncleared 
mine areas, while white rocks are considered mine free areas. 
 Be advised, however, there remains a 10% chance that 
unexploded mines remain in the mine cleared areas.  For this 
reason, during all travel in Kabul or out of the city, 
travelers should remain on hard surface roads at all times. 
NEUMANN