VZCZCXRO4968
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0979/01 0850526
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 260526Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7041
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3822
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 000979 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO GASTRIGHT, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
TREASURY FOR ABAUKOL 
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, AND POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID ECON MASS SOCI AF
SUBJECT: PRT/MAZAR: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY, 
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN THE NORTHWEST 
PROVINCES 
 
REF: KABUL 195 
 
------ 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Northwest Afghanistan enjoys a better 
security situation than much of the rest of the country but 
drought and crime hamper development.  The Afghan National 
Police (ANP) and the judicial system need much work but 
progress has begun with the ANP.  The balance of power 
between Tajik-dominated Jamiyat and Uzbek-dominated Junbesh 
political parties has been somewhat disrupted by improved 
organization among the Pashtuns and other forces and the 
perceived weakening of Junbesh leader General Dostum.  The 
caliber of governance remains low and corruption is rampant, 
although the new chiefs of police may bring improvements. 
The media is playing a greater role in the region, increasing 
the importance of the battle for public opinion.  The 
regional economy is stunted by water shortages, although the 
major urban center of Mazar-e Sharif continues to grow. 
Re-opening oil and gas production in Sheberghan, construction 
of a gas-fired power plant there, and completion of the North 
East Power System connections to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
could stimulate faster economic growth.  Taliban values never 
took hold in the northwest, so girls can go to school if 
their families can afford it and women can put aside their 
burkas if they are ready.  Overall, trends in the region are 
positive but the pace is painfully slow.  Many residents 
still fear the international community will leave and the 
Taliban will return.   END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Northwest Afghanistan includes the provinces of 
Faryab, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul, Samangan, and Balkh.  The Amu 
Darya river marks their long northern border with the Central 
Asia.  The northern area by the river border is largely 
desert; south of that is an agricultural belt that has 
suffered severely from drought; the mountainous area further 
south is a mountainous area that is largely inaccessible in 
winter.  The region's 2.8 million residents are a mix of 
Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Pashtuns and Hazaras.  One quarter 
of the population lives in the vicinity of Mazar-e Sharif, 
although the provinces cover nearly fifty thousand square 
miles.  Traditional trading and smuggling routes crisscross 
the region. 
 
---------------------- 
Security Fairly Stable 
---------------------- 
¶3.  (SBU)  Security in the region during the winter improved, 
probably due to a weather-related decrease in crime, and 
remains better than in many parts of the country.  Insurgent 
activity is largely limited to recruitment, propaganda, 
winter resting and smuggling.  Taliban and Hezb-Islami 
Gulbuddhin (HiG) party representatives work with local power 
brokers (LPBs) in the rampant and lucrative smuggling of 
drugs and weapons.  There have been few improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) and no suicide bombings.  The spate of school 
burnings last summer stopped in the fall and has not resumed. 
 The Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) process is 
moribund but caches of old weapons and ammunition continue to 
turn up.  It is suspected that locals are moving unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) they find in the fields to the side of the 
road so ISAF will find and dispose of them. 
 
--------------------------- 
Biggest Threat: Local Crime 
--------------------------- 
¶4.  (SBU)  Crime is the biggest security issue facing most 
residents.  Motorcycle gangs work stretches of the highways 
(Route Ring North) in good weather and many LPBs terrorize 
their local populations.  Notorious subcommander Wali 
Mohammed was killed in a firefight with international and 
Afghan national security forces (ANSF) in Balkh in November, 
to the great relief of many local residents and GOA 
 
KABUL 00000979  002 OF 006 
 
 
officials.  After his death there was a noticeable downturn 
in incidents in the area.  We received reports that other 
LPBs worried they would meet the same fate and curtailed 
their illegal activities accordingly.  (COMMENT: This bounce 
will only be temporary if ANSF and ISAF are unable to follow 
up with arrests of other mid-level LPBs on wanted lists. END 
COMMENT.) 
 
¶5.  (SBU) NGOs continue to be nervous about safety, mainly 
because of unrest in the country as a whole and the threat of 
violent crime.  A car belonging to an NGO in Sar-e Pul was 
attacked in what many NGOs believe was a robbery.  Other than 
several attacks on the Asian road construction teams paving 
the ring road in Faryab where criminals want to prevent ANSF 
and ISAF from gaining easy access to their operating area, 
there is no evidence that foreigners are being targeted.  A 
substantial upturn in security incidents during poppy 
harvesting season and eradication operations is expected, 
with the aim of preventing extensive patrolling of drug 
areas. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
National Security Forces: Slow, Steady Reform 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶6.  (SBU) The Afghan National Army (ANA) is the most 
respected branch of the ANSF operating in the northwest, but 
their presence is limited.  PRT and other international 
forces work with them regularly and the mentoring programs 
are showing progress.  Experts put the ANP at 3-4 years 
behind the ANA; the U.S. operates a regional police training 
center in Mazar-e Sharif to help the ANP catch up.  The U.S. 
training focus in the northwest has shifted to the Afghan 
National Civil Order Police, but basic skills are still 
lacking everywhere.  Three quarters of the ANP in the region 
do not even know how to read or write.  Reports of local 
police exploiting their own communities are not uncommon.  A 
district police office in Sar-e Pul was exchanging firewood 
for sex with boys.  Other reports involve forced sex or 
stealing food aid.  Police pay and rank reform is proceeding 
slowly but steadily.  Banks now operate in the provincial 
centers so police can get paid their actual salaries. 
Previously, police were paid in cash, and money was skimmed 
off the top before it reached its intended recipients.  Also, 
there were previously fewer banks, so it was logistically not 
possible to send money electronically to the provinces in 
many cases.  Now, however, most regional centers have banks, 
and the improved infrastructure has allowed for an improved 
payment distribution system. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The next reform step is the replacement of the 
district chiefs of police.  Some COPs are trying to do a good 
job, but many are corrupt and/or incompetent.  New leadership 
at the provincial level should help.  Three of the five 
provincial chiefs of police in the region were on the 
national probation list (14 individuals in total were on the 
list); they were all replaced in January.  One positive sign 
of change: the new Balkh Chief of Police (COP) is tackling 
corruption involved with the issuance of passports, which are 
valid for one year.  The COP signs the passports in a public 
room to show that he is taking nothing for his signature. 
Officially, passports cost less than twenty dollars, but the 
previous COP charged approximately one thousand daily 
applicants USD 300-400 each.  Rumor has it that the price is 
down to USD 160 and will drop more as others who take their 
cut in the process are removed. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The public has a justifiably low opinion of the 
effectiveness of not only the ANP but also the judicial 
system.  Major and minor criminals with influence or money 
can, and do, buy their way out of jail.  Men and women are 
held in jail for months without being charged with any crime. 
Residents prefer to use the Provincial Councils to settle 
civil disputes because the courts are ineffective, corrupt 
and expensive. Returning refugees, especially Pashtuns, often 
 
KABUL 00000979  003 OF 006 
 
 
find their land has been taken by others so many land 
disputes end up before the Provincial Councils. 
Consequently, the PRT receives many exaggerated reports of 
Taliban activity by residents trying to discredit returnees. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Politics: Self-Interested Governors Poor Administrators 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶9.  (SBU)  The five Governors in the northwest present 
studies in contrast: 
-Governor Latif of Faryab has a reputation as ineffective, 
corrupt and controlled by General Dostum,s Junbesh party. 
PRToff has seen nothing to contradict this.  His ambitious 
deputy governor Abdul Sattar Barez has better managerial 
skills and more interest in accountability to the people, but 
no power. 
-Jowzjan Governor Hamdard, who harbors ambitions to lead 
Pashtun political forces in the north and has Taliban/HiG 
connections, is a crafty individual who runs his own agenda 
while claiming loyalty to Karzai.  He aims to replace Balkh 
Governor Atta.  During the recent high tensions between a new 
political force, the Turkic Council headed by Akbar Bay, and 
Dostum's Junbesh party, Hamdard spent more time in Kabul 
checking up on his political opponents than he did at home 
controlling the outbreaks of violence.  The other parties 
resent rising Pashtun influence in the area as new 
appointments of Pashtun officials are attempted.  Friction is 
particularly strong in the broad areas controlled by 
Dostum,s Junbesh party (this includes much of Hamdard,s 
Jowzjan province), probably in part because Dostum,s 
strength has begun to wane. 
-Sar-e Pul Governor Munib is corrupt, has HiG connections and 
is allied with the notorious commander Haji Payenda Khan, who 
is reportedly the real power in Sar-e Pul province. 
-Governor Shafaq of Samangan provides the best governance out 
of all the northwestern governors, but he still needs to work 
on his management skills. 
-Balkh Governor Atta, a Tajik former mujaheddin commander and 
a national figure, has the most experience, power, income and 
visibility of the five.  Rumors of his corruption and drug 
ties persist.  He is a leader of Jamiyat party (founded by 
former President Rabbani in 1971), whose main rival remains 
Junbesh party despite their having formed alliances of 
opportunity including against the splinter Azadi party in 
Faryab.  Atta's word is law in Balkh; this year he used it to 
the GOA's advantage with his strong anti-poppy campaign. 
Preliminary indications show the crop will be far smaller 
than last year. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Balkh is the only province with a functioning 
professional staff in the Governor's office, but these 
staffers primarily look after Atta,s needs, which do not 
always coincide with the interests of the people.  Attorney 
General Sabit has been examining reports that they take 
bribes.  Sabit has also been quite active in Jowzjan, which 
makes Dostum nervous.  Munib has made a show of looking into 
corruption at the district level in Sar-e Pul but nothing has 
come of it.  Balkh has been a pilot province for GOA-led 
administrative and budgeting reform, and results are visible 
at the local level.  Line ministries in Mazar are generally 
staffed by competent individuals; this is not always the case 
in the other provinces. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  The Provincial Councils (PCs) all function 
somewhat effectively by Afghan standards although the council 
head in Balkh is completely under the Governor's control. 
Junbesh controls the PC in Jowzjan.  Almost all officials 
spend much time away from their jobs.  Samangan's 
administration grinds to a halt when Governor Shafaq is away. 
 
 
------------------ 
Mass Media Growing 
------------------ 
 
KABUL 00000979  004 OF 006 
 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The media has diversified and increased in recent 
months, as has public access to both TV and radio.  Public 
opinion is becoming increasingly important in the region. 
Governor Atta is particularly media savvy.  General Dostum is 
not.  Most of the population continues to view the provincial 
governments (and the national government) as corrupt and 
ineffective and media coverage of government excesses is 
increasing.  Governor Atta forbade Balkh TV from airing a 
story about the Attorney General's investigation of Atta,s 
notorious Chief of Technical Services, but the story got out 
nevertheless. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Locals Disillusioned With Karzai, Wary of Pashtuns 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶13.  (SBU) Most of the population supports or at least 
tolerates both ISAF and the central government.  Hostile 
propaganda centers are small and few.  However, a substantial 
number of residents doubt the staying power of the 
international community and the ability of Kabul to maintain 
control, expecting it is only a matter of time before the 
Taliban will return.  Few are actively looking for 
alternatives to Karzai, but they feel his government favors 
the Pashtuns.  Elites feel that the Pashtuns are trying to 
regain the power in the north that they lost when they were 
defeated by the Northern Alliance.  Ordinary people point to 
their villages and say there is no development.  Uzbeks and 
Tajiks resent how the Pashtun pockets have allegedly received 
a particularly high concentration of development assistance 
and have a higher standard of living yet security incidents 
remain elevated in these areas and poppy cultivation is 
widespread, weakening the argument that good behavior is 
rewarded.  The GOA's and ISAF's struggle against the 
insurgency will likely increasingly be waged in the media in 
the northwest, where actual incidents are few but propaganda 
opportunities considerably greater. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Agrarian Economy Suffers Water Shortage 
---------------------------------------- 
¶14.  (SBU)  The economy in the northwest, outside of the few 
urban centers, remains primarily agricultural, dominated by 
rain-fed crops and animal husbandry.  The long years of 
drought have weakened the sector across the region as cereal 
and other crops have failed several years in a row 
(unfortunately there has been no negative effect on the 
drought-resistant poppy crop).  Temperatures have been higher 
than normal and rain and snow shortfalls have decreased river 
flow and ground water, drying up fields and pastures.  Poor 
water management infrastructure and spring flooding displaces 
many residents and destroys homes; however these same regions 
are completely dry by summer.  The GOA has planned some major 
water projects, but the shortfall is already critical and 
many communities cannot wait the years it will take for dams 
and other works to be built.  Water shortages feed tensions 
between communities and have led to the threat of riots in 
Jowzjan over accusations that some districts use up the water 
in the river before it reaches districts downstream.  Animals 
are being slaughtered prematurely across the region because 
farmers cannot afford to feed them. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Farmers Leaving to Find Work Elsewhere 
-------------------------------------- 
¶15.  (SBU) Impoverishment of farmers is a growing problem 
across the region.  Displacement of farmers to urban centers 
continues.  Many young men go abroad to work, usually leaving 
families behind.  The Shia go to Iran and the Sunni to 
Pakistan.  Before, few left the region for other provinces 
but now some families leave for Baghlan or Kunduz (where 
there is more water), or even Kabul.  The drought is 
particularly severe in Faryab, Sar-e Pul and Samangan. 
Industry is limited.  USAID is looking at reviving oil and 
gas production around Sheberghan as well as construction of a 
 
KABUL 00000979  005 OF 006 
 
 
gas-fired power plant.  North East Power System (NEPS) 
transmission lines from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will 
cross some of these provinces, providing electricity for 
future growth.  Meanwhile, the fertilizer factory in Mazar-e 
Sharif lacks the natural gas it needs to operate.  Old 
factories such as the Soviet-built bread factory on the 
outskirts of Mazar remain derelict.  Turkmen communities 
weave carpets, often the major source of income in these 
rural areas. 
 
------------------------- 
Mazar: Center of Commerce 
------------------------- 
¶16. (SBU) The economic heart of the northwest remains Mazar-e 
Sharif, where the economy is growing steadily.  The paved 
portions of North Ring Road are now dotted with modern (and 
some less modern) gas stations and vehicle traffic is 
sometimes heavy.  However, most other roads in the region are 
not paved.  Faryab province has only twenty miles of paved 
roads; the Ring Road there will take another few years to 
complete.  Markets in urban centers are full but many people 
lack money to buy goods.  Merchants spend a lot of time 
waiting for customers.  Commercial traffic entering 
Afghanistan through northwest border crossing points is 
increasing, but it appears that little of the revenue 
collected by customs officials is making it into GOA coffers. 
 Allegedly, the majority of customs  duties collected is 
divided among Dostum, Atta and some minor players.  The 
Border Management Initiative is looking at improving duty 
collection and transmission  to Kabul.  Communications links 
are poor, hampering business development.  The drug trade is 
a major source of income in the region, particularly for 
LPBs, who in turn pay their subcommanders and other 
supporters. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Cultural/Social Situation: Rural Life Sees Little Change 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶17.  (SBU) While conditions in the urban centers have 
improved substantially in recent years, lives of those living 
in rural isolation have changed much less.  Clinics are more 
common and doctors more readily available in district 
centers.  Remote areas lack clinics and any winter service, 
cutting thousands of people off from healthcare for months at 
a time.  Salaries in remote areas are too low to attract the 
limited supply of healthcare professionals, who are also put 
off by the isolation.  Provincial hospitals have improved. 
Balkh hospital in Mazar-e Sharif burned last year, crippling 
critical care resources in this major urban center.   The 
Germans are helping to re-equip the hospital.  There are no 
indigenous civil society organizations. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Burkas Optional, But Forced Marriage Common 
------------------------------------------- 
¶18.  (SBU) Taliban values never really took hold in the 
northwest.  Although women wearing burkas are still seen on 
the streets, this is due in part to the greater number of 
women who are now getting out of the home.  Many women 
apparently still feel more comfortable wearing a burka, but 
some women, particularly those in Mazar-e Sharif, wear 
headscarves.  Educated women are more likely not to wear a 
burka, but they are also more likely to travel by car, so 
fewer of them are visible on the streets.  Violence against 
women is still a problem, despite ongoing education campaigns 
by the Ministry of Women's Affairs.  Some women, many 
underage, are married against their will, and girls are, in 
some instances, given as brides to settle disputes between 
families.  Others are contracted for marriage while still in 
childhood.  The Ministry of Women's Affairs runs literacy and 
other educational programs in the provincial capitals, and in 
some districts in Balkh Province.  The World Food Program 
donates food to these programs  for women to take home to 
their families. 
 
KABUL 00000979  006 OF 006 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
More Girls In Schools, But Teacher Quality Is Poor 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶19.  (SBU) More girls are now going to school than 
previously, although many schools lack buildings and classes 
are held in tents, the open air or in borrowed facilities. 
Most schools run two shifts.  Teachers are in short supply 
and salaries are low, meaning that remote rural areas have 
great difficulty in attracting teachers.  Some teachers are, 
themselves, illiterate; in the rural areas teachers who have 
only finished primary school are common.  More secondary 
schools are being built.  In the countryside, girls stay in 
school at least four years.  Boys are more likely to stay at 
least until the seventh year.  Children are mainly taken out 
of school primarily for economic reasons.  In Mazar-e Sharif 
many girls and boys go to secondary school, and even the 
older girls typically do not wear burkas. 
NEUMANN