VZCZCXRO4594
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0950/01 0831259
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241259Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6999
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3549
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3803
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000950 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO GASTRIGHT, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
TREASURY FOR ABAUKOL 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-82, AND POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID ECON MASS SOCI AF
SUBJECT: PRT/QALENOW: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY, 
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL SITUATION 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Qal-e Now, in the western part of 
Afghanistan, has witnessed much progress over the last year. 
Residents of the capital enjoy a much better quality of life 
then they did under the Taliban.  The PRT has had a direct 
impact on economic growth in the provincial capital. 
However, this progress has not reached the rest of Badghis. 
While threats to security are relatively low compared to 
other provinces, the government's ability to confront 
security threats is also comparatively weak.  Rising 
insecurity in the northern districts of Murghab and Ghormach 
has prevented the provincial government from initiating 
development projects.  Recent violence is a result of ethnic 
conflict and criminal activity as well as increased insurgent 
activity.  Security initiatives such as DIAG and counter 
narcotics programs have languished, especially in Murghab, 
Ghormach and Jawand districts.  The inability of the local 
government to extend its influence province-wide impedes 
progress on a variety of fronts.  There are reportedly plans 
to station ANA forces in the Murghab area, but no date has 
been set for the deployment.  Governor Mohammed Nasim has 
attempted to create support for his administration by quickly 
responding to local emergencies, but many local residents 
blame him for the slow pace of development in the districts. 
Until the security situation and provincial road network is 
improved, the province will continue to experience highly 
mixed political, economic, and social progress.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Security: Capital Safe, Regions Less So 
--------------------------------------- 
¶2.  (SBU) Badghis has historically been a very stable 
province, but over the last year insecurity has increased. 
While threats to security are relatively low compared to 
other provinces, the government's ability to confront threats 
is also comparatively weak.  There is no Afghan National Army 
(ANA) presence in Badghis and the Afghan National Police 
(ANP) lacks the manpower, training, equipment and possibly 
motivation to provide security throughout the province.  The 
government has focused its security resources primarily in 
Qal-e Now and the southern districts, in effect creating a 
relatively safe zone around the capital while allowing a zone 
of insecurity to develop in the districts of Ghormach, 
Murghab, and Jawand.  The general impression in the province 
is that insecurity has spread province-wide, but the reality 
is that the level of insecurity varies between regions. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Security in Qal-e Now has remained static or 
improved slightly over the last year.  There has never been 
an insurgency-related attack in the capital, and members of 
the PRT continue to walk to meetings in the city with only a 
two-man armed escort.  UNAMA recently opened an office in 
Qal-e Now after UNAMA's regional security advisor pronounced 
security in the capital "manageable."  The PRT Commander 
believes that overall security in Qal-e Now has improved in 
recent months and notes that common crime is very rare in the 
capital.  Frequent PRT patrols of the capital area augment 
the large ANP presence in and around Qal-e Now. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Security in the northern districts of Murghab, 
Ghormach, and to a lesser extent eastern Jawand continues to 
deteriorate.  In the last six-months there has been a marked 
increase in the number of security incidents, with a large 
percentage of them being targeted against foreigners.  In 
addition to UNAMA's new office, World Vision continues to 
operate in the capital, but the only NGO that has any 
significant reach beyond Qal-e Now is the Bangladesh NGO 
BRAC.  BRAC runs all the health clinics and hospitals in the 
districts and BRAC's Director, Dr. Islam, believes the 
situation facing his employees is getting worse.  Two months 
ago, Dr. Islam informed PRToff that he had withdrawn his 
doctors from all clinics in Murghab and Ghormach due to 
security concerns.  Medical care in those districts and much 
of Jawand is in the hands of locally hired and trained 
nurses.  In addition to threats and attacks on BRAC medical 
facilities, the company working on the Ring Road in Ghormach 
 
KABUL 00000950  002 OF 004 
 
 
has come under attack. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Spanish Development Agency (AECI) recognizes the 
need to provide development in both Murghab and Ghormach. 
AECI's reconstruction plan calls for some development and 
road projects to begin in Murghab in 2007, with increased 
programs including clinic and school construction 
province-wide in 2008.  AECI director Pablo Yuste highlighted 
that his development plan depended on increased security in 
the northern districts.  He opined that "we are losing the 
north."  He added that "all our work and gains in the Qal-e 
Now area are threatened by the increased dissatisfaction of 
the people in the northern districts. If this dissatisfaction 
continues to grow there could be a full-blown insurgency in 
the province." 
 
¶6. (SBU) There has been an increase in improvised explosive 
device (IED) activity and several attacks against ANA and ANP 
outposts that could indicate an increase in insurgent 
activity in the region.  These attacks could also be the 
result of local or ethnic conflicts.   The northern districts 
of Badghis continue to be too unstable for NGOs, the PRT or 
the provincial government to conduct meaningful development 
activities in areas where such projects are needed the most. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
ANP Improving, ANA Needs To Be Deployed 
--------------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) There are reportedly plans to deploy an ANA unit to 
the Murghab area sometime in the spring.  The deployment of a 
sizable ANA unit would improve security significantly, but 
the lack of a deployment date makes it imperative that 
provincial leadership, supported by the PRT, take the 
initiative to increase the capacity of security forces that 
are currently deployed in the province. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The ANP continues to benefit from training and 
support received from the PRT.  While not involved directly 
in police training, members of the Spanish Military work 
closely with ANP and National Directorate for Security (NDS) 
leadership.  The PRT Commander regularly attends Provincial 
Coordination Center (PCC) and other security related meetings 
and has developed strong relationships with the governor and 
all other provincial authorities involved in security related 
issues.  The Spanish Military also conducts frequent joint 
patrols with members of the ANP to increase the force's 
competence and confidence.  The newly-deployed U.S. Military 
Police Support Team (PST) and Civilian Mentors have also 
recently begun operations aimed at standing up the ANP as an 
effective security force able to project its power throughout 
the province.  The PST is focused on teaching ANP officers 
basic police skills while the Civilian Mentors work on 
improving the ANP's management and organization.  While both 
of these programs are in their infancy, they have already 
demonstrated great potential to improve ANP capacity. 
 
¶9. (SBU) A contributing factor to insecurity in Murghab is 
the geographic isolation of the district.  In 2007, AECI 
plans to build the first 30 kilometers of an improved road 
from Qal-e Now to Murghab.  When completed, the road should 
cut normal travel times between the capital and Murghab in 
half, and increase access to the district during winter 
months.  In addition to increasing the ability of ANP and PRT 
forces to exert influence in Murghab, it will open the 
district to increased trade and commerce as well. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Having an improved ANP will not improve security 
significantly unless the local government has the will to 
deploy the ANP in greater numbers to problem areas.  The 
local government's track record of centralizing ANP forces 
near the capital will need to change if security 
province-wide is to be improved.  Maintaining the strong 
working relationship developed between local leadership and 
the Spanish military will be fundamental in moving the ANP to 
a more aggressive posture. 
 
KABUL 00000950  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Politics: New Governor Working To Establish Himself 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶11. (SBU) Mohammed Nasim has been serving as governor for 
just over five months, and while the jury is still out on his 
effectiveness, many locals blame him for a perceived lack of 
progress in the province.  Nasim has attempted to establish 
his authority by effectively reacting to events such as 
flooding in Murghab.  During the flooding he quickly formed 
an emergency response team and personally went to Murghab for 
two weeks to supervise the relief operation.  His efforts 
demonstrated a real interest in strengthening his popularity 
outside of Qal-e Now, and he continues to seek ways to 
demonstrate the positive results of his administration. 
 
¶12. (SBU) A key criticism of Nasim is his lack of experience, 
especially in the area of security.  In response to problems, 
Nasim is known to dispatch quickly letters to the ministry 
officials, instructing them to "resolve the issue" with no 
detailed instructions as to how to proceed.  Another common 
criticism of Nasim's administration is corruption, but to 
date no real evidence has been produced.  Recently, two 
members of the Attorney General's office were in Qal-e Now 
investigating the provincial government.  It is too soon to 
say if any charges will come out of the investigation or if 
they will reach to the Governor, but the investigation has 
weakened Nasim.  Acting on authority from Kabul, the 
prosecutors overturned Nasim's appointment of the Provincial 
Administrator and three District Administrators, ordering 
that the men fired by Nasim re-take their positions.  To 
date, Nasim has yet to reinstate the individuals in question. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The provincial administration has made little 
progress on some key programs such as DIAG and counter 
narcotics initiatives.  Local DIAG members hold regular 
meetings, and occasionally a small cache of weapons is 
collected, but all DIAG efforts are centered in the secure 
districts with little effort expended to promote DIAG in 
Murghab, Ghormach or Jawand.  Similarly, to date the province 
has no comprehensive counter narcotics plan, virtually no 
eradication effort and local authorities have only 
interdicted a small fraction of the opium believed to transit 
the province.  While Badghis is not considered a major opium 
producer, there are reportedly significant amounts of opium 
grown in Murghab, Ghormach and Jawand.  The failure of DIAG 
and counter-terrorism efforts in Badghis is indicative of the 
lack of reach of the provincial government. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Economy: Growth in the Capital, Not In Districts 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶14. (SBU) There has been economic progress since the PRT was 
established.  Some of this progress is the result of 
development and quick impact projects, such as the creation 
of a power grid capable of providing light to 90 percent of 
the city.  Local consumer demand has been spurred by the 
large number of citizens (over 300) employed by the PRT and 
an even larger number working on other development projects 
around Qal-e Now. The city center of Qal-e Now boasts many 
more shops than a year before.   Some of them, such as the 
three carpet stores, obviously cater to foreign workers and 
soldiers, but many more offer local food and products 
targeted at the growing number of local residents with money 
to spend.  Although the growth of consumer demand has 
produced a slight increase in the cost of basic consumer 
goods, the standard of living in the capital appears to have 
grown more rapidly than inflation. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The economic growth in the capital has yet to reach 
some districts, especially Ghormach, Murghab and Jawand. 
Last year a drought ravaged local farmers across the 
province, and heavy flooding impoverished thousands in 
Murghab and Ghormach.  Agriculture remains the primary source 
of employment.  The poor road network puts much of the 
 
KABUL 00000950  004 OF 004 
 
 
province beyond the reach of development projects and 
exacerbates the economic isolation of outlying districts, 
especially Ghormach, Murghab, and Jawand.  The standard of 
living of many villagers could be improved by the 
construction of a well or a micro-dam project near their 
village, but road conditions and the security concerns 
outlined above keep NGOs, the PRT and the local government 
from launching such programs. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶16. (SBU)  As the effectiveness of the ANP improves, the 
provincial leadership will need to embrace a more 
forward-leaning ANP force posture to move ANP officers from 
around the capital to the districts of Ghormach and Murghab. 
The positive effects of the Spanish military's presence and 
AECI's development projects are substantial, but in order to 
protect the gains already made and to spread this progress to 
the districts, security must be improved in the Murghab and 
Ghormach districts.  ANA deployment would be a welcome 
addition to provincial security, but the PRT is taking 
concrete steps to increase the capacity of security forces 
already present in the province to attain this goal.  Until 
security improves in the northern districts, development 
projects needed to incorporate them into the provincial and 
national economy will not be able to be implemented.  END 
COMMENT. 
NEUMANN