VZCZCXRO2174
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0940/01 0810902
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220902Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6971
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3785
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 KABUL 000940 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO GASTRIGHT, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
TREASURY FOR ABAUKOL 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID ECON MASS SOCI AF
SUBJECT: PRT/KUNDUZ: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NORTHEAST 
PROVINCES 
 
REF: REF: KABUL 195 
 
------ 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (SBU) The situation on the ground in the Northeast region 
of Afghanistan has not changed appreciably in the 
past six months.  The security situation remains relatively 
calm, with only occasional criminal or terrorist attacks 
against local officials and ISAF. The primary threat and 
cause of instability come from lack of government control. 
Control rests with former jihadi commanders, many of whom are 
heavily involved in illegal activities, including drug 
production and trafficking, smuggling of fuel, weapons, and 
other high-value commodities, and extortion.  The Northeast 
had high expectations of the Karzai government, but pervasive 
corruption and failure to control illegal activities, both in 
the region and in Kabul, have led to an almost total loss of 
faith in government authorities and programs. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Economic growth has slowed over the past year. 
Large investors particularly are reluctant to commit their 
resources due to lack of effective government 
regulation and security concerns in general.  Most of the 
population continues to rely on agriculture for survival, 
but drought remains a serious concern.  The overall economy 
is doing fairly well, with construction a particularly 
strong sector, but the lack of adequate power, 
unconstrained corruption and illicit activity, and the lack 
of employment for young men hamper economic growth and 
development.  Despite perceptions that development aid has 
been wasted and little accomplished, some projects -- 
especially roads between and within the provincial capitals 
-- have made an important impact.  There is a view that 
some development aid ends up in someone's pocket, but 
enough filters into the economy to improve the lives of 
most people, including many women.  Education is highly 
valued -- including for girls -- and school construction 
cannot keep up with the demand.  The success of democracy 
and progress in the region depend on a successful and 
visible reduction of corruption and criminality, which 
would signal a clear gain of control by the government over 
the current criminal elements who largely run things.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Security Situation: Relative Calm Prevails 
------------------------------------------ 
¶3. (SBU) The security situation in the Northeast of 
Afghanistan -- which includes the provinces of Badakhshan, 
Takhar, Kunduz, and Baghlan -- remains relatively calm, but 
not entirely stable.  Restrictions on travel or movement of 
people and goods in the Northeast primarily have to do with 
poor (or in Badakhshan, total lack of) roads rather than 
security threats.  With the exception of a few problem 
districts in Baghlan and Badakhshan, and occasional 
short-term threat alerts, both Afghan and foreign civilians 
from government organizations or NGOs travel freely around 
the area with only basic safety guidelines (i.e., armored 
vehicles or two-vehicle convoys). 
 
¶4. (SBU) Military vehicles from the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) also travel widely and freely, 
though they have been subject to occasional attacks.  These 
include several attacks on German convoys with small arms 
and Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) launchers on the main 
roads going east and south from Kunduz City, and several 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and small arms attacks on 
Dutch, Hungarian, and German convoys in Baghlan on the main 
road north of the capital of Pul-e Khumri.  No injuries and 
little damage to ISAF vehicles have resulted from these 
attacks, though an Afghan Police vehicle was destroyed and 
one Afghan National Police (ANP) soldier were injured in 
one incident.  All armed attacks in Kunduz have occurred at 
night, and all incidents have targeted ISAF or Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) vehicles. Some of these 
 
KABUL 00000940  002 OF 008 
 
 
assaults have been carried out by terrorists and the 
attackers appear to come from outside the region.  While 
they do have some local supporters who assist or enable 
their operations, the attackers have gained little traction 
with most locals.  PRT Feyzabad (Badakhshan Province) 
military convoys have also been attacked several times, and 
the PRTs in Pul-e Khumri and Feyzabad have taken occasional 
incoming rockets.  A series of small IED explosions (no 
injuries and only minor damage) and IED finds in early 2007 
in Taloqan, where such incidents have been almost unknown 
for many months, seem to be the work of disgruntled local 
commanders. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  No NGOs have been attacked in the region since 
the May 2006 IED that destroyed a vehicle belonging to 
USAID Alternative Livelihoods Program contractor PADCO in 
Darayeen District of Badakhshan.  That assault killed two 
Afghans and slightly wounded two Americans, and is believed 
to have resulted from perceived interference in the drug 
business of the district rather than from any political or 
terrorist objective.  In addition, two German reporters 
camped on the roadside in the far southwest of Baghlan 
(Tala Wa Barfek district), were shot and killed in October 
¶2006.  Although not a robbery (valuable items were left 
behind), this attack remains a mystery and may have been 
carried out by locals who felt either threatened or 
insulted by the pair.  Other violent incidents in the 
region have been attributed to personal feuds, land 
disputes, or grudges against particular officials or other 
individuals, and have not involved foreigners. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Terrorist activities, although supported by a 
small portion of the population, receive little encouragement 
from officials, many of whom actively seek to 
interfere with Taliban or  HIG) activities and arrest 
perpetrators, or at least drive them out of the region.  This 
is in part because terrorism is considered bad for 
Afghanistan (and the Northeast), but also because it is 
considered bad for (illegal) business.  A large percentage of 
officials in both the provincial capitals and districts -- 
including police and other security authorities, as well as 
governors, district managers, and others -- are closely 
linked with criminal activities, including drug production 
and trafficking, smuggling of weapons, fuel, and other 
high-value commodities, and extortion.  In many cases, 
particularly in the remote areas of all four provinces, these 
officials not only permit but also control and direct illegal 
activities.  In fact, police and other official vehicles are 
the preferred means to transport drugs, weapons, and other 
contraband.  People are reluctant to stop for uniformed 
police, particularly in remote areas, since some of those 
"uniformed police" are in fact highway robbers. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Political Situation: Criminality Hampers Good Governance 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶7. (SBU) Virtually every official in the region claims to 
support the Government of Afghanistan, and most have good 
relations with the international community (including the 
PRTs).  Although willing to act against terrorist threats 
and individuals, few are prepared to give up their own 
(illicit) pursuits or actively involve themselves in 
measures against local power brokers that may either upset 
the power balance or hinder the illegal activities from 
which they gain most of their income and prestige. 
Officials often respond to and implement central government 
programs and requirements, but not if it threatens their 
own positions or the stability of the region.  In general, 
senior officials seek to keep security conditions under 
control by balancing the interests of competing parties, 
including drug lords, former commanders, powerful religious 
leaders, and other local power brokers.  The national 
interest definitely comes second (or much farther down) on 
their lists of priorities. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Locals' total lack of faith in the national, 
 
KABUL 00000940  003 OF 008 
 
 
provincial, or local governments is largely due to the lack 
of government control and the widely-known involvement of 
officials in illegal activities.  Bribes are considered 
normal; those who refuse to pay them do not get the service 
or commodity they seek and sometimes end up in trouble with 
the formal or informal authorities.  This negative 
perception applies to the Afghan National Police (ANP) and 
Border Police at all levels.  Many people have a more 
positive view of the Afghan National Army (ANA), but with 
virtually no ANA presence anywhere but Kunduz, this is 
neither surprising nor helpful. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The distrust of government extends to Kabul. 
Northeasterners had high expectations of the Karzai 
government; the majority in this overwhelmingly non-Pashtun 
area voted for him.  Many people now believe the core of the 
region's problems lies in the pervasive corruption in Kabul 
and, in particular, the continuation in office or in 
positions of influence of known drug dealers and former 
commanders who protect local officials and prevent 
authorities from removing bad actors.  Arresting local power 
brokers is considered impossible -- not even something a 
governor or chief of police could do -- because of the 
perception that their sponsors in Kabul will have them 
released in short order, and retribution on those who carried 
out or supported the arrest will be swift and fierce. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Another problem is the regions' perceived 
"Pashtunization."  Although Pashtuns are in the minority in 
the north, many people believe that Pashtuns receive 
advantageous treatment in everything from government 
positions to land allocation.  The treatment of 
non-Pashtuns in Kabul is a particularly sore point; the 
Kunduz Provincial Council claimed that they waited 23 days 
for an appointment with President Karzai, whereas a Pashtun 
elder from the Northeast went to Kabul and saw Karzai 
within 24 hours.  Many also have a negative view of 
Pakistan, but the woes of Afghanistan are attributed more 
to corrupt and inept Afghans than to interference from 
outside the country. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Provincial Council (PC) members, 
Parliamentarians, and other powerful people are sought out 
as intermediaries with government officials because any 
petition or request delivered without the assistance of 
such an intermediary is unlikely to receive any attention 
whatsoever, much less a favorable response.  Many of these 
powerful people, including MPs, are themselves former 
commanders, and continue to operate at the center of 
narcotics trafficking or other criminal activities. 
 
¶12. (SBU) While the Provincial Councils of the four 
provinces are active as representatives of and 
intermediaries for the people, all continue to have 
problems with funding, and they face uncertainty about 
their role.  USAID and other PC training projects appear 
not to have had substantial impact, but continued capacity 
building programs, along with more substantive guidance and 
support from the central government (such as a new 
Provincial Council Law), may improve these elected 
representatives' ability to fulfill their functions more 
effectively.  Interestingly, although many PC members were 
elected on the basis of traditional leadership roles (e.g., 
many mullahs sit on the councils), the individuals with the 
most local influence -- who also control the largest and 
most pervasive drug and other criminal organizations -- 
were mostly elected to Parliament rather than Provincial 
Councils, leaving the latter body with less capable but 
also less corrupt membership. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Economic Situation: Relatively Positive 
--------------------------------------- 
¶13. (SBU) The economic situation in the Northeast is 
relatively positive, particularly in the larger cities and 
towns, where commercial activities abound and the streets 
 
KABUL 00000940  004 OF 008 
 
 
are bustling with people, vehicles, and animal-drawn carts 
and carriages.  Gas stations are readily available and new 
ones are going up all the time, though lacking reliable (or 
in some cases any) electricity, pumps are still run by 
small generators that the attendant starts up when a car 
comes in to buy diesel, the usual fuel of choice. 
 
---------------------- 
Energy Supply Is Vital 
---------------------- 
¶14. (SBU) Energy availability is a critical issue in the 
Northeast.  The close proximity to Tajikistan and electric 
transmission lines has made Kunduz one of the few Afghan 
cities with relatively dependable electricity that does not 
rely on diesel generators.  Baghlan provincial capital 
Pul-e Khumri has an inadequate hydroelectric plant (built 
in the early 1960s to supply the cement factory and 
currently running at about one-third capacity), while 
Taloqan and Feyzabad provinces have no large power 
generation capability.  Although small hydro and other 
generators provide some power to many areas, the failure 
thus far to expand the power grid in the region is one of 
the major complaints of the local population -- and one of 
the serious constraints on economic development.  The route 
from Kunduz to Taloqan is lined with hundreds of large 
concrete power poles lying on the side of the road, 
awaiting the transmission lines that were expected several 
years ago.  Many of the poles are no longer usable.  The 
Kunduz Provincial Power Director outlined a plan he claimed 
was funded by the Asian Development Bank (this project is 
also being funded by USAID, World Bank, Germany, and India) 
that will transmit power from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan and bring the whole region (except Badakhshan) 
into the new 220V power grid.  Donors have paid little 
attention to renewable energy projects, despite excellent 
solar and wind power prospects, though fairly small 
hydroelectric schemes in conjunction with canal upgrades 
may also contribute to the local power supply in the near 
future.  While it seems likely that the grid will reach 
large portions of Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar within the 
next few years, the prospects for mountainous Badakhshan 
remain far less hopeful. 
 
----------------------- 
Agriculture Remains Key 
----------------------- 
¶15. (SBU) Agriculture is a mainstay of the Northeast, and 
farming activities are visible throughout the year in the 
extensive irrigated fields bordering the rivers of the 
region.  The EU is working on the irrigation canal system 
in the Kunduz River Basin (Takhar and Kunduz Provinces), 
and has recently announced a follow-on project to complete 
an upgrade in the Khanabad area (Kunduz) that was started 
in the 1970s.  Irrigated areas are usually double cropped, 
with wheat as the primary first crop, while rice, cotton, 
vegetables, and other crops share the second planting and a 
later harvest.  If farmers believe there will not be 
adequate water for rice, they will often switch to another 
crop that requires less water. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Many large areas that cannot be irrigated, 
including fairly steep slopes, are planted with wheat in 
the often forlorn hope that precipitation will be sufficient 
for a successful crop.  Many such areas, particularly in 
Badakhshan, are also planted with poppy. In 2006, Badakhshan 
was second only to Helmand province in poppy cultivation. 
During the fall of 2006, however, Governor Majid demonstrated 
greater engagement with counter-narcotics activities and 
launched a widespread campaign against planting poppy.  He 
followed this with approximately 500 hectares of early 
eradication in November and December 2006.  UNODC's Rapid 
Assessment Survey predicts that Badakhshan will see a sharp 
decline in poppy cultivation.  Previously, the high degree of 
control by local commanders (often involved in the narcotics 
trade), lack of GOA penetration, the inaccessibility of many 
areas, and the lack of serious alternatives for the local 
 
KABUL 00000940  005 OF 008 
 
 
population made this one of the most difficult areas to 
eradicate or otherwise eliminate poppy production.  More 
recently, the governors in the Northeast have responded to 
increasing pressure from the GOA to eliminate poppy, and they 
have taken advantage of the region's comparatively 
benign security environment to extend legitimate government 
influence throughout the region. Corruption remains a 
problem, and local offices often attempt to derail poppy 
elimination efforts.  The Interior Minister dismissed the 
Daraim District's Governor and Chief of Police in the fall 
due to their interference with the provincial governor's 
eradication plans. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Like all of Afghanistan, most agriculture in the 
Northeast depends on winter snows and rains for the runoff 
that fills the streams and rivers for irrigation and to 
nourish rain-fed wheat.  Years of drought (and given the 
meager rain and snowfall so far, it looks like 2007 may be 
yet another drought year) have left water levels low and 
have severely limited the crop from rain-fed agriculture 
throughout the region.  Only Kunduz, which normally has a 
surplus and depends far less on rain-fed crops, had no food 
shortage in 2007, but even Kunduz may have difficulties in 
¶2008. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Development Projects Abound, But Much Still to Do 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶18. (SBU) Many reconstruction (or construction) and 
development projects have been carried out in the five 
years since the fall of the Taliban.  Despite this effort, 
a tremendous amount remains to be done.  Many Afghans in 
the Northeast bemoan the lack of visible development 
despite the billions of dollars invested by the 
international community.  In some cases, the projects have 
been poorly designed or poorly executed, and there is no 
doubt that millions of dollars have been spent with little 
or nothing to show for it.  Results of capacity-building 
projects are less visible, though no less important, but 
also appear to have had only partial success.  One issue 
that has received little focus is the need for and capacity 
to do maintenance on buildings, roads, or other 
infrastructure, or to follow basic sanitation procedures. 
Facilities that have only recently been completed often 
look very old, with apparently no effort made to replace 
broken windows, fix leaking roofs or plumbing, or repair 
other damage, or even to clean toilets or washing 
facilities.  Sometimes the main problem is poor 
construction, but often it is simply a lack of basic 
maintenance and hygiene. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Many projects, however, have made a huge 
difference.  Paving the road from Kabul through the Baghlan 
capital of Pul-e Khumri up to Mazar e-Sharif, Kunduz City, 
and the Tajik border at Sher Khan Bandar, and from Kunduz 
City over to the Takhar capital of Taloqan, has made these 
stretches of road effectively superhighways of transport 
for goods and people.  The drive from Kunduz, where many 
regional organizations and companies are located, to Pul-e 
Khumri or Taloqan has been reduced from well over half a 
day to only about an hour and a half, and the drive time 
between Kunduz and Kabul has been cut in half to about six 
or seven hours.  A project to reconstruct and pave the road 
from Taloqan to the Badakhshan capital of Feyzabad, which 
is being funded by USAID and the World Bank, will extend 
that commercial connection to the fourth capital of the 
region and, it is hoped, bring it more contact with the 
region.  The increased ability to transport grain and other 
food is particularly important, and the increased ability 
for police and other security patrols is also vital.  In 
Kunduz and Taloqan between 45 and 50 km of city streets 
have been paved, cutting down considerably on what 
previously was one large dust cloud over these cities and 
removing a major source of pollution and respiratory 
illness.  Agriculture near the cities has received a boost, 
as the removal of a persistent coating of dust on the 
 
KABUL 00000940  006 OF 008 
 
 
plants has increased yields. 
 
¶20. (SBU) While there are still few good roads linking the 
capitals to the districts, this need is recognized and is 
slowly being addressed, with some district roads already 
graveled and others planned in the near future.  For 
example, USAID is building a road from the paved highway 
near Sher Khan Bandar to the fairly large population center 
of Imam Sahib, in the far north of Kunduz.  This will link 
Imam Sahib to the border crossing into Tajikistan, where a 
new three-lane U.S.-funded bridge will finally provide a 
road connection between Kunduz and Tajikistan, previously 
linked only by small ferries.   The facilities will include 
U.S.-funded border crossing stations on both sides, and a 
large customs facility on the Afghan side funded by the 
EU.  This complex is expected to lead to a quantum jump in 
cross-border trade, giving an economic boost to the region 
and a revenue boost to the GOA. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Small Investors Build, But Larger Investors Worry 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶21. (SBU) Investment continues, primarily in the 
construction of homes and commercial establishments, but it 
is less than it was a year ago, with some estimating a 
decrease of approximately 40 percent.  Constraints on 
small investors include lack of city planning that may lead 
to forced removal in the future and the lack of employment 
that limits available funds.  Larger investors are more 
concerned about the bigger picture in Afghanistan: lack of 
security in the south, lack of GOA capacity or control, and 
Taliban or other insurgent activities.  Although these 
risks (except lack of GOA control) are minimal in the 
north, investors -- particularly foreigners -- fear their 
negative effect on the future of the nation as a whole.  A 
joint venture between a French company and the GOA to 
revive the cotton processing industry that led the economy 
of the region until the 1970s is still struggling after two 
years  (COMMENT: Given the anti-competitive behavior of the 
French company, this may not be a bad thing. See reftel. 
END COMMENT.).  A group of Afghan and other investors is 
planning substantial investment ($140 million) in the 
cement production and coal mining facilities in Baghlan 
Province.  If successful, this venture should improve 
employment and economic growth in the region, particularly 
in Baghlan, which thus far has received relatively little 
attention from the international community. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Markets and business are still good in the 
region, but they are not growing as much as they were a 
year ago.  Then, people were importing everything they 
possibly could, new items were appearing constantly in the 
markets, and people were bidding up the cost of land and 
houses.  Now, those costs have gone back down (though not 
quite to what they were before the price hikes), while 
imports of durable goods (cars, furniture, appliances) have 
slacked off and most imports are softer goods like food and 
textiles.  Although traffic congestion is growing, perhaps 
only half the number of large Russian trucks is visible 
transporting goods from Tajikistan or Pakistan into the 
region. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Despite the apparent prosperity of the cities and 
towns, however, many young men, mostly from rural areas, 
leave the region to seek employment in Iran or Pakistan. 
Regional immigration officials estimated that between five 
and 15 percent of young men in Kunduz, Takhar, and 
Baghlan have left, and in Badakhshan, the figure is 35 to 
45 percent.  A few women and families go along, but some 90 
percent of emigrant laborers have been young men.  Most 
Pashtuns go to Pakistan (a few for religious education, but 
mostly for employment), most Tajiks (the majority of whom 
are from Badakhshan) and Hazaras go to Iran, and Uzbeks go 
to both places.  Most travel in groups for security and 
mutual support.  Meanwhile, as many as 40,000 former 
refugees, primarily Pashtuns, have returned to the 
 
KABUL 00000940  007 OF 008 
 
 
Northeast, and authorities have provided land and shelter 
for many of these across the region.  In spite of this GOA 
effort, however, many returnees, including widows, the 
elderly, and disabled persons, continue to live in returnee 
camps without decent shelter, employment, or basic 
services. 
 
------------------------- 
Cultural/Social Situation 
------------------------- 
¶24. (SBU) Although virtually all adult women in the 
Northeast continue to wear a burqa in public, there seems 
to be a bit of loosening of the social pressure to wear 
one, as well as a general sense that society is more lively 
and less constrained.  Underneath the burqa, the women 
clearly are well-dressed, well-coiffed, and well made up, 
with nice jewelry and henna and other decoration.  Perhaps 
more importantly, many women can be seen on the streets, 
shopping together or with children.  Women are generally 
more visible in public, even if behind the veil.  Women are 
also playing an increasingly important role in the 
community of the Northeast.  Many work for the government, 
and their numbers are increasing, particularly in health 
and education.  Nevertheless, women continue to be viewed 
widely as property belonging to men; many endure verbal and 
physical abuse, and the sale or exchange of women to settle 
debts remains a widespread and accepted practice. 
 
--------------------------- 
Media Active but Struggling 
--------------------------- 
¶25. (SBU) The Northeast also has a lively media presence, 
with nine radio stations covering all four provinces and 
three TV stations.  BBC can also be heard on FM due to an 
antenna in each province.  Two radio stations have been 
opened in the past year, and none have been shut down; 
there is no formal restriction on what is broadcast. 
Kunduz TV is very active; its cameramen are a fixture at 
important events, and PRT members appear regularly on the 
evening news.  The stations all face financial problems, 
but so far they have found sponsors to help them keep 
going, including USAID, which funds a station in Baghlan, 
and the Kunduz PRT, which pays one of the radio stations in 
Kunduz a fixed fee in return for broadcast time.  The PRT 
also supports Radio Zohra, a women's radio station and 
sponsors a cultural center called Mediothek, where young 
people and others can gather for community theater, 
internet use, and other media-related activities. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Life is Better, but Serious Concerns Remain 
------------------------------------------- 
¶26. (SBU) Basic education and health services are available 
in most areas, thanks in part to the assistance of the many 
international organizations that build and furnish 
facilities, though many schools still rely on tents for all 
or some of their classrooms.  Furniture, blackboards, 
books, medicines, medical equipment, trained teachers and 
medical personnel are in short supply.  Security incidents, 
however, occur only sporadically and local authorities are 
generally are able to manage them.  Even in remote places, 
parents want to send their children, including girls, to 
school.  Although many schools have been built, and many 
school tents and other equipment have been provided, 
facilities cannot keep up with the demand.  Many schools 
run morning and afternoon shifts, with boys in one shift 
and girls in the other.  This strong interest in education 
and other improvements is partly due to the influence of 
returnees who experienced a much more modern lifestyle in 
Iran or Pakistan, and who often convince their neighbors of 
the value of education and clean water, even if that may 
mean paying for it.  Several town water systems are under 
construction, with one in Aliabad (Kunduz) already 
functioning.  At least three others, including one in 
Kunduz City, should be completed over the next year.  Water 
meters will allow the towns to collect fees for the 
 
KABUL 00000940  008 OF 008 
 
 
maintenance of the systems. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Although police and legal services are available 
to some extent in most areas, the numbers are too few, the 
individuals lack adequate training, and corruption is 
pervasive.  Land disputes are particularly persistent, with 
both formal and informal adjudicators often collecting 
bribes from both sides, keeping the disputes going for 
years so they can continue to collect the payments. 
Traffic police also notoriously collect bribes from anyone 
involved in an accident, whether guilty or not.  In 
general, most people would prefer to resolve disputes 
through informal systems -- elders, local shuras, or other 
community leaders -- because they believe that going 
through the formal system may exacerbate, rather than 
solve, the problem due to the ineptness and corruption 
endemic in the formal system.  Nevertheless, major disputes 
usually go through the formal system, and most people 
almost certainly would prefer to go to the government if 
they felt the officials would treat their cases fairly. 
Sharia law is used very little in the Northeast, even in 
remote areas, although local religious leaders often are 
also community leaders and involved in informal dispute 
resolution. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶28. (SBU) Although things are going relatively well in the 
Northeast of Afghanistan, the failure of the GOA and 
international community thus far to successfully and 
visibly reduce the level of corruption and criminality 
undermines continued progress in the region, including 
economic growth, social advances, political stabilization 
and legitimate stability.  If Northeasterners do not see a 
real change in circumstances on the ground, building 
democracy and lasting stability will be an even more 
daunting challenge.  END COMMENT. 
NEUMANN