VZCZCXRO8434
RR RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0790/01 0661343
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071343Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6658
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0045
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3729
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000790 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT), SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMETT 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
REL NATO/ISAF/NZ/AUS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON MARR NATO SOCI AF
SUBJECT: PRT CHAGHCHARAN: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY, 
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN GHOR PROVINCE 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Ghor Province should be one of 
Afghanistan?s success stories, but because it remains unable 
to attract the resources needed to overcome its developmental 
deficit, the province continues to lack the wherewithal for 
economic and political "take-off".  Marginal progress was 
made over the last six months on some fronts, and, very 
importantly, a food crisis appears to have been averted. 
What is more, there is widespread appreciation throughout the 
province for its relative peace and security, which residents 
realize from listening to the radio contrasts markedly with 
the situation in the south and east.  On the other hand, that 
same medium is fueling the belief -- and resultant 
unhappiness -- that Kabul and the International Community are 
largely ignoring Ghor?s needs while addressing those of 
other provinces.  Perhaps not coincidentally, there have been 
a number of serious security incidents since last summer. 
These reflect, among other things, the inability of 
legitimate government authority to neutralize competing 
tribal- arms-, and crime-based centers of power, some of 
which are willing to do the Taliban?s bidding.  End summary. 
 
Security 
-------- 
¶2. (SBU) It is all but impossible to find a Ghor resident who 
does not thank his or her lucky stars that the security 
situation in the province is so much better than in many 
other parts of the country.  Ghor?s relative peace has 
several, sometimes paradoxical sources:  its largely Tajik 
population, still quietly armed and ready to resist the 
Taliban; the difficult terrain, harsh climate, and lack of 
good transit routes; the watchful eye of an active but 
non-aggressive PRT; and, perhaps most importantly, the 
delicate balance between the province's competing centers of 
power (legitimate and illegitimate), which rarely comes under 
direct challenge.  The security climate in Chaghcharan, the 
provincial capital, is so permissive that UNAMA now plans to 
open an office there in the spring.  Just before Christmas 
the contrast between Ghor and those parts of the country 
suffering ongoing hostilities was thrown into especially 
stark relief with the arrival at PRT Chaghcharan of a U.S. 
Army Police Support Team (PST), complete with fresh combat 
experience, more restrictive yet robust operating procedures 
than the other PRT elements, and a certain initial 
unfamiliarity to encountering smiling and waving adults and 
kids along the road. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) There is, however, another side to the story.  The 
PRT headquarters has not come under RPG fire again, as it did 
last May, but a Croatian patrol operating near Ghor?s border 
with Helmand and Farah was targeted by direct small arms fire 
in late June and narrowly avoided casualties.  The French NGO 
"Mission d?Aide au Development des Economies Rurales en 
Afghanistan" (MADERA), for years the backbone of the NGO 
community's presence in Ghor's southern districts, has yet to 
return its international staff to the area following the RPG 
and small arms attack on its premises in Pasaband last May 
¶25.  On May 31 the administrative center in Saghar district, 
again on Ghor?s southern border, was attacked.  One week 
earlier the district administrator in Shahrak was killed, 
followed in October by the murder of the head of the 
important Palawan tribe in the district.  Back on July 23 an 
Afghan doctor working for World Vision and his driver were 
murdered north of Chaghcharan in Charsada district.  Two 
weeks later a World Food Program (WFP) truck was attacked 
nearby.  On August 24 the Pasaband police station came under 
RPG and small arms fire.  At almost the same time, three tent 
schools in neighboring Taiwara were attacked.  Finally, on 
November 23 prominent Mullah Sarwarjan from Taiwara district, 
known for having opposed Taliban propaganda, was killed at a 
Taliban checkpoint in northern Helmand Province. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The circumstances of many of these acts of violence 
remain murky.  Reports suggest they had their origins 
variously in criminality, family or tribal disputes, 
 
KABUL 00000790  002 OF 005 
 
 
jockeying for power among competing strongmen, simple shows 
of force, and/or ideologically or monetarily motivated 
support for the Taliban.  What they all clearly demonstrate 
is the limited reach of legitimate state authority.  Of at 
least equal concern are the repeated warnings voiced since 
late last year by local officials responsible for tracking 
Ghor?s security situation that individual acts of violence 
may now be in the planning stages, intended not just for the 
province's periphery. 
 
Politics 
-------- 
¶5. (SBU) Political institutions in Ghor are formally up and 
running, but they remain in the "sputtering" stage, as likely 
to grind to a halt as finally kick into high gear.  The one 
real exception is Governor Afzali, who doggedly continues to 
push for real policy outcomes in the face of obstacles at 
every turn.  In one telling incident a few months back, when 
word was slow to get out that he had returned from Kabul, 
Afzali began looking for government workers in their offices 
and, finding those offices empty, promptly locked the 
relevant doors.  Before long there was quite the crowd of 
displaced civil servants on his doorstep.  On more than one 
occasion, the Governor has declared publicly that, if people 
are content to snipe at him instead of working for real 
progress, then he would be just as content to move back to 
Kabul.  Privately he remains genuinely concerned at the lack 
of what he feels are the resources needed to do an effective 
job.  He has received, for example, only a fraction of the 
funds he has sought to keep the main transport routes open 
during the winter, a campaign he personally has taken in hand 
with repeated visits to the affected mountain passes. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Still in its inaugural year, the Provincial Council 
is trying to find its way.  The ill-will that characterized 
relations with the Governor early on has been replaced, 
thanks to outside mediation, with a rudimentary workman like 
relationship.  The Council meets with the Governor at least 
once a week now, sends a representative to most larger-scale 
government-sponsored events, and on occasion seeks 
information from various department heads. Like most 
institutions of all sorts in Ghor, the Council is severely 
short on human capital (it is rumored to include warlords, 
relatives of warlords, and drug traffickers).  After one of 
the PRT?s poloffs recently devoted an afternoon to 
suggesting to the PC Chairman a possible way ahead for the 
sub- group on human rights and good governance, which the PC 
Chairman heads, the Chairman arrived an hour late for the 
actual subcommittee meeting, in time to sign off on the 
conclusions that the PRT poloff had been compelled to extract 
- for wont of anyone else willing to push discussion -- from 
the participants. 
 
¶7.  (U) In the absence of any ANA presence in Ghor, even the 
limited progress on the police front over last six months is 
noteworthy.  The ANP in Ghor, though permanently present only 
in district centers with a total force (officers, enlisted, 
civilians) of 923 as of January 2007, remains the only 
available "pointy end" of governmental authority.  Having set 
his house in order with the Ministry of Interior, Police 
Chief General Noori has over the last month come out from 
under the cloud of probation and returned to the job 
demonstrating greater engagement as a partner with the PRT's 
Dyncorps mentors (and their PST support team) and Lithuanian 
police trainers. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Dyncorps continues to do its best to turn even 
illiterate recruits into functioning policemen in 13 weeks, 
to drag police officialdom into properly supporting police 
pay reform, and to call up the infinite patience required to 
bring a functioning Provincial Coordination Center (PCC) into 
being.  The Lithuanians also continue their yeomen's work, 
building up the provincial ANP?s radio transmitting 
capabilities practically from scratch, furnishing the most 
 
KABUL 00000790  003 OF 005 
 
 
basic elements of mobility (motorbikes), and offering the 
first forensic training since the Soviet occupation.  The 
PRT's military element recently began supplemental weapons 
training for the police and is gearing up to cover a 
significant part of the curriculum that must be taught in 
order to stand up Ghor?s 150-strong auxiliary police force 
contingent. 
 
Economy 
------- 
¶9.  (U) Ghor?s economy made scant progress over the last six 
months.  Government revenues are expected to amount to a 
paltry $200,000 for the year ending in March.  Retail 
activity in the capital was lively enough over the summer, 
though perhaps not to the extent city authorities may have 
anticipated (as evidenced by the number of municipal-owned 
shop stalls left only half-built).  Over the winter, sales 
have stagnated due to the seasonal drop-off in customers from 
outlying villages.  The province continues to have virtually 
no commercial enterprises.  Transport "companies" consist of 
one or two privately owned vehicles.  According to the 
director of transport, the whole province only has about 40 
functioning trucks and about 30 privately owned passenger 
transport vehicles.  There is no commercial banking in the 
province.  Satellite dishes continue to sprout up, even in 
rural areas.  Given the dearth of 
legitimate economic activity, that and other displays of 
wealth often give rise to the suspicion that drug trafficking 
proceeds are at the base of such conspicuous consumption. 
 
¶10. (U) Chaghcharan city has 400 kilowatts of generating 
capacity (enough for five hours of electricity a day) but at 
a price beyond the reach of most consumers.  In December a 
group of consultants working for the Asian Development Bank 
identified a site 17 kms. east of Chaghcharan on the Hari Rud 
River that they deemed suitable for a 5 megawatt dam.  The 
decision on whether to select Ghor as one of three provinces 
to get such a potentially transformative boost rests with 
Energy and Water Minister Ismail Khan.  Ghor is not slated to 
received any electricity from the giant Salma dam nearing 
completion in Herat Province, even though the water powering 
the dam comes from Ghor and the dam is located practically on 
its border. 
 
¶11. (U) The continuation last summer and fall of the 
Region?s severe drought reinforced what has become a 
seasonal as well as permanent trickle of economic 
out-migration from Ghor to Herat, southern Afghanistan, Iran, 
and Pakistan.  On the other hand, this winter?s snowfall, 
looking to be somewhat greater than last year?s, shows signs 
it might bring with it a reverse flow, at least in some areas 
and at least through the winter wheat harvest.  Humanitarian 
assistance (including almost 6 metric tons so far in WFP aid) 
appears to have averted widespread hunger. 
 
¶12. (U) Limited development work, some supported by USAID, 
continued, aimed at improving literacy, teacher training, 
health, and drinking water/irrigation.  The Japanese finished 
work on five large schools in Lal district.  Only about 90 of 
the 300 kms. of gravel roads into Chaghcharan originally 
slated by the UK and USAID for grading, culverting, and 
compacting were reconstructed before money ran out.  Even so, 
they have served to remind Ghor residents of just how bad 
they have it with the rutted tracks that make up the 
remainder of the province?s road 
network. 
 
Society 
------- 
¶13. (U) Morals and mores remain quite traditional in Ghor, 
but these tend to be leavened by an enthusiasm for education 
and a continuing hope for a better future, nurtured in turn 
by the province?s generally good security environment. 
Unfortunately, at the same time both educational opportunity 
 
KABUL 00000790  004 OF 005 
 
 
as well as an otherwise fairly optimistic spirit are being 
undercut by poverty, something that likewise appears to be 
creating fertile ground for the perception that Kabul and the 
International Community are ignoring Ghor in favor of other 
areas of the country. 
 
¶14. (U) The desire for schools and the acknowledgment of 
education as the path to a better future are palpable 
throughout the province.  Schools usually beat out even 
clinics as top on villagers? wish lists  According to the 
director of education, 124,000 children and teenagers go to 
school, a figure he estimates takes in about 70 percent of 
the school-age population.  Only 32 of 390 schools actually 
have a school building.  Others are in tents or the open air, 
a circumstance that in traditional Ghor is said to create a 
hurdle for girls? attendance.  All the same, fully half of 
the 14,000 first-time registrants for the upcoming school 
year are girls.  Enrollment at Chaghcharan?s girls? school 
(one of several in the province) has shot up from 400 to 1800 
in the course of the last three years.  (Some girls also 
attend mixed gender schools.)  Only 600 of the province?s 
2,600 teachers have attended a teacher training institute. 
Kabul has approved in principle the opening of Ghor?s first 
teacher training college in Chaghcharan, but the actual 
start-up appears to have been delayed for at least a year. 
 
¶15. (U) The health care situation in Ghor has improved 
somewhat but overall remains extremely poor.  Its 
600,000-plus population is served by a single, six-doctor 
provincial hospital in Chaghcharan -- for many simply beyond 
their reach, given the expense, their own remoteness, the 
severe weather, and the mountainous terrain.  In principle 
there are five comprehensive health care centers and a 
scattering of basic health care centers in the districts, but 
these too are often inaccessible to the affected population. 
Two NGOs, World Vision and Coordination of Humanitarian 
Assistance (CHA), have been supporting these clinics, in the 
case of World Vision with the help of USAID funding.  As of 
September 1, the EC assumed responsibility for supporting 
both NGOs.  Despite the presence of three foreign-operated 
specialty clinics in the east of the province and sometimes 
adequate supplies of medicine, the core problem remains a 
serious shortage of basic health care facilities throughout 
the province and a nagging difficulty in staffing the clinics 
that already exist.  The current director of the government 
health care center in Lal district, for example, is a 
pharmacist; while Sharak?s district administrator 
characterizes the clinic in his district center as nothing 
more than a first aid station. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Comment:  It is not without reason that Aristotle 
believed the mountains on Ghor's border marked the end of the 
earth, as Rory Stewart points out in "The Places in Between," 
the account of his walk across Ghor.  Whether it?s the 
three-day drive required to reach the province?s capital 
from Kabul, the impossibility of recruiting a gynecologist 
for the provincial hospital even with the offer of premium 
pay, or Chaghcharan?s nightly near black-out (with available 
city electricity costing more than 12 times the going rate in 
Herat) - living in Ghor really does feel like falling off the 
planet.  Many believe it will take a revolutionary 
improvement in infrastructure (for example, the long sought 
east-west highway) to kick-start the development process that 
in turn will lead to a take-off in legitimate economic 
activity, inflow of human and material capital, burgeoning of 
governmental legitimacy, and atrophying of competing centers 
of power.  In the meantime, the PRT and its national 
capitals, along with the few NGOs active in Ghor, are working 
hard to provide patient counsel and encouragement, resources 
to the limited extent available, and a link to other, outside 
sources of development funding.  This last has become a 
priority even for the PRT?s poloffs, given the promise such 
funds hold for preserving the province?s precious stability 
and solidifying support for elected government. 
 
KABUL 00000790  005 OF 005 
 
 
 
NORLAND