VZCZCXRO2640
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0680/01 0610401
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020401Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6474
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//JF/UNMA//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3702
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3499
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6685
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 2028

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000680 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, SCA/PAB, S/CT 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRT/GARDEZ: GOVERNOR'S PLAN TO DEAL WITH TALIBAN 
STRONGHOLD 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) Paktia governor Rahmatullah Rahmat announced 
on Jan. 30 that he intends to move energetically and 
methodically to bring Zormat District, currently 
plagued by insurgency, under government control.  He 
outlined a plan, developed with UNAMA, to reform the 
district administrative and security apparatus and 
implement high-profile, consensus-building development 
schemes. The plan calls for the replacement of 
Taliban-influenced officials with loyal government 
representatives, enhancement of local ANA and ANP 
forces, deploying nearly one-third of Paktia's ANAP 
contingent there, a possible increase in coalition 
force presence, engagement with tribal leaders to 
eliminate Taliban influence in the district shura and 
to formalize tribal responsibility for securing the 
area.  Zormat has been a traditional bastion of 
Taliban influence.  Insurgents have used the 
district's strategic location astride key 
transportation routes between Pakistan and central 
Afghanistan as a safe haven, staging area, and conduit 
for attacks elsewhere.  Governor Rahmat's aggressive 
personal style and extensive knowledge of the region 
and local tribal structures may generate some success 
in subduing Zormat, creating a significant blow to the 
Taliban's anticipated spring offensive in Central and 
Eastern Afghanistan.   END SUMMARY. 
 
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Zormat a Taliban Hub 
-------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Paktia Governor Rahmat briefed a meeting of 
the PDC on Jan. 30 regarding plans to deal with 
Paktia's chief security objective: gaining effective 
control of Southeastern Zormat District.  Rahmat 
stated that Paktia's overall security situation was 
not as bad as many parts of the country, but that 
Zormat was heavily influenced by Taliban insurgents. 
Taliban have exploited the weak tribal structure in 
Zormat to gain essential control over the tribal and 
district shuras and to intimidate government 
officials. The Taliban use the area for safe haven and 
transit to coordinate attacks on neighboring provinces 
and Kabul. As a result, the provincial government 
cannot administer the area effectively nor can 
development projects be implemented freely and without 
insurgent harassment. 
 
---------------------------- 
Government to Assert Control 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Rahmat outlined a plan to stabilize Zormat 
and establish a viable government presence in the 
district, which now lies beyond the pale of his 
administration's control.  He said that he intends to 
develop a strong, pro-government tribal shura in 
Zormat that would be responsible for self-policing the 
area. The governor explained that he would replace 
current Shura members who were either actual Taliban 
or under Taliban influence and then sign a self- 
policing agreement with the Shura.  He would model the 
 
KABUL 00000680  002 OF 003 
 
 
agreement on one he had signed recently with the 
tribal Shura for Northeastern Pathan District, which 
borders Pakistan.  Under the terms of this agreement, 
continued government development assistance is 
contingent on Shura compliance in deterring insurgent 
activities in the district.  Rahmat asserted that 
locals caught supporting or participating in Taliban 
activities would have their houses destroyed and be 
fined 200,000 Afghanis (About USD 4000).  The governor 
also said that he planned to augment the ANA and ANP 
presence in Zormat in order to provide sufficient 
security for government administrators and 
international aid representatives to operate with 
impunity. 
 
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Detailed Plan 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Governor Rahmat's brief was based on a 
detailed "Zormat Stabilization Initiative" that he 
developed with UNAMA in concert with the PRT and local 
coalition forces.  The three-phased plan focuses on 
administrative reform, enhanced security, tribal 
engagement, and high impact reconstruction/economic 
development programs.  During the initial phase, the 
governor would remove the current disloyal or inactive 
officials with trustworthy appointees; notably the 
District Commissioner, the local prosecutor, and the 
heads of the civil and Ulema courts and create a 
supportive religious council.  The provincial 
government  also intends to ensure that local ANA, 
ANP, and NDS contingents stationed in Zormat are at 
least 80 percent of intended strengths.  This move 
would result in an added 40 ANP troopers being 
stationed in Zormat, for example. In addition, almost 
one-third (80 out of 300 total) of the ANAP allotted 
to Paktia would be assigned to Zormat after the ANAP 
training is completed within the next three months. 
Paktia officials also will explore possibilities for 
an increased ISAF presence in the district, including 
the establishment of a FOB in Zormat. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In order to address needed administrative 
reform, the governor would create an advisory council 
of tribal elders to work with him in creating a 
representative and responsive district tribal shura. 
Provincial officials would similarly consult with 
local religious leaders to create a fully functional 
religious council, which would help to legitimize 
government programs and counter the Taliban's 
religious appeal.  Development programs would be 
designed to provide immediate and concrete benefit to 
Zormat residents and, thereby, a practical reason for 
backing the government.  The PRT, UNAMA, AID and the 
GOA would concentrate on low-cost, high impact 
development, such as mosque and road refurbishment 
and irrigation projects.  (Note: Per guidelines, 
AID funds would not be used for the mosque 
refurbishment.  End note.)  Activities planned for 
the following two phases would seek to strengthen 
and institutionalize security, administrative, and 
developmental initiatives slated for the initial 
phase. 
 
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Background 
 
KABUL 00000680  003 OF 003 
 
 
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¶6. (SBU) Zormat is Paktia's largest and most populous 
district and is a transportation hub with major routes 
from neighboring Paktika, Ghazni and Logar provinces 
passing through its borders.  The Taliban, and 
previously anti-Russian Mujahidin, frequent a couple 
of these routes, especially one starting in Pakistan 
and passing through Paktika to Southern Ghazni. 
Another connects the district with Taliban bases in 
Pakistan through the Zadran District in the Khost- 
Paktia pass region. Insurgents also remain in Zormat 
and use the district as a staging area. Zormat was a 
Taliban stronghold during the Taliban regime and many 
Zormatis maintain links with Taliban insurgents. 
Taliban influence within the district government and 
an ineffective, corrupt ANP presence have made the 
area extremely dangerous for development activities 
and a viable provincial government presence untenable. 
There have been numerous attacks and kidnappings 
against government officials and development 
implementers.  The unimpeded Taliban influence in 
Zormat is a de-stabilizing influence for the entire 
region; promoting and enhancing insurgent activities 
in adjacent provinces.  Officials and coalition 
representatives fully expect Zormat to be a focus of 
insurgent activity during the Taliban's anticipated 
spring offensive. 
 
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Comment 
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¶7. (SBU)  Controlling Zormat is the key to government 
counter-insurgency efforts in Paktia. While the Wazi 
Zadran and Swak Districts of the Khost-Gardez Pass 
region are also insurgent hotbeds, Zormat would appear 
to be the more strategic area for thwarting Taliban 
activities.  The District's size, transportation 
routes, and borders with insurgent areas of other 
provinces make Zormat a more easily accessed and 
infiltrated zone.  Governor Rahmat's emphasis on 
tribal engagement and self-policing to deter insurgent 
activities is one of his fundamental approaches to 
building government control throughout the province. 
The governor's aggressive personal style and feel for 
the local tribal system (he worked for UNAMA in Paktia 
for five years) provide hope that he will be able to 
negotiate effectively with tribal leaders and not back 
down when confronting the insurgent threat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEUMANN