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DE RUEHIT #0252/01 0851338
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261338Z MAR 07
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6805
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000252 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPAO TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH OPINION MAKERS ON PM ERDOGAN AND THE 
PRESIDENCY 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 0648 
     ¶B. ANKARA 0629 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  In what was meant to be an hour and a 
half tour d'horizon with three of Turkey's most prominent 
opinion makers, Ambassador was only able to get one question 
in: Will PM Erdogan be a candidate for President?  The heated 
debate that ensued was a sharp contrast to the backdrop of 
ships calmly flowing through the Bosphorus.  Sahin Alpay of 
Islamist-oriented daily Zaman believed PM Erdogan would not 
run.  Radikal's editor-in-chief Ismet Berkan proffered that 
the PM had not yet decided and would likely keep his options 
open until the very last minute.  Leftist-nationalist daily 
Cumhuriyet's colorful commentator Emre Kongar confidently 
proclaimed there was no doubt PM Erdogan would be a 
candidate.  The three opinions accurately reflect the 
diversity of (and passion behind) the discussions throughout 
Turkey in the weeks ahead of the official start of the 
presidential election period on April 16.  Meanwhile, among 
industrialist circles, light-hearted bets have proliferated 
on this subject, suggesting they are not terribly concerned 
one way or the other, as long as the economy continues to 
grow.  End summary. 
 
----------------------- 
SAHIN ALPAY, ZAMAN:  NO 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Alpay responded first by stating he did not believe 
PM Erdogan would run for president.  He came to this 
conclusion after "reading something in the papers" about 
Erdogan's intentions to confer about this decision with the 
National Security Council (MGK), he said.  Responding to 
Kongar's allegations that the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) has an ulterior Islamic agenda (see below and ref A), 
Alpay argued the PM's party has genuinely embraced a 
western-orientation because it has become convinced that an 
open market economy protects it from "forces in Ankara." 
 
----------------------------- 
ISMET BERKAN, RADIKAL:  MAYBE 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Berkan opined the PM does not yet know what he will 
do and will likely not make a decision until the last minute. 
 He attributed this to what he described as PM Erdogan's 
reliance on the Islamic tradition of counseling.  He noted 
the PM had already asked prominent businessmen in Istanbul 
about their opinions and would seek to hear from other 
circles as well before announcing his decision.  Berkan added 
that PM Erdogan is "authoritarian" and that once he says 
something publicly he does not consider alternatives.  In a 
solo game of devil's advocate, Berkan suggested the very 
political PM may not seek the apolitical position of the 
Presidency.  However, PM Erdogan may not want to let slip 
what could be his only opportunity to ascend to the 
Presidency -- what he called the "forgotten raison-d'etre" of 
the PM's AKP. 
 
------------------------------ 
EMRE KONGAR, CUMHURRIYET:  YES 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The most assertive of the group, Kongar told 
Ambassador there was no question the PM will pursue the 
Presidency.  He claimed AKP parliamentary group members had 
recently signaled their voting intentions by giving PM 
Erdogan their "loyalty, loyalty, loyalty" for his birthday. 
Characterizing PM Erdogan as the "imam" of the AKP core, 
Kongar distinguished between AKP and the Republican People's 
Party (CHP), claiming the PM draws his loyalty from Islamic 
culture while the loyalty given to CHP leader Deniz Baykal is 
politically engineered. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Kongar further proffered that AKP's ultimate goal 
was to change Turkish society in accordance with Islamic 
principles.  It is the only way to explain the party's 
significant shift from being the most anti-U.S./EU party to 
the most pro-U.S./EU party, he said.  For its part, the 
party's core electorate has not shifted quite so rapidly with 
xenophobic anti-American sentiments still riding high.  The 
end justifies the means, explained Kongar.  PM Erdogan will 
seek the Presidency in order to gain influence over the three 
areas of the State system that he can't control as Prime 
Minister: the universities, the high courts and the military. 
 
 
 
ISTANBUL 00000252  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Refuting Berkan's suggestion that the PM was 
seeking counsel before making his decision, Kongar argued PM 
Erdogan wants to shape public opinion rather than sense it. 
He pointed to the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's 
Association (TUSIAD) recent public statement supporting the 
ruling party's right to select the President as evidence that 
the PM's strategy was working. 
 
----------------- 
WHAT TO CONCLUDE? 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Despite their differences, the three commentators 
agreed with Ambassador's conclusion that they all believed 
the important period is not the month between the start and 
end of the election but rather the year that follows.  Though 
skeptical, Kongar remained hopeful that if PM Erdogan could 
be "secular enough" there would be no problems.  He feared 
however, that if AKP were to change "the axis of society" 
from secular to religious then signs of turmoil would begin 
on university campuses.  Berkan argued that because AKP will 
control the election, who ultimately becomes President is 
irrelevant.  Rather, he is concerned about the increasing 
polarization of Turkey which he said threatens its democracy. 
 Alpay disagreed, responding that Turkey has never had a 
stronger democracy and that polarization was much worse in 
the 1960s and 70s.  He remained "cautiously optimistic" and 
was less concerned about domestic challenges than those 
emanating from Iraq "because of the US invasion." 
 
---------------------------------- 
MEANWHILE in the Private Sector... 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Among Istanbul's wealthy industrialist class, 
Erdogan's Presidency - which they consider to be a foregone 
conclusion should he choose to pursue it - has become a 
matter for light hearted betting.  At one event we attended, 
a member of one of Turkey's top holding companies bet his 
former business partner five thousand dollars that Erdogan 
would pursue and gain the presidency; a signed document was 
witnessed by the sister of another leading industrialist 
(herself one of Turkey's wealthiest women) and given to a 
third party for safe keeping amidst great laughter.  Several 
board members of TUSIAD, Turkey's pre-eminent association of 
industrialists and developers, told us that they have bet 
shopping sprees, trips to London and Geneva, and other "in 
kind" prizes on the outcome of the election.  The nominal 
head of Turkey's leading holding company told us he did not 
anticipate a change in fiscal policy, no matter who won the 
presidency, and that was what mattered. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Comment:  However acute the debate on Turkey's 
presidency is among thoughtful intellectuals across the 
political spectrum, however, for the business sector a stable 
economic environment is the key factor (and presumably the 
retention of fiscal conservative and businessman Ali Babacan 
as the AK Parti's key advisor).  The picture is unlikely to 
get clearer before the start of the presidential election 
process on April 16 and perhaps not until April 25 when all 
candidates must be officially declared (ref B).  End comment. 
OUDKIRK