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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI187, FINLAND: MISSILE DEFENSE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OUTREACH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI187 2007-03-15 16:00 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0187 0741600
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151600Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3072
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 1115
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0735
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4757
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 8619
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 4667
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000187 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/PRA - MAZEVEDO, EUR/PPD - 
TCORN, CI/MDSP - STEVEN ROSENKRANTZ, NSC - MAHAYWARD, MDA - 
NANCY MORGAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PL EZ RU FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND: MISSILE DEFENSE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OUTREACH 
 
REF: A. HELSINKI 162 
 
     B. HELSINKI 144 
     C. EMBASSY HELSINKI - PEKALA EMAIL 7 MARCH 2007 
     D. STATE 30480 
     E. STATE 21640 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) The public reaction in Finland to US missile defense 
plans in Eastern Europe and Russian misrepresentations of 
them have been largely muted.  Several editorials and 
comments from leading politicians appeared in the immediate 
aftermath of Putin's Munich speech, but very few of these 
directly addressed the missile defense issue.  (Many even 
acknowledged the positive impact of SecDef Gates' measured 
response.)  The lack of public commentary is somewhat odd, 
given that Finland will hold parliamentary elections on 
March 18 and candidates have been eagerly opining 
(oftentimes inaccurately) on everything from the trans- 
Atlantic relationship to cluster bombs to the War on 
Terror.  Given the uninformed or unhelpful commentary that 
has emerged regarding these issues, we are pleased that 
missile defense has run largely under the media's radar 
screen. 
 
2. (C) The GOF, for its part, has made clear that missile 
defense is not a matter for Finland to address, but rather 
a bilateral issue between the Czech and Polish Governments 
and the US.  Senior Finnish officials have welcomed wide 
discussions of the issue within NATO and have thanked us 
for sharing information with key non-NATO partners such as 
Finland.  In response to our demarche (Ref E), Foreign 
Minister Erkki Tuomioja also issued a helpful statement 
"rejecting" Russian misrepresentations and threats against 
Poland and the Czech Republic (see Refs A-C). 
 
3. (C) Thus far, we have focused our outreach efforts on 
ensuring that the missile defense issue does not blossom 
into a campaign controversy and on ensuring that key 
players have the facts.  Thus far, in addition to briefing 
MFA officials, we have: 
 
 -- privately briefed candidates and political strategists 
in the Center, SDP, and Green parties; 
 
 -- shared our demarche points with key advisors in the 
office of the Prime Minister; 
 
 -- shared facts with the acting foreign editor of 
Helsingin Sanomat, Finland's largest and most influential 
daily; 
 
 -- and laid out US views to a senior researcher at the 
Helsinki University's Aleksanteri Institute, one of the 
largest Russia-focused think tanks in Europe. 
 
4. (C) Going forward, Embassy believes that it is best to 
continue to brief key opinion makers behind-the-scenes, 
rather than to raise the missile defense issue publicly 
during election season and risk making an issue out of what 
has been a non-issue. 
 
5. (U) Overall Embassy POC for missile defense issues is 
PolChief Gregory Thome, tel.:  358-9-6162-5478; unclass e- 
mail: thomegd@state.gov. 
HYATT