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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI150, FINLAND'S MARCH ELECTION: SDP LIKELY TO TAKE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI150 2007-03-05 14:50 2011-04-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXRO5572
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHHE #0150/01 0641450
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051450Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3034
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4685
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0289
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000150 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND'S MARCH ELECTION:  SDP LIKELY TO TAKE 
CHARGE -- IN SPITE OF THEMSELVES 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The latest polls give Finland's Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) a chance to win the March 17 
election, but the popularity of Center Party (CEN) PM 
Matti Vanhanen seems to indicate that the SDP will more 
likely come in a very close second.  But in the follow-on 
negotiations to form a new government, look for the SDP 
to come away a winner.  Entrenched in government for 
nearly all of the past 60 years, the SDP boasts arguably 
the most experienced bureaucrats, best political 
negotiators, and a certain intangible pride of place in 
"being in government" that pundits across the spectrum 
acknowledge.  Oddly, despite these advantages, the Social 
Democrats face their own internal challenges, including 
the retirement of their major party heavyweight, a 
leadership often divided on key issues, and the 
persistent unpopularity of party leader Eero Heinaluoma. 
Given these challenges, we expect the SDP to come just 
short of winning the election.  But in Finland, second is 
good enough for the SDP to ensure itself a dominant role 
in the governing coalition, snap up key ministries and in 
many ways take charge.  End Summary. 
 
A DEAD HEAT IN THE POLLS, BUT ADVANTAGE VANHANEN 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
2. (U) Two weeks before the Finnish Parliamentary 
election, the polls are forecasting few surprises.  The 
Center Party (CEN) and the Social Democrats (SDP) -- the 
main partners in the current government coalition -- are 
tied for the lead, with each likely to grab about 24 
percent of the vote.  This puts them safely ahead of the 
Conservative Party (CONS), which will likely score about 
19 per cent.  None of the parties will reveal a word 
about the back-room negotiations which by now are well 
underway regarding possible future governing coalitions, 
but most pundits are anticipating the return of an CEN- 
SDP led coalition, with some combination of smaller 
parties invited along to ensure an ample parliamentary 
majority. 
 
3. (SBU) While the polls show a stastical dead heat, 
observers across the spectrum give the ultimate edge to 
CEN, thanks to the great popularity of PM Matti Vanhanen 
(see reftel A).  More than 60% of voters, regardless of 
party affiliation, say they would like to see Vanhanen 
return as PM.  In 2003, without a "political superstar," 
CEN edged the SDP by a mere one parliamentary seat, and 
with Vanhanen having emerged as something of a star, we 
expect CEN to edge SDP again by a razor thin margin. 
 
HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE FAVOR THE SDP 
------------------------------------ 
4. (SBU) Yet even with a second place finish, the SDP has 
a way of coming out a winner.  In 2003, the SDP had its 
own superstar in the form of incumbent PM Paavo Lipponen 
-- the man who, as PM from 1995 to 2003, guided Finland 
into the EU; presided over the GOF's successful first EU 
Presidency; strengthened trans-Atlantic relations; and 
delivered on a range of domestic issues that, among other 
things, helped pull Finland out of the devastating 
recession it suffered following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  Lipponen and the party were shocked when 
CEN won -- but they regained their footing immediately, 
and by all accounts promptly went on to outfox CEN during 
the coalition negotiations:  CEN had earned the 
Premiership through the ballot box, but SDP maneuvered 
itself into almost all the other key posts, including 
Speaker of Parliament and the Ministries of Education, 
Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance. 
 
5. (SBU) CEN strategists insist to us that regardless of 
whether they finish first or second, they do not intend 
to get outmaneuvered by the SDP again.  Nevertheless, 
politicians and commentators from across the spectrum 
marvel at the SDP's consistent ability to get their hands 
on the controls of government regardless of whether they 
sit atop the coalition or play second fiddle.  Having 
served in nearly every government coalition since 
1950, the SDP boasts by far and away the broadest 
grouping of experienced politicians with ministerial- 
level experience, as well as the most bureaucratic and 
technocratic government expertise at lower levels.  The 
party has rotated its activists in and out of ministerial 
posts and other key positions for decades, skillfully 
seasoning up-and-comers while also balancing their 
nominations with very experienced subject matter experts. 
The result has been both governments that can deliver for 
voters, as well as a party machinery that knows in 
advance what posts it needs in order to implement the key 
parts of its agenda.  In addition to these factors, our 
CONS and CEN contacts admit that they always enter post- 
 
HELSINKI 00000150  002 OF 003 
 
 
election negotiations that lead to forming the government 
at a disadvantage.  CONS suffers from least government 
experience in the past half-century, while CEN arguably 
boasts the best nation-wide electoral machinery but lacks 
national-level technical experience and a certain 
political "eye for the game."  By contrast, as one CONS 
candidate put it, the SDP simply "expects itself to be in 
government," and thus enters the negotiations with an 
intangible but real advantage. 
 
IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT -- DESPITE THEMSELVES 
------------------------------------------ 
6. (SBU) Yet in 2007, despite these historical and 
bureaucratic advantages, the SDP faces tough internal 
challenges that could hurt it at the polls.  Most 
importantly, the SDP is not only running without a 
"political superstar"; it is led by something of an 
"anti-superstar."  With Speaker Lipponen retiring, the 
SDP faces a double-whammy:  first, it loses its single 
largest vote winner, in a parliamentary system that 
rewards the whole party for individual candidates' 
successes; and second, Party Leader Eero Heinaluoma, the 
party's de facto PM candidate, simply cannot shake a 
persistent unpopularity with voters.  Heinaluoma, who 
comes from the powerful labor wing of the SDP, has proven 
himself a tough debater, a master of his issues as 
Finance Minister, and a respected campaign strategist. 
However, polls asking "Who would make the best PM?" 
consistently place him near the bottom of the eight-party 
field -- as many as a whopping 50 percentage points 
behind PM Vanhanen, and consistently behind the CONS 
superstar, candidate Sauli Niinisto, who is not even his 
party's PM candidate.  Moreover, polls in Heinaluoma's 
Helsinki district show him likely to capture just over -- 
or maybe just under -- the roughly 6000-vote threshold he 
would need to get elected.  This has opened up the 
potentially very embarrassing possibility that SDP Leader 
Heinaluoma might not even win a seat in Parliament -- in 
a district where his predecessor Lipponen won more than 
30,000 votes for himself and the party in 2003. 
 
7. (SBU) In addition to Heinaluoma's lack of popularity, 
the SPD is finding it difficult to deliver a unified 
message on several issues.  On foreign and security 
policy (FSP), the party is badly divided between 
Lipponen's disciples, who favor NATO membership and 
stronger trans-Atlantic ties but fear that saying so will 
cost them votes, and others like Tuomioja and President 
Tarja Halonen who are clearly luke-warm on those issues. 
However, the party has rather effectively papered over 
these differences and, more importantly, succeeded in 
colluding with rival parties to keep a real FSP 
discussion off the agenda until after the election. 
 
8. (U) Of greater concern to voters, in any case, a 
varied basket of domestic issues, including elder care 
and pensions; immigration; jobs and taxes; nuclear power; 
education; Finland's place in the EU; and the role of 
Swedish language in Finnish culture.  And on many of 
these SDP leaders have been all over the map.  Just two 
examples: (1) On immigration, many SDP candidates have 
called for more liberal policies, in large part to bring 
in workers to help finance the expensive Finnish welfare 
state model -- a point of SDP pride -- in the face of a 
shrinking workforce and aging population.  However, 
Heinaluoma has joined his long-time labor colleagues in 
voicing skepticism about foreign workers who might 
compete with Finns for jobs, while SDP Interior Minister 
Kari Rajamaki has called for almost draconian measures to 
cut down on the already-scant numbers of immigrants who 
do come to Finland.  (2) On nuclear power, Lipponen and 
others have consistently supported increases in capacity 
-- to include building a sixth reactor -- both to meet 
Finland's energy needs and as a way to mitigate green 
house gas emissions; yet almost simultaneously, President 
Halonen (who, as President, is theoretically supposed to 
rise above the fray of party politics but can never 
resist an occasional plunge) has called for limiting 
nuclear power. 
 
Whither FM Tuomioja? 
-------------------- 
9. (SBU) Perhaps ironically, Foreign Minister Erkki 
Tuomioja has emerged well ahead of Heinaluoma as the 
SDP's potential heavy hitter, both in terms of delivering 
a consistent message and as a magnet for votes.  Tuomioja 
is an ideological counterweight to Lipponen on security 
policy and trans-Atlantic relations, to be sure. 
However, as a politician, his star has risen dramatically 
in recent months.  Tuomioja's mastery of international 
 
HELSINKI 00000150  003 OF 003 
 
 
issues, his leadership during the Finnish EU Presidency, 
and his reputation as an intellectual have earned him 
extremely high domestic approval ratings.  In recent 
weeks alone, Finland's most widely read news magazine 
rated Tuomioja the GOF's most effective minister; a 
historical novel Tuomioja penned was chosen for Finland's 
most prestigious literary prize; and polls have shown 
that Tuomioja will quite likely be the SDP's number one 
vote-getter.  Foreign Ministry and SDP party sources 
still tell us that Tuomioja is unlikely to return to the 
MFA, as he announced late last year.  However, if his 
coattails carry the SDP in the way party strategists are 
beginning to hope, he will be able to demand his post of 
choice in any SDP coalition government. 
 
COMMENT:  SDP - IN GOVERNMENT AND OF GOVERNMENT 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
10. (SBU) Despite internal divisions and a lack of star 
power, look for the SDP to come out well following the 
March elections.  Threats by CONS and CEN to form a "non- 
socialist" coalition in the run-up to the election 
(Reftel B) have largely faded, and at least at this point 
the election appears to be an every-party-for-itself 
affair.  And while the exact breakdown of the final 
results may be tough to call, the easy bet appears to be 
the SDP back in government, either as the leader of the 
coalition or as a secondary but in many ways dominant 
partner.  END COMMENT. 
WARE