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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI144, FINNISH RESPONSE - RESPONDING TO RUSSIAN THREATS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI144 2007-03-02 11:34 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0144 0611134
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021134Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3027
INFO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0734
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4753
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 8618
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE, EUR A/S DAN FRIED, 
A/S PAULA DESUTTER, A/S ISN JOHN ROOD, NSC/ DAVID STEPHENS 
AND JUDY ANSLEY, AND OSD/P BRIAN GREEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 
TAGS: MARR PREL EZ PL FI
SUBJECT: FINNISH RESPONSE - RESPONDING TO RUSSIAN THREATS 
AGAINST MISSILE DEFENSE IN POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
 
REF: SECSTATE 21640 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) DCM delivered subject demarche to Finnish MFA 
Undersecretary for Political Affairs Markus Lyra on March 
1.  Lyra thanked the US for sharing detailed information 
regarding the missile defense assets that are to be 
deployed as well as regarding the extensive consultations 
the US has held with Russia regarding our plans.  He 
expressed appreciation that Finland was included among the 
small group of non-NATO allies with whom the information 
had been shared. 
 
2. (C) Lyra noted that Finland fully understands that the 
missile defense assets to be deployed in Poland and the 
Czech Republic are defensive with no offensive capabilities 
-- and that they are not designed to defend against Russia. 
Finnish technical experts had already assured the MFA that 
both geography and the laws of physics indicated that these 
weapons could only be designed to defend against ballistic 
missile attacks originating from elsewhere.  Lyra added 
that Finland and the EU viewed Russian threats to withdraw 
from the INF as particularly unhelpful, but added that such 
statements were "probably not realistic."  In his view, 
Moscow is upset about NATO expansion and frustrated about 
the fact that Russia is "behind the US and NATO" in terms 
of nuclear and conventional weapons capabilities; because 
of this frustration, they have made comments about the INF 
that are "emotional not logical."  However, he continued, 
the Russians know that withdrawing from the INF would not 
serve their purposes. 
 
3. (C) In response to DCM's request that the GOF consider 
making a public statement to "calm the waters" on the 
missile defense issue, Lyra pointed to a public comment FM 
Erkki Tuomioja made last week indicating that the GOF 
understood that the assets in question were in no way 
intended for offensive purposes.  Although he agreed to 
pass on our request to the FM, he could not promise 
additional statements.  Lyra noted though -- with 
parliamentary elections only two weeks away -- questions on 
this issue could indeed arise and our fact-based points 
would be of use in responding accurately. 
WARE