VZCZCXRO0079
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0232/01 0791125
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201125Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1274
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1528
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1386
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1532
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0205
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0794
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1158
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1587
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3991
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1357
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2015
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1749

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000232 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR S. HILL 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS EFIN PGOV PHUM PINR PREL ZI
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN FINANCIAL AND VISA 
SANCTIONS 
 
 
-------- 
Overview 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) U.S. sanctions have played a key role in putting 
pressure on the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ).  Post believes 
that now is the time to deepen and expand the financial and 
visa sanctions, and to apply further pressure on the regime 
as it increasingly shows signs of crumbling and fragmenting. 
We propose to aggressively target senior GOZ and ZANU-PF 
officials by adding more than 200 names of individuals to the 
sanctions lists who meet the current criteria for inclusion 
in the sanctions regime.  Post also recommends an amendment 
to the current Executive Order on visa sanctions to add the 
children of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) to the 
list.  Many SDNs send their children abroad, including the 
U.S., to study while at the same destroying the educational 
opportunities for other Zimbabwean children.  (Note.  The 
current Executive Orders already permit children's inclusion 
on the financial list.  End Note.)  To account for rapidly 
unfolding events, Posts recommends that the sanction process 
be streamlined so that we can more rapidly add new names as 
information arises.  End Overview. 
 
------------ 
The Criteria 
------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In his Zimbabwe Proclamation of February 22, 2002, 
the President laid out criteria for barring particular 
Zimbabweans from entry into the United States.  The criteria 
included senior members of the government of Robert Mugabe 
and other Zimbabwean nationals who formulate, implement, or 
benefit from policies that undermine or injure Zimbabwe's 
democratic institutions or impede the transition to a 
multi-party democracy; persons who through their business 
dealings with Zimbabwe government officials derive 
significant financial benefit from policies that undermine or 
injure Zimbabwe's democratic institutions or impede the 
transition to a multi-party democracy; and the spouses of 
persons described above. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In his Executive Order of November 23, 2005, the 
President laid out criteria for blocking the property of 
individuals found undermining Zimbabwe's democratic processes 
and institutions.  The criteria includes individuals or 
organizations found to undermine Zimbabwe's democratic 
institutions and processes; have assisted, sponsored, or 
provided financial, material, or technological support to 
these entities; to be owned, controlled, or acting on behalf 
of a sanctions target; or to be an immediate family member of 
a sanctions target. 
 
-------------------- 
Post's Proposed List 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Over time Post has developed a detailed list of 
individuals that we judge worthy of adding to the financial 
and visa sanctions lists.  Below is an overview of the 
categories of individuals we suggest adding to the lists.  We 
have posted a detailed Excel spreadsheet of the suggested 
revisions to our classified website and emailed a copy to 
AF/S.  Our classified website can be accessed at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/harare/ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) With the exception of the extension to spouses (in 
 
HARARE 00000232  002 OF 004 
 
 
the visa criteria) and to immediate family members (in the 
financial criteria), the criteria are nearly identical.  Post 
therefore recommends that the two lists be made identical, to 
the extent possible, and that individuals subject to one form 
of sanction be automatically be added to the other form of 
sanction. 
 
----------------- 
Names To Be Added 
----------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) As the ruling party for the past 26 years, ZANU-PF 
has placed its firm imprint onto the decision-making 
processes of the GOZ.  For example, any policy decisions are 
first discussed by the party structures of Central Committee 
and Politburo and then passed on to the Cabinet (consisting 
of Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Provincial Governors) for 
comment and approval.  In this process, any member of the 
Central Committee, Politburo, or Cabinet has an opportunity 
to suggest, support, and/or oppose particular policies 
brought before each body.  As such, each member of the 
Central Committee, Politburo, and Cabinet has a direct hand 
in GOZ policy formulation.  Therefore, we propose that all 
Central Committee, Politburo and Cabinet members that are not 
currently on the financial and visa sanctions lists be added. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In addition, we propose inclusion of the most 
senior officials of key GOZ institutions not already on the 
lists.  The senior members of the Zimbabwe Election 
Commission, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, and ZANU-PF 
provincial chairpersons merit inclusion for their role in 
suborning the integrity of Zimbabwean elections.  The senior 
leadership of the security forces, to include the police, 
military, and intelligence branches, should also be included 
for their decisions to apply Zimbabwean law in a manner that 
violates human rights, and undermines democracy and the rule 
of law. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Post further recommends that heads of key 
state-owned enterprises be added to the lists.  Parastatal 
heads are government employees, and are among the most 
corrupt and venal of the civil servants.  Targeting 
parastatal heads would also serve to limit the GOZ's ability 
to use these parastatals as a tool of oppression and 
revenue-generation.  Consistent with prior policy decisions 
we do not propose extending sanctions against parastatals 
more broadly to avoid the dilemma that doing so might harm 
the people of Zimbabwe.  But there is great symbolic value in 
including the senior executives as individuals. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Inclusion of Children on Visa List 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The GOZ and ZANU-PF have systematically crippled 
Zimbabwe's once-promising educational system, and have shown 
a callous disregard for the plight of the country's most 
unfortunate schoolchildren, who do not have the same 
opportunity to travel abroad for schooling as the children of 
elites.  At the same time, a significant number of senior GOZ 
and ZANU-PF officials avoid the consequences of their 
depredations by sending their children to the U.S. and 
foreign destinations for education. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) A significant number of Zimbabwean critics of the 
GOZ, while praising U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe, have 
lamented that children of ZANU-PF officials have not been 
 
HARARE 00000232  003 OF 004 
 
 
included.  These critics have told us that nothing would 
catch the attention of ZANU-PF officials more quickly than 
including their children on the sanctions lists.  Denying 
visas to children of these officials and refusing to renew 
the visas of these children already in the U.S., in addition 
to placing these children on the financial sanctions list, 
would send a powerful message to the GOZ and ZANU-PF 
hierarchy. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) We therefore recommend an amendment to the current 
Executive Order on visa sanctions to add the children of SDNs 
to the list.  Our consular section already has the names and 
identifying information of more than 30 children of SDNs who 
are believed to have traveled to the U.S. and is working to 
expand the list.  Nine of these children are studying in the 
U.S. and our consular section has heard reliable information 
that additional children are studying in the U.S. under 
tourist visas, leading us to believe that there are 
additional children of SDNs studying in the U.S. We will 
continue to work on updating this information.  U.S. 
leadership on this question could convince the U.K. and the 
Australians among others, to also sanction the leadership's 
children. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) We also recommend revoking the visas of children 
currently in the U.S., in addition to refusing to issue 
future visas.  Those currently in the U.S. tend to be the 
children of ZANU-PF's old guard, who are most opposed to 
reform.  Meanwhile, if the sanctions are not applied to those 
who currently have visas, the measure would primarily affect 
the families of the younger generation of ZANU-PF leaders, 
who are not as resistent to reform. 
 
---------- 
Exceptions 
---------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Among the categories of individuals listed above 
who deserve inclusion in the financial and visa sanctions 
list, there are a number of moderate and reform-minded 
individuals for whom Post recommends that exceptions be made. 
 Progressive individuals whom we have been able to cultivate 
should not be subject to the sanctions as it would jeopardize 
our ability to influence these individuals to work toward 
reforming the GOZ and ZANU-PF from the inside.  Moreover, 
granting exceptions would encourage more insiders to embrace 
reform and further wedges within the regime.  This is 
consistent with past policy of excluding selected individuals 
from the financial and visa sanctions. 
 
------------------- 
Names To Be Deleted 
------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) We also recommend removing individuals from the 
lists who no longer meet the criteria of the sanctions 
regimes.  Many individuals were initially added for 
association with former activities in the DRC and the flawed 
parliamentary election in March 2005, but have no current, 
significant political or financial role in the GOZ.  These 
individuals should be removed. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Post recommends that deceased sanctioned 
individuals remain on the financial sanctions list to prevent 
family members from benefiting from the ill-gotten estate, 
but that they be removed from the visa list. 
 
 
HARARE 00000232  004 OF 004 
 
 
------------------------ 
Streamlining The Process 
------------------------ 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Since the inception of the financial and visa 
sanctions against targeted Zimbabwean officials an ad hoc 
process of suggesting and approving revisions has developed. 
As the lists have grown, however, this process has created 
confusion and led to an increasing divergence between the two 
lists.  Moreover, this method is cumbersome, making it 
difficult to cope with the increasingly rapid pace at which 
we are collecting new names for consideration.  To formalize 
this process and to make the addition of new names more 
nimble, Post recommends that AF/S maintain the authoritative 
list for both the financial and visa sanctions.  Post also 
recommends that AF/S be charged with leading the inter-agency 
process of reviewing the suggested revision.  Post will 
continue to collect names of individuals who merit inclusion 
on the list and will then forward these names to AF/S for 
consideration. 
DELL