VZCZCXRO0661
PP RUEHGR
DE RUEHGE #0288/01 0792101
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 202101Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4928
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0025
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0726
RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
CA/VO FOR JUNE KUNSMAN 
CA/FPP FOR LARA HARRIS 
GUATEMALA FOR JOLEEN SCHWEITZER 
BOGOTA FOR RMO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS SMIG KCRM KFRD GY
SUBJECT: Civil Document Vulnerability Compromises Visa Security - 
Action request 
 
Ref: Nesbitt/Tuller and Kunsman/Tuller Conversations 6 Mar 2007 
 
This cable contains an action request.  See paras 9 and 10. 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (U) Georgetown continues to wrestle with excessive fraud in all 
aspects of consular services. Longstanding issues such as sham 
marriages and engagements, corruption in the issuance of passports 
and civil documents, as well as more recent concerns involving fraud 
in HIV testing, complicate adjudication of visa and passport 
applications.  New revelations about civil document issuance in 
Guyana and possible vulnerabilities in U.S.-based DNA testing give 
Post further cause for concern that petitions may inadvertently be 
approved and visas issued to persons who do not have the claimed 
qualifying relationship to the petitioner. Post is now requiring 
chain of custody documents for DNA testing and is increasing the 
evidence of relationship required to prove a blood relationship. 
Post requests CA declare Guyanese civil documents unreliable and 
consult with the AABB on accreditation standards for parentage 
testing facilities. 
 
------------------------- 
Civil Documents in Guyana 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Guyana still uses a paper-based civil registry system, 
recording births, deaths and marriages in large ledgers that are 
stored haphazardly at the main office in the capital city. The 
process has many vulnerabilities: clerks are paid about US$100 per 
month, making them highly susceptible to bribes; the paper stock for 
civil documents has no security features and the paper, color, and 
format vary dramatically as the GOG bids out the contract each time 
more paper is required; access is not controlled to the dry seal. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In mid-2004, the GOG changed the design of the dry seal 
die. At that time, due to concerns that the former version of the 
die had been competently forged by document vendors, Post began 
requesting newly-issued birth certificates as ConOffs believed the 
new seal had not yet been comprised. In the first year and a half 
that the new seal was in use, Post was detecting 5-10 fraudulent 
civil documents per week. However, for the past eight months or so, 
Post has only detected a handful of fraudulent documents.  Post 
recently learned that the new 2004 die was made locally by a trophy 
store in Georgetown.  Copies of the 2004 dry seal die are likely in 
the hands of the several well-established alien smuggling rings 
headquartered here that move Guyanese as well as Chinese and South 
Asia migrants to the United States and Canada.  This would account 
for the greatly reduced numbers of fraudulent Guyanese civil 
documents Post is detecting. 
 
------------------------------ 
Vulnerabilities in DNA testing 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (U) Although Post recommends DNA testing in many immigrant visa 
applications, ConOffs are concerned about the integrity of the DNA 
process. Specifically, some AABB-accredited labs mail the 
petitioner's test kit to their residence and/or allow the petitioner 
to get their sample drawn at any facility of their choosing. A 
number of AABB-accredited labs do not send the chain of custody 
documents with the DNA results, making it impossible to verify where 
the sample was drawn and what identity documents were presented. 
 
¶5. (U) Post recently surveyed the 43 AABB-accreditated parentage 
testing facilities listed on the AABB website.  Consular staff were 
unable to contact 15 of the clinics, which appear to be out of 
business. Another facility no longer provides parentage testing 
services. A consular associate contacted the remaining 27 
facilities, identifying herself as an employee of the US Embassy in 
Georgetown, and aked about the facility's procedures for collecting 
samples. Of the 27 facilities that Consular staf were able to 
contact, only one requires the pettioner to go the facility to have 
the sample drawn. Several other facilities have contracts with lab 
that cover most of the US and petitioners must o to one of these 
labs for the sample draw. The ajority of facilities, however, 
stated that theywould send the sample collection kit to any 
physician, doctor, or "neutral" third-party lab to have he samples 
taken. Several facilities stated thatthey tried to kep this option 
as a last resort.When asked what that meant, several labs stated 
hat if the client lived more than thirty minutes frm the facility 
 
GEORGETOWN 00000288  002 OF 002 
 
 
or if they preferred to have their family doctor take the samples, 
they would send the kit there. Several facilities also stated that 
they would send the kit to the client who could then have the 
samples taken by any physician. Post got the impression that while 
the facilities understand the chain of custody requirement, most do 
not realize that clients undergoing parentage testing for 
immigration purposes may have personal reasons to manipulate the 
results. 
 
¶6. (U) The majority of the US-based Guyanese population resides in 
New York and NJ. The only AABB-accredited parentage testing facility 
in the NY/NJ area requires petitioners to come to their facility for 
the sample draw. Post has begun to see an increasing amount of NY 
and NJ-based petitioners using other facilities, however, in 
Washington, Ohio, Texas and elsewhere that do not have this 
requirement and do not forward chain of custody documents. While 
petitioners can, of course, select any AABB-accredited facility, the 
fact that an increasing number of petitioners are choosing 
facilities that are not near their place of residence and that have 
questionable chain of custody requirements is a concern. 
 
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Post response 
------------- 
 
¶7. (U) Consular chief worked with USAID to get a needs assessment 
conducted at the GRO by a USAID contractor. The Consular Chief is 
now working with USAID to obtain a new dry seal machine and die for 
the GRO.  However, even with a new dry seal, forgers will retain the 
ability to create perfect birth/marriage certificates backdated to 
2004-2007. 
 
¶8. (U) Post has completely reconfigured the panel physician program 
and will be working with the panel physicians to ensure that DNA 
samples continue to be secure.  ConOffs have also begun requiring 
chain of custody documents to be included with DNA results. Post 
receives many cases in which DHS required DNA testing prior to 
approval of the petition; Post will review chain of custody 
documents in these cases as well. Post has also begun requesting 
additional evidence of relationship in visa categories founded on a 
blood relationship. Post already requires significant evidence of 
relationship in marital cases, but a legitimate marital relationship 
does not necessarily mean it is a legal one. 
 
----------------------------- 
Recommendations for CA Action 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Given the vulnerability of Guyanese civil documents and the 
extreme level of fraud in Guyana, Post recommends CA alter the 
Guyana entry in the Visa Reciprocity and Country Documents schedule 
to note that Birth and Marriage Certificates are "Available, but 
unreliable.  Guyanese birth and marriage certificates must be 
submitted with an immigrant visa petition/application, but will not 
be accepted as primary evidence of relationship."  Petitioners 
needing to establish evidence of blood relationship should be 
required to provide substitute documentation and/or additional 
secondary evidence of relationship which may include results of DNA 
testing along with chain of custody documentation. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Given concerns about the DNA testing process, Post 
recommends CA consult with the AABB regarding standards for 
accreditation of DNA testing laboratories.  Those requirements 
should include sufficient safeguards to ensure the identity of 
persons having samples taken in the U.S. for purposes of supporting 
a visa petition or application.  If AABB standards are not 
sufficient, and cannot be made sufficient, Post recommends that CA 
and DHS work with the AABB to create separate standards for DNA 
testing for immigration purposes and/or allow high-fraud posts to 
limit acceptable DNA testing facilities to those that require the 
petitioner to have the sample drawn on-sight. 
 
¶11. (U) These recommendations have full Front Office support. 
 
ROBINSON