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Viewing cable 07DUSHANBE314, FEBRUARY 2007 BORDER WRAP-UP REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DUSHANBE314 2007-03-05 04:46 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dushanbe
VZCZCXRO4725
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0314/01 0640446
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050446Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9729
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1998
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2037
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2013
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1918
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1346
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000314 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PINR SNAR TI AF
SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 2007 BORDER WRAP-UP REPORT 
 
REF: DUSHANBE 2153 
 
DUSHANBE 00000314  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU) An interagency Department of State and Defense team 
conducted a demining policy assessment visit February 5-7.  The 
purpose of the trip was to obtain an initial assessment of the 
landmine problem, and make recommendations to the PCC sub-group 
regarding the viability of allocating resources to contribute to 
future demining operations (reftel). 
 
2.  (SBU) A Marine Corps Special Operation Command's (MARSOC) 
Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU) continues to train a Tajik 
Border Guard Special Forces unit southwest of Dushanbe.  The 
FMTU is a new Marine special unit designed specifically to 
conduct Foreign Internal Defense training and is currently 
training approximately 45 Tajik Border Guards in small arms, 
pistol marksmanship and combat tactics.  They are scheduled to 
depart Tajikistan in March. 
 
3.  (SBU) Post's Office of Defense Cooperation hosted a seminar 
on Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism 12-16 February; 19 of 
40 invited participants attended.  The Committee on State 
Security's "Alpha" team participated, but the Border Guards did 
not.  When we sought to encourage Border Guard attendance, a 
fairly junior representative of the Committee on State Security 
replied that the Border Guards had no role in the fight against 
terrorism.  In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not 
provide information required for Leahy vetting until the second 
day of the seminar, causing a last minute scramble to bring 
another funding source to bear.  Despite the initial rough 
start, the seminar went quite well, with representatives from 
the Ministry of Defense, Committee on Emergency Situations and 
Drug Control Agency all actively participating.  The Office of 
Defense Cooperation also invited Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
The Tajik government included them on the list of attendees, but 
they did not attend. 
 
4.  (SBU) Post's Narcotics and Law Enforcement Section met with 
First Deputy Gafarov of the State Committee on National Security 
the week of February 12.  Post's Border and Law Enforcement 
Working Group drafted Embassy Dushanbe's priorities for 
assistance to the Border Guards, which include infrastructure, 
institutional development, salary supplements, communications, 
training and provision of equipment.  Also of note, since the 
reorganization of the Border Guards under the State Committee on 
National Security, officers have been less willing to share 
information, schedule meetings or communicate as freely without 
top-level Committee approval. 
 
5.  (SBU) The Narcotics and Law Enforcement Section will also be 
completing the construction/renovation of the Bog, Bakharat and 
Khirmanjo border Posts on the Tajik-Afghan border in the 
Shurabad area by mid-April or early May.  Within this period, we 
hope the Committee will distribute the millions of dollars worth 
of supplies and equipment (including 10,000 uniforms) which 
Post's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), Export 
Assistance and Border Security (EXBS), and the Office of Defense 
Cooperation (ODC) have provided. 
 
6.  (SBU) The Office of Defense Cooperation is also waiting for 
the Tajik government to return "1033 Certification Letters", 
which are a Department of Defense required certification for 
Tajikistan to receive equipment and training under 
counter-narcotics funding.  It is a statement that equipment 
will not be transferred to third parties, and that all persons 
using equipment or receiving training have passed background 
checks by the Tajik government.  The Presidential Administration 
has informed Post that the diplomatic note and draft letter have 
been signed by the Deputy Prime Minister, and should be retuned 
to Post soon via Tajik diplomatic note.  Another set of 
certificates is also required for the export control license for 
the Harris radios Post is providing under the counter-narcotics 
program.  The Office of Defense Cooperation is preparing the 
DSP-83 certificates for transfer to the Tajik government for 
signature. 
 
7.  (SBU) At the February 15 Border International Working Group 
meeting, the European Union's Border Management Program for 
Central Asia (BOMCA) announced that they would continue their 
embargo against the Border Guard dog program.  Embassy and 
European funding agencies and programs have all agreed not to 
provide any more dogs to the Tajik Border Guards, primarily due 
to lack of controls and other identified shortcomings, including 
rumors of the border guards breeding these dogs and selling 
their offspring for private gain.  Post personnel have witnessed 
 
DUSHANBE 00000314  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
other dogs being used as guard dogs, rather than their intended 
purpose of detecting narcotics.  The Europeans' BOMCA program 
will however fund two trainers to retrain the Tajik dog 
trainers, and take an inventory of the dogs they previously 
provided. 
 
8.  The Office of Defense Cooperation and Army Corps of 
Engineers representatives from the Afghan Engineering District 
will also meet with Border Guard engineers March 13-16 to 
continue planning for the reconstruction/renovation of border 
posts at Kokul, Sayod and Ribhoz, three locations along the 
Afghan border affected by Pyanj river flooding. 
JACOBSON