VZCZCXRO2275
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0101/01 0710857
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 120857Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3350
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0851
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0810
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0919
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0745
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0055
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2702

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000101 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS,IO 
PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/12/2017 
TAGS: KPKO MOPS PGOV PREL TT AU NZ
SUBJECT: AUSSIES BRIEF ON REINADO OPERATION 
 
REF: A) DILI 94, B) DILI 96, C) DILI 95 
 
DILI 00000101  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Seiji T. Shiratori, DCM, EXEC, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  International Stabilization Forces (ISF) 
commander Brigadier Malcolm Rerden and Australian Ambassador to 
East Timor Margaret Twomey briefed Emboffs March 9, reviewing 
the current status of ISF operations to apprehend Major Alfredo 
Reinado and summarizing a meeting Rerden has just attended with 
top GOET and UN officials to discuss strategy to resolve the 
crisis.  Rerden told us that the ISF mission remains committed 
to apprehend dissident military officer Major Alfredo Reinado 
and his band alive.  Rerden said the operation to date has been 
a success in that it has met the prerequisite of no civilian 
casualties, and Reinado was able to slip away from the holdout 
in Same on March 4 in large part because ISF had given him every 
opportunity to surrender before launching an assault. 
Summarizing his just-concluded meeting with the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), the President, 
Prime Minister, Prosecutor General, the military commander, 
Speaker of Parliament and other officials, Rerden described how 
neither UN nor GOET officials could find a face-saving way of 
communicating with Reinado in order to convince the rogue 
soldier to turn himself in.  Rerden confirmed that ISF does not 
know where Reinado is hiding, that they are trying to cut off 
attempts to escape by boat, and that the President had stated 
the Government's determination to let the operation drag on for 
weeks if necessary.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Australian Ambassador Margaret Twomey at our request 
arranged for Charge d'Affaires (CDA), Deputy Chief of Mission 
(DCM) and U.S. Defense Representative (USDR) to meet with ISF 
commander Brigadier Malcolm Rerden the evening of March 9, to be 
briefed on the current state of the operation to bring in rebel 
military officer Major Alfredo Reinado.  Rerden came to our 
meeting directly from Tripartite consultations among GOET 
leaders, UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) leaders, 
and Rerden.  Rerden briefed us extensively verbatim from his 
written notes of the meeting.  The primary purpose of the 
meeting apparently was to discuss a March 4 revised petition on 
terms of surrender from Reinado sent to GOET and UNMIT leaders 
by Reinado's attorney Benevides Correia.  (Note:  See Ref A. 
CDA received same document two days ago and passed this to 
Twomey.  We sent scanned version to EAP).  Besides Rerden, 
attendees at the meeting included:  President Xanana Gusmao, 
Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta, Vice Prime Minister (VPM) 
Estanislau da Silva, Prosecutor General Longuinhos Monteiro, 
SRSG Atul Khare (SRSG), Deputy (security) SRSG Eric Tan, Timor 
armed forces (F-FDTL) Commander Taur Matan Ruak, and Speaker of 
Parliament Francisco Lu-Olo Guterres, among others. 
 
Rerden Recounts Political Discussion of Reinado Predicament 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Rerden recounted the following discussion with GOET and 
UNMIT officials:  Monteiro spoke first stating that he would no 
longer be in contact with Reinado, in order to avoid conflict of 
interest.  SRSG Khare, listed along with Dili Bishop Dom Alberto 
Ricardo da Silva as a witness on the Reinado petition, said 
UNMIT could not be a witness because of troubling points in the 
petition.  Khare noted that all weapons must be secured before 
the UN can be involved, and that the SRSG cannot be a witness to 
a document between the government and someone facing criminal 
charges.  VPM da Silva then said Reinado must be treated as a 
deserter. 
 
Ramos-Horta Vacillates 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) An uncertain Ramos-Horta then replied that there are both 
political and social issues at play, that they should not rule 
out the option of some sort of surrender, and that GOET should 
not be publicly seen as ruling out the surrender option.  He 
added, however, that surrender is the first goal, asking if 
perhaps Dili Bishop Ricardo could help open direct doors of 
communications with Reinado. (See Ref B for account of the 
Bishop saying he does not want to play that role).  Ramos-Horta 
closed by vacillating back to the view that Reinado must 
surrender himself and his weapons. 
 
DILI 00000101  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) President Gusmao replied that the Reinado petition has no 
status and that the state would not respond to the document 
directly.  (Note:  See Ref C, Gusmao Expounds on Reinado, 
Elections.)  He asked if perhaps Reinado would talk to the 
Bishop.  Gusmao told the Prosecutor General that he could talk 
to lawyer Correia only about item 6:  "That all charges be 
dropped against me."  Also, all weapons would need to be turned 
in before any discussions could begin. 
 
¶6. (C) Matan Ruak then also chimed in that perhaps the Church 
could help, or maybe they should appeal to Reinado through the 
media, but that there should be no direct negotiations.  Lu-Olo 
took a hard-line stance of no state negotiations:  surrender or 
arrest.  If the Church is used, the word will leak out and the 
state will be damaged.  Gusmao said the GOET should not contact 
the Church, and that only Correia should.  Lu-Olo rejected 
talking to the media and all dialogue, but did suggest that 
perhaps Father Domingos Maubere might talk to Reinado.  (Note: 
Father Maubere is known as pro-Alfredo Reinado and is often 
opposed to the ruling Fretilin party.  Observers suggest, 
however, that his close occupation-era ties to independence 
movement leaders continue to afford him respect and trust among 
current GOET leaders.)  Ramos-Horta wanted someone to take the 
GOET message directly to the media but in the end no one in the 
room was willing to do so, Rerden recounted.  (Note: 
Ramos-Horta had already addressed the nation on local television 
--- TVTL --- the night of March 8, telling Reinado that if he 
wants UN Police and ISF to withdraw, he must surrender all 
weapons.  The speech resulted in rumors that same night that the 
PM had announced Reinado's surrender and the withdrawal of ISF 
troops, a false interpretation of a confusing speech that Rerden 
said reached all the way to Canberra). 
 
Military Operation Described 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Rerden also briefed us on the military operation.  He 
said the overall mission  remained one of  "apprehending Reinado 
and his men," without casualties if at all possible, with 
surrender being the primary emphasis of the operation.  He said 
the March 4 operation "was a success" because it met the 
prerequisite of no civilian casualties.  Reinado's side had five 
killed in the course of two significant engagements initiated by 
Reinado's side, Rerden confirmed.  Rerden described how ISF 
called out for Reinado to surrender one last time in the early 
hours of Sunday morning when ISF was staged for an assault, and 
then initiated the attack with teargas.  ISF's Australian and 
New Zealand forces continued to call out to Reinado's group to 
surrender during the beginning of the assault even though they 
were being fired upon, and did not fire back until it became 
clear that Reinado's men were not going to cease fire, and 
because they were in imminent danger, Rerden said.  ISF assumed 
great risk in operating in this manner but minimization of 
civilian casualties was preeminent, Rerden told us.  There would 
have been many more than five casualties had they acted more 
aggressively, he said.  There were no Australian casualties, he 
confirmed. 
 
¶8. (C) One of Reinado's key lieutenants - "Nixon" - was found in 
the company of nuns who were nursing his injuries; they 
subsequently turned him in to ISF after prolonged negotiations. 
There were four killed in initial reports, but ISF later found a 
fifth casualty who had fallen off a steep embankment after being 
shot. 
 
¶9. (C) ISF conventional forces were pulling out of Same and 
operating at a lower operational profile because larger forces 
were actually spooking Reinado's men to stay under cover, Rerden 
said.  They are now operating in a smaller, covert manner in the 
hope that the fugitives can be lured into the open.  ISF is no 
longer conducting vehicle checkpoints in the Same area.  Same is 
no longer a restricted area and is safe for general passage. 
(Note:  Rerden invited Emboffs to visit Same and following a 
check by RSO with ISF and other security officers that Same is 
safe, Emboffs arrived in Same the afternoon of March 12 to talk 
firsthand with persons on the scene.  Emboffs are also talking 
with sources in other parts the western region to determine the 
extent of Reinado's support.) 
 
Interesting Operational Notes 
------------------------------ 
 
DILI 00000101  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) Rerden said the focus of continuing surveillance 
operations is along the Ainaro - Same - Alas corridor. 
Reinado's group is greatly dispersed and operating in 2-3 man 
teams; over 25 escaped from the target area during the ISF 
assault on March 4, more than likely armed.  ISF also is closely 
watching suspicious maritime activity, largely due to Reinado's 
penchant for using the sea as a means of facilitating his own 
operations; the night of March 8 there was a boat operation in 
Dili which resulted in the boarding of one underway vessel by 
ISF helicopter commandos; no weapons were found, and boat 
occupants were released following the search.  Rerden said 
Reinado will hear about this search, and this may dissuade him 
from conducting boat operations.  Contrary to previous reports, 
no tunnels were found at the Portuguese fort Reinado was 
encamped at in Same. 
 
Rerden:  Reinado Support All Hype 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) Rerden said that contrary to their initial analysis that 
Reinado was moving  from town to town building support, they now 
believe that he kept moving because townspeople "got sick of 
him."  Claims of widespread Reinado support are all media hype, 
he opined.  Rerden cited threats of mass demonstrations that 
never materialized.  There was no big reaction in any western 
cities nor any sign of discontent.  An ISF officer talked with 
69 petitioners in Gleno the night before the assault to discuss 
the operation in a public diplomacy outreach.  They all 
sympathized with Reinado but none said they would join him. 
"Maybe he was too much of a loose canon," Rerden said. 
 
¶12. (C) Rerden described a call the night before the assault by 
Prosecutor General Monteiro to Reinado, in which negotiations 
lasted for a couple of hours, with Ramos-Horta and Rerden 
listening quietly in on speaker phone.  Finally, Ramos-Horta got 
fed up with the dialogue and gestured to Monteiro to cut off the 
dialogue.  The assault came a few hours later. 
 
U.S. Officials Offer Support, Caution 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) CDA reiterated to Rerden and Twomey that the USG fully 
supports ISF and Australian policy in this operation and that we 
will work in close cooperation with them.  We cited how we have 
conveyed the importance of Reinado surrendering, and our support 
for the GOET/ISF operation, in all our meetings.  We also 
conveyed how we are rebuffing overtures to communicate with 
Reinado and the petitioners (F-FDTL soldiers dismissed last year 
after they complained of discrimination in the military) in 
order to not jeopardize the ISF operation, and that we will 
continue to share information that might be important for that 
operation.  We shared information from our meetings with the 
President, the Bishop, Benevides and others.  We did caution 
Rerden that his assessment of lack of support for Reinado only 
took into account the reaction by such groups as the Movement 
for National Unity and Justice (MUNJ) and the petitioners, and 
immediate visible public reaction; that Reinado might be seen 
more as an icon than a hero, and that apprehension or killing of 
Reinado could cause a groundswell of grassroots reaction 
triggered by other factors such as disillusionment with the 
government and poverty, although no one can predict.  We said 
our staff would be traveling to western parts of East Timor over 
the weekend to take the pulse of the people in order to gauge 
support for Reinado and his cause. 
HARSHA