Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07CAIRO924, CIVIL SOCIETY MONITORS CRITICIZE CONDUCT OF

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07CAIRO924.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07CAIRO924 2007-03-29 14:47 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEGA #0924 0881447
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZUI RUEWMCE0627 0881433
O 291447Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0000
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS CAIRO 000924 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC STAFF FOR WATERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KDEM EG
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY MONITORS CRITICIZE CONDUCT OF 
 
REFERENDUM 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 866 
     B. CAIRO 870 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  AT LEAST FIVE GROUPS OF EGYPTIAN CIVIL 
SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS MONITORED THE MARCH 26 REFERENDUM ON 
EGYPT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS.  THEIR REPORTS, WHICH WERE 
ISSUED THROUGHOUT THE DAY ON MARCH 26, AND SUMMARIZED IN 
WRAP-UP PRESS RELEASES ISSUED OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS, PROVIDE 
FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE WIDESPREAD IRREGULARITIES THAT 
CHARACTERIZED EGYPT'S MOST RECENT ELECTORAL PROCESS, AS WELL 
AS THE GAP BETWEEN THE OFFICIAL AND INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS 
OF VOTER TURNOUT.  AN NDI MONITORING EXPERT IN CAIRO TOLD US 
THAT THE FACT THAT EGYPTIAN MONITORS WERE ABLE TO ORGANIZE 
AND ISSUES CRITICAL REPORTS ON THE REFERENDUM WAS ONE BRIGHT 
SPOT IN AN OTHERWISE PROBLEMATIC PROCESS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU)  THE MONITORS INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING GROUPS: 
 
--THE INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRACY SUPPORT, A 
COALITION OF 12 NGOS, LED BY THE IBN KHALDUN CENTER (A MEPI 
GRANTEE), WHICH DEPLOYED 300 OBSERVERS TO MONITORS THE POLLS 
IN 24 OF EGYPT'S 27 GOVERNORATES. 
 
--THE EGYPTIAN COALITION FOR DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT (ECDS), A 
USAID-FUNDED COALITION OF NINE NGOS, LED THE NAQIB CENTER, 
WHICH DEPLOYED 330 MONITORS IN 26 GOVERNORATES. 
 
--THE EGYPTIAN ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (EOHR) DEPLOYED 
AN UNPUBLICIZED NUMBER OF MONITORS IN CAIRO, ALEXANDRIA, AND 
THE DELTA. 
 
--THE EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY (EASD), A 
PAST MEPI GRANTEE AND CURRENT BENEFICIARY OF USAID FUNDING, 
DEPLOYED AN UNPUBLICIZED NUMBER OF MONITORS ACROSS THE 
COUNTRY. 
 
--THE EGYPTIAN CENTER FOR WOMENS RIGHTS (ECWR) DEPLOYED A 
SMALL NUMBER OF OBSERVERS IN THE GREATER CAIRO METROPOLITAN 
AREA. 
 
3.  (SBU)  ALL OF THE MONITORS IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING 
PROBLEMS WITH THE REFERENDUM: 
 
--LOW TURNOUT:  INDEPENDENT MONITORS' ESTIMATES, BASED ON 
EXITS POLLS AND OTHER INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF VOTER DATA, 
VARIED FROM A HIGH OF SEVEN PERCENT TURNOUT TO A LOW OF TWO 
PERCENT.  THESE ESTIMATES STAND IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE 
OFFICIAL RESULTS OF 27.1 PERCENT TURNOUT. 
 
--MISTAKES IN VOTER REGISTRATION LISTS:  THERE WERE MULTIPLE 
REPORTS OF INACCURACIES ON THE VOTER LISTS INCLUDING MISSING 
NAMES AND REPEATED NAMES, AS WELL AS VOTERS WHO REPORTED 
BEING ABLE TO VOTE SEVERAL TIMES AT DIFFERENT STATIONS. 
 
--LACK OF INDEPENDENT SUPERVISION OF POLLING STATIONS:  IN 
MANY INSTANCES, RULING PARTY OFFICIALS APPEARED TO BE IN 
CHARGE OF VOTING STATIONS, WITH THE TACIT OR EXPLICIT 
APPROVAL OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. 
 
--ILLEGAL GET-OUT-THE VOTE OPERATIONS:  MONITORS REPORTED 
MULTIPLE INSTANCES OF NDP OFFICIALS USING VEHICLES REGISTERED 
WITH THE GOE OR WITH REGISTERED NGOS TO PROVIDE MASS 
TRANSPORT OF VOTERS TO THE POLLS.  (UNDER EGYPTIAN LAW, IT IS 
ILLEGAL FOR POLITICAL PARTIES TO USE RESOURCES BELONGING TO 
THE GOVERNMENT OR NGOS TO FACILITATE VOTING.) 
 
--DENIAL OF ACCESS BY MONITORS TO POLLING STATIONS AND/OR 
VOTE COUNTING:  DESPITE THE GOE'S ASSURANCES THAT CIVIL 
SOCIETY MONITORS WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO POLLING STATIONS, THERE 
WERE NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES DENYING ACCESS 
TO THE POLLS BY MONITORS. 
 
--REPORTS OF VOTE BUYING:  THERE WERE SCATTERED REPORTS OF 
NDP OFFICIALS OFFERING MODEST INDUCEMENTS (LE 20 (ABOUT 
$3.50), TICKETS TO SOCCER GAMES, OR SMALL PORTIONS OF MEAT) 
TO VOTERS TO VOTE YES.  (COMMENT:  THE REPORTS OF VOTE BUYING 
WERE RELATIVELY RARE COMPARED TO THE 2005 PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTIONS, WHEN CONTENDING CANDIDATES OFTEN FOUND THEMSELVES 
IN BIDDING WARS TO SECURE VOTES.  THE OPPOSITION BOYCOTT OF 
THE REFERENDUM LIKELY LED TO LOWER INCIDENTS OF VOTE BUYING, 
BUT ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE LOW TURNOUT.  END COMMENT.) 
 
--LATE OPENINGS AND EARLY CLOSINGS OF VOTING STATIONS:  THE 
VOTERS' LIMITED ENTHUSIASM FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE 
REFERENDUM SEEMS ALSO TO HAVE EXTENDED TO MANY OF THE POLL 
WORKERS.  THERE WERE MULTIPLE REPORTS OF POLLING STATIONS 
REFERENDUM 
 
THAT DID NOT ADHERE TO THE OFFICIAL OPENING AND CLOSING TIMES. 
 
--INTIMIDATION OF PROSPECTIVE VOTERS: THERE WERE SCATTERED 
REPORTS OF NDP OFFICIALS TELLING VOTERS THAT A FAILURE TO 
VOTE COULD RESULT IN PENALTIES INCLUDING FINES. 
 
4.  (SBU)  AN EXPATRIATE MONITORING AND OBSERVATION EXPERT 
(PROTECT) WORKING FOR THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE--WHO 
PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN SUPPORTING CIVIL SOCIETY MONITORING OF 
THE 2005 ELECTIONS, BUT WAS PROHIBITED FROM ASSISTING THE 
2007 REFERENDUM MONITORS, DUE TO THE GOE'S RESTRICTIONS ON 
NDI--OFFERED THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT.  THE EXPERT OPINED 
THAT, DESPITE THE LIMITED PREPARATION TIME, THE ABSENCE OF 
OUTSIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND LIMITED DONOR FUNDING, THE 
REFERENDUM MONITORING WAS EVIDENCE OF A "GROWING ABILITY BY 
CIVIL SOCIETY" TO PLAY A ROLE IN EGYPT'S POLITICAL PROCESSES. 
 HE CHARACTERIZED THEIR WATCHDOG ROLE AS "THE ONLY SUCCESS 
STORY FOR EGYPT'S REFERENDUM."  DESPITE THE VARIOUS FACTORS 
THAT WORKED AGAINST THE MONITORS, THE NDI EXPERT CREDITED THE 
MONITORS WITH "CLEARLY PORTRAYING THE LEVEL OF MANIPULATION 
AND TRANSGRESSIONS IN THE REFERENDUM, WHICH IS STRONG 
INDICATOR OF HOW BAD EGYPTIAN ELECTORAL PROCESSES REALLY ARE." 
RICCIARDONE