VZCZCXRO6586
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHBS #0881/01 0741542
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151542Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4719
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0091
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 7850
RUEHAST/USO ALMATY 0342
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RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0001
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RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1532
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1423
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0358
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1837
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0802

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000881 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TAGS: PTER KNNP MCAP PINR PARM PREL BE RS
SUBJECT:   Joint Russian-U.S. Demarche to Belgium on the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
 
REF: (A) STATE 21535, (B) 03 STATE 333924 
 
¶1.  Summary:  On March 14, Russian Ambassador Vadim Lukov 
and Charge d'Affaires Will Imbrie presented to Belgian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for Security and 
Disarmament Pol De Witte and Director for Non- 
Proliferation Werner Bauwens the invitation to join the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (Ref A). 
Both diplomats underscored the importance of the Global 
Initiative to their two nations and their joint goal of 
seeing it adopted world-wide.  Acknowledging the 
"political" importance of a joint demarche, Bauwens voiced 
several reservations:  the costs, time and energy that 
Global Initiative membership might presume; its 
"redundancy," lest the Global Initiative be a needless 
duplication of already-existing, broader legal commitments 
required by UNSCR 1540 and membership in the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.  He drew a parallel with the "Oslo 
process" on cluster munitions, in which Belgium is heavily 
engaged, which risks undermining the effectiveness of the 
broader Convention on Conventional Weapons.  Bauwens asked 
if the European Union - specifically the European Council 
- had also been asked to join, as the EU already was doing 
much to stem nuclear terrorism that should be coordinated 
with any new effort. 
 
¶2.  Drawing on instructions from Moscow, Lukov responded 
that the Global Initiative represents a group of motivated 
nations that can serve as a spearhead to catalyze others 
to deal with the pressing question of nuclear terrorism. 
Thus, it is more effective than slow, tortuous 
negotiations of a lowest, commop 
such as at the UN.  Hn October 2006, 
produced the basic principles of the initiative.  Together 
with the IAEA, the Global Initiative would enforce 
unavoidable punishment of terrorists by strengthening the 
legal system and cooperation in technical means to develop 
and prevent nuclear terrorism.  A plan was also agreed, 
Lukov continued, to implement Global Initiative principles 
by the original signatory states and others that join. 
Belgium, with its reputation in preventing nuclear 
diffusion, had an important role to play.  It was hoped 
that the Government of Belgium would join by notifying 
Russia and/or the U.S., before the next Global Initiative 
meeting in Kazakhstan in June 2007. 
 
 
BRUSSELS 00000881  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5.  Imbrie underscored the full Russian and U.S. agreement 
in the Global Initiative and added that the IAEA is an 
observer member of the Global Initiative.  Handing over 
Ref A points on the Global Initiative, Imbrie remarked 
that Belgium should find it easy to endorse the 
organization's principles and work plan, which he hoped 
Belgium would provide its expertise to help develop. 
 
The Response:  Yes, But... 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  Director of Common Security, Defense and Disarmament 
Pol De Witte thanked Lukov and Imbrie, noting that the 
joint nature of the demarche underscored the political 
importance of the initiative.  He then turned the floor 
over to Director of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
Werner Bauwens. 
 
¶7.  Stating that he was already familiar with content of 
the demarche, Bauwens remarked that the Global Initiative 
was similar to the approach of the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (Ref B), which Belgium had joined as had most 
of the European Union.  Bauwens suggested that, like PSI, 
the Global Initiative might be "embedded" in a larger 
existing framework, e.g. UNSCR 1373 or 1540.  What was its 
"added value"?  Further, all EU players including the 
European Council should receive the demarche so that 
everyone could act together to avoid duplication.  The EU 
was already doing much to prevent nuclear terrorism. 
Could not the Global Initiative be folded into initiatives 
that already exist? 
 
¶8.  Belgium's core questions, Bauwens continued, are:  Who 
does what?  Does the Global Initiative not represent a 
"turning away" from the legal requirements already imposed 
by UNSCRs 1373 and 1540, to which it appears redundant? 
What are the organizational details and financial 
expectations of membership?  PSI imposed a great burden so 
Belgium wanted to know from the start expected resource 
requirements.  Belgium's strong preference, he concluded, 
was to avoid any duplication.  Nonetheless, he expected 
the founding partners could expect "to count us in." 
 
Music to the Ears 
----------------- 
 
¶9.  Citing the G-8 as an example, AMB Lukov responded that 
"there are two ways to attack" an issue:  negotiate in 
plenary session, which is slow, painful and reaches the 
lowest common denominator, or begin through a small group 
of motivated parties that catalyze others to action.  This 
latter has been the method to fight terrorism, as in 
negotiating UNSCR 1540.  Pointing out Russia's planned 
activities to promote the Global Initiative, he suggested 
that Bauwens look closely at the proposed action plan and 
see where Belgium might fill in gaps to generate new 
knowledge and initiatives.  He summed up by stating that 
the Global Initiative would welcome the input of Belgium 
and Bauwens at its coming meeting in Astana. 
 
¶10.  Imbrie stated that the Global Initiative posed no 
contradiction to IAEA efforts of the past seventeen years 
but rather, like PSI, was intended to fill gaps created in 
the non-proliferation agreements.  He stated that, on 
specific expectations of membership, Global Initiative 
partners might ask Belgium to organize a conference and 
actively participate in meetings.  Partners would be 
expected to fund initiatives they sponsored, but other 
costs would be for participation in Global Initiative 
events. 
 
The Bottom Line 
--------------- 
 
¶11.  De Witte asked if the demarche had been sent to all 
EU members, suggesting that Belgium could work the topic 
 
BRUSSELS 00000881  003 OF 003 
 
 
into an all-EU agenda.  Imbrie confirmed that all EU 
members were being contacted but not the European Council 
itself; he would suggest that to the State Department. 
Bauwens proposed that the GOB would see to it that the 
Global Initiative be put on the agenda of the next Council 
working group meeting.  Imbrie observed that an approach 
to the Council should not delay the decisions of its 
individual member nations.  Bauwens stated he expected 
that even after EU coordination, Belgium would be able to 
reply by late April or early May; "We have to go through 
the motions of a transparent approach" as an EU member, he 
observed. 
 
¶12.  Subsequently, Imbrie learned from EU PSC Ambassador 
Dirk Wauters that Belgium had already contacted him 
concerning EU coordination and expected that the EU would 
support the initiative. 
IMBRIE