VZCZCXRO3733
OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0430/01 0721153
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131153Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8321
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 5978
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 4141
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4631
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 3631
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY 0338
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 5227
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 3393
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 6781
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1025
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 0182
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2162
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 6126
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE PRIORITY 6335
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 3982
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 9375
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000430 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: U/S BURNS MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL 
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR MARCO AURELIO GARCIA 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  U/S Burns and WHA A/S Shannon, in Brasilia 
for strategic dialogue talks with the Brazilian Foreign 
Ministry (MRE), joined with Ambassador, PolCounselor and 
S/P officer William McIlhenny to meet on 
February 7 with Marco Aurelio Garcia, President Lula da 
Silva's international affairs advisor.  Garcia was 
accompanied by his senior deputy, Marcel Biato. U/S Burns 
provided an overview of the transition in USG global 
strategy toward focus on building relations with regional 
powers like Brazil, and noted the importance of 
collaboration on bio-fuels to this relationship.  Brazilian 
views on developments in the region and Cuba also were 
focal points of the discussion.  In the region, Garcia said 
there is a consensus on integration among disparate but 
democratically elected governments that facilitates 
communication and limits conflict.  Brazil does not admire 
Hugo Chavez's political model, but needs to pursue good 
relations with Venezuela as part of a foreign 
policy driven by Brazil's vital interests and 
domestic economic priorities.  In Cuba, it is clear Fidel 
is fading rapidly and permanently, but transition scenarios 
are hard to predict.  The largest step the U.S. could take 
to encourage a peaceful transition to democracy would be 
elimination of sanctions, Garcia said. End summary. 
 
THE REGION 
 
¶2. (C) U/S Burns outlined for Garcia the ongoing shift in 
USG strategic focus away from a Europe and 
toward increased engagement with major and emerging 
regional powers, including Brazil.  U.S.-Brazil cooperation 
in Haiti and the promising bilateral collaboration on 
bio-fuels are building blocks for this enhanced 
relationship.  The USG also values Brazilian insights on 
regional affairs.  In that context, U/S Burns invited 
Garcia to share his views on developments in the region, 
especially in Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba -- all countries 
Garcia has visited frequently as Lula's special envoy. 
 
¶3. (C) Garcia said South America has been undergoing a 
major transformation in the past several years, with 
democratically elected governments seeking economic 
recovery and growth, while also addressing grave social 
problems.  There has been at least a general consensus in 
the region on the importance of integration, and that has 
permitted countries with disparate political situations and 
ethnic cultures to work together on many issues.  While 
there is still conflict, communication is more the norm, 
Garcia said. 
 
¶4. (C) With Venezuela, Brazil has worked to maintain a 
positive dialogue, focusing on points of convergence, 
e.g., joint projects in infrastructure and energy.  On the 
political level, "We do not agree with Chavez's path, and 
it is not the one we chose," Garcia declared, echoing a 
similar statement made by FM Amorim in a meeting with U/S 
Burns earlier in the day.  That said, Garcia said it needs 
to be recognized that "Chavez is a product of Venezuela's 
crisis, not its cause." 
 
¶5. (C) Brazil's relationship with Argentina is "strategic," 
and is analogous in some ways to the Franco-German 
relationship in Europe -- i.e., sometimes tense, but 
crucial for regional stability and progress.  Relations 
with Chile are similarly important and growing, Garcia 
said, as are Brazil's relations with Colombia.  Indeed, 
Brazil is practicing "variable geometry diplomacy" in the 
region, adjusting and shifting constantly to build and 
exploit opportunities in a foreign policy that is still 
 
BRASILIA 00000430  002 OF 002 
 
 
mainly driven by domestic priorities, he added. 
 
CUBA 
 
¶6. (C) Turning to Cuba, Garcia noted that his deputy 
advisor, Marcel Biato, had just returned from five months 
as Brazil's charge d'affaires in Havana, and his views were 
incorporated in Garcia's perspective.  Garcia said the GOB 
believes it is highly unlikely Fidel Castro will ever 
return to exercise real power.  The waning of Fidel over 
the past year had caused the Cuban population to begin 
contemplating a different future, but everyone has 
difficulty imagining what that future will look like, 
Garcia said.  Cuba, in the past forty years, had a system 
built on a single charismatic figure, and that is not 
sustainable.  Raul Castro is not his brother and seems more 
inclined to take a committee approach to leadership that is 
pragmatic, at least on economic issues.  Garcia was 
doubtful Cuba can replicate the "China model" with economic 
opening but continued centralized political control. 
"China is a civilization, Cuba is not... they do not have 
the patience, resources or organization" to emulate China's 
approach," he opined.  Moreover, Cuba today lacks an 
"economic vocation," and has not been able to place its 
tourism industry, its medical capacity or its bare handful 
of other productive sectors into a strategy for 
productivity or increased self reliance.  Brazil wants to 
help, and is offering to provide both assistance and 
markets for Cuba, but the Cubans have to define a direction 
for themselves, Garcia said. 
 
¶7. (C) Asked by U/S Burns about Brazil's views on Chavez's 
role in Cuba's transition, Garcia said that Cuba and 
Venezuela in the near term are mutually dependent (i.e., 
"oil exchanged for expertise"), but Fidel's passing will 
leave a vacuum Chavez will try to fill.  However, Chavez's 
brand 
of strident populism "has less space to grow in Latin 
America than you may think," Garcia said, and could be 
curtailed if Cubans perceived other openings -- especially 
if the U.S. lifted sanctions on their economy.  This would 
be the single biggest step the U.S. could take in easing 
the transition in Cuba toward a positive direction, Garcia 
opined.  Conversely, the U.S. needs to avoid public 
recommendations to Cubans about their political future, 
since Cubans' traditional nationalism and sensitivity to 
U.S. influence assure negative reactions. 
 
¶8. (C) A/S Shannon said the United States has tried to 
assume a careful, low-key position in public on the Cuban 
transition, but the U.S. believes that others in the region 
need to speak out for democracy there. If a transitional 
government could take certain concrete steps -- e.g., 
release of political prisoners -- the positive reaction 
within the U.S. would be considerable. But someone 
other than the U.S. must pressure Cuban leaders toward such 
actions, he said.