VZCZCXRO2350
OO RUEHRG
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O 011948Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000370 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: U/S BURNS' MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER 
AMORIM 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Under Secretary for Political Affairs R. 
Nicholas Burns, WHA Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon, P 
Special Assistant Heide Bronke, Ambassador Sobel and PolCouns 
Dennis Hearne met on 7 February with Foreign Minister Celso 
Amorim for a broad discussion of bilateral and regional 
issues.  The USG delegation visited Brasilia for a bilateral 
strategic dialogue at the U/S level.  Amorim was accompanied 
by Foreign Ministry U/S for Political Affairs and designated 
U.S. Ambassador Antonio Patriota, incoming U/S Everton 
Vargas, and other senior officers.  U/S Burns emphasized the 
change in U.S. strategy away from a Euro-centric focus and 
toward new alliances with major regional powers, and noted 
Brazil is the focal point for this U.S. approach in South 
America. Amorim and U/S Burns agreed on the desirability of 
using cooperation on biofuels as the centerpiece of a broader 
strategic relationship, drawing on the example of newly 
dynamic relationship of the United States and India.  Two 
meetings in March between Presidents Bush and Lula offer 
excellent opportunities for pursuing an agreement on 
biofuels.  On regional issues, Amorim affirmed Brazil's 
long-term commitment to Haiti.  He said that Brazil does not 
admire Chavez's political path, but does not fear him.  The 
GOB has limited influence in ameliorating Chavez's behavior 
and must remain engaged with him in light of Brazil's vital 
interests.  In Bolivia, Amorim and U/S Burns agreed on the 
need to continue engagement with Evo Morales.  The 
conversation was substantive and frank, and is organized 
topically below for clarity.  End summary. 
 
BILATERAL RELATIONS AND BIOFUELS 
 
¶2. (C) U/S Burns outlined for FM Amorim the evolution of U.S. 
global strategy away from the Cold War's Euro-centric 
paradigm toward the current focus on building strategic 
partnerships with key regional powers, including India, 
China, South Africa and Brazil. The USG is eager to intensify 
its dialogue with Brazil, and the prospect of two 
presidential meetings in March -- in Sao Paulo and later in 
the United States -- offer great opportunities to move in 
that direction. 
 
¶3. (C) U/S Burns offered as an example the new and dynamic 
U.S. relationship with India, in which the bilateral 
agreement on civil nuclear energy has served as the 
"backbone" for improving political, commercial and cultural 
links between India and the United States. Praising Brazil's 
regional leadership (e.g., in Haiti) and its strong 
commitment to democracy, U/S Burns indicated the USG's desire 
to turn now toward deepening its strategic relationship with 
Brazil. Noting the critical geopolitical, environmental and 
energy consequences of over-reliance on oil, U/S Burns 
stressed the USG's heightened interest in establishing 
alternative energy options, and said this augured well for 
building a partnership with Brazil with cooperation in 
development of biofuels technologies and markets as the 
centerpiece. U/S Burns indicated the USG will be working with 
the GOB to conclude a biofuels agreement with Brazil -- based 
on a draft MOU provided by Brazil -- with a view to making 
the accord a deliverable for the March pr 
esidential meetings. 
 
¶4. (C) FM Amorim noted the generally positive state of 
U.S.-Brazil relations and personal friendship between 
Presidents Lula and Bush.  He said U.S. enthusiasm for close 
cooperation in biofuels has a resonant echo throughout the 
GOB, starting with Lula himself, who is seized with the 
potential of biofuel as a transformational agent not only in 
energy but in effecting social change.  Amorim said the GOB 
is receptive to utilizing cooperation on biofuels as a 
 
BRASILIA 00000370  002 OF 004 
 
 
central element for strengthening ties with the United 
States, but also issued a caveat against "ethanolizing" the 
entire bilateral relationship, which is more diverse and 
complex than any single issue. 
 
¶5. (C) Amorim and U/S Burns discussed the component of the 
draft biofuels MOU which addresses U.S.-Brazil cooperation in 
third country economic and social development projects, and 
U/S Burns presented the USG preference for a multi-country 
approach, including projects in South America. Amorim 
reiterated Brazil's stated preference for commencing 
U.S.-Brazil cooperation in third countries with pilot 
projects in Central America or the Caribbean.  Pressed by U/S 
Burns as to Brazil's reasoning on this point, Amorim said 
that GOB concerns include reactions within Mercosul to an 
initial biofuel project in a South American country that 
would certainly be outside of that regional group.  In the 
case of Colombia, the GOB would not rule out cooperation at 
some point, but it would be necessary to create a clear line 
between Brazilian efforts on biofuels and any connection to 
Plan Colombia, which is controversial in Brazil.  Moreover, 
Amorim noted that the GOB has not attempted a broad 
international effort of this complexity before, and is 
concerned about "scattering its energy too widely."  Brazil 
prefers to focus initially on a single pilot project in a 
relatively small country where there is good potential for a 
transformative effect on a near-term horizon.  Such a success 
would establish a positive precedent for U.S.-Brazil 
cooperation, and subsequent joint projects -- including in 
South America and Africa -- would then become seen by all as 
"routine," he said. 
 
RECIPROCITY ISSUES 
 
¶6. (SBU) Amorim again asked the USG to relax its current 
restrictions on leasing or purchasing of properties for the 
Brazilian bilateral and UN missions in the United States, 
which the USG has linked to resolution of property and social 
security problems the USG continues to confront with its 
mission in Brazil.  Amorim noted that the foreign ministry 
has submitted an accord for congressional approval which will 
resolve the U.S. problems in Brazil, but that in light of the 
fact that congressional approval could take "perhaps the rest 
of the year," a loosening of restrictions on Brazil would be 
a good will gesture in the bilateral relationship.  Amorim 
implied that GOB receptivity to a USG request to base an 
Embassy C-12 aircraft in Brasilia is now linked to a U.S. 
show of flexibility.  (Note: In a press interview on 2 
February, Amorim complained that the USG is "retaliating" 
against Brazil because of the U.S. Mission's problems in 
Brazil. End note.) 
 
HAITI 
 
¶7. (C) Amorim affirmed that the GOB has assumed its role in 
Haiti as "a long-term commitment."  Amorim said the Haiti 
experience has been a positive example of U.S.-Brazil 
cooperation, even though the two governments have sometimes 
differed on specific aspects of the mission.  Haiti now has 
an elected national government, and it is imperative for the 
international community to avoid "the vicious circle" of not 
donating resources to a government that is not perfect, 
thereby ensuring that the government and country can never 
improve to a point of deserving donations, Amorim said. In 
addition, it continues to be crucial, in the GOB's view, that 
the population perceive tangible improvements in their daily 
lives in the near term.  MINUSTAH can secure Bel Aire and 
other crime-ridden areas, but the local populations will grow 
disillusioned and restive if there is no follow-up in basic 
services and social programs, Amorim said. 
 
 
BRASILIA 00000370  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶8. (C) U/S Burns agreed that President Preval is mounting a 
serious effort at governance and deserves support; the USG is 
now sending resources for security and development in Cite 
Soleil.  Amorim and U/S Burns agreed that the USG and Brazil 
should continue pressing the Chinese Government to support 
the 12 month extension for MINUSTAH, and Amorim instructed 
his staff to call the Chinese Ambassador in Brasilia in 
immediately to receive a new demarche on the issue. 
Beijing's Ambassador in Brasilia is a good channel to PRC on 
the issue because he had served in East Timor and "had seen 
first-hand what happens when the UN leaves too soon,"  Amorim 
noted. 
 
VENEZUELA AND BOLIVIA 
 
¶9. (C) Amorim said Hugo Chavez's political path is not that 
of Brazil, but Brazil "does not feel threatened" by Chavez. 
Chavez's military build-up is part of a quest for prestige, 
and his rhetorical excesses are primarily for internal 
consumption in Venezuela -- "his bark is worse than his 
bite," Amorim opined. Isolation is not a solution with 
Chavez, since it would only serve to make him "more radical 
and self-righteous," Amorim said.  Brazil tries to be a 
positive influence in ameliorating Chavez's behavior, and has 
had some successes, but with his electoral victories and the 
strength of oil prices consolidating Chavez's position, 
"there is only so much we can do."   Brazil has vital 
interests with Venezuela -- infrastructure and energy 
investments, for example -- and it has to be careful. 
 
¶10. (C) U/S Burns said the USG has taken Lula's advice and 
does not respond to Chavez's constant provocations.  "We 
don't want to isolate him, we want to talk to him, but he 
won't deal with us," U/S Burns emphasized.  Amorim replied 
that the GOB had urged the Venezuelans to open a dialogue 
with the United States, to no avail, and Amorim had also 
intervened personally with Chavez in the Sumate human rights 
case.  Amorim also complained that the removal of former 
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Ali Rodriguez was a bad thing. 
He described Rodriguez as an intelligent and reliable 
interlocutor.  He complained that the current Foreign 
Minister, Nicolas Maduro, seems "insecure."  Amorim has tried 
to persuade Maduro to come alone to Brasilia for discussions, 
but he refuses to travel apart from Chavez "because he is 
afraid of him."  Amorim suggested that continued efforts be 
made to engage Chavez in a broad dialogue on the region, 
since focusing on Venezuela's internal situation is unlikely 
to yield results.  He also complained that the disunity and 
in-fighting in the opposition had only helped Chavez, and 
reiterated his standing complaint that Brazil's ability to 
influence Chavez had been undercut by the U.S. decision to 
block export of Embraer Super Tucano aircraft to Venezuela by 
refusing export licensing of U.S. content in the planes. 
 
¶11. (C) Amorim and U/S Burns touched briefly on Bolivia, and 
agreed on the continuing need to reach out to Morales 
wherever possible.  Patience and perseverance are needed, "so 
that he does not fall into Chavez's arms," Amorim said.  The 
GOB further doubts that the military ties Morales appears to 
be establishing with Chavez will be fruitful for Bolivia, and 
appear to be causing a significant political backlash.  On 
Colombia, Amorim noted that Lula and President Uribe enjoy a 
good relationship, and that Brazil is watching with interest 
the disarmament process with paramilitaries.  U/S Burns and 
Amorim agreed that the process must proceed with care and 
rigor, as the experience with the paramilitaries will set the 
standard for any future effort with the FARC. 
 
¶12.  (U) Participants 
 
Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns 
 
BRASILIA 00000370  004 OF 004 
 
 
Ambassador Clifford Sobel 
Assistant Secretary Thomas A. Shannon 
Political Counselor Dennis Hearne 
Policy Planning Staff Officer William W. McIlhenny 
Heide Bronke, Assistant to Under Secretary Burns 
 
Brazil: 
Minister Celso Amorim 
Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota 
Ambassador Everton Vieira Vargas 
Ambassador Goncalo Mourao 
Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti 
Counselor Joao Tabajara Jr. 
Secretary Ricardo Ayrosa 
 
SIPDIS 
SOBEL