VZCZCXRO6205
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHBK #1809 0860906
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270906Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5877
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 3342
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS BANGKOK 001809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS AND EB 
TREASURY FOR OASIA 
COMMERCE FOR EAP/MAC/OKSA 
STATE PASS TO USTR FOR WEISEL 
STATE PASS TO FEDERAL RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO FOR DAN FINEMAN 
STATE PASS TO FEDERAL RESERVE NEW YORK FOR MATT HILDEBRANDT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON TH
SUBJECT: BANK OF THAILAND'S LATEST EFFORT TO STOP THE BAHT 
 
REF: 06BANGKOK7435 
 
¶1. (U) Rumors of a return to a fixed foreign exchange rate 
regime were widespread the afternoon of March 26 as word 
spread that all commercial banks in the country were being 
summoned to the Bank of Thailand: Thai banks to appear at 
5:00, foreign banks at 5:45. There were several factors 
propelling the rumors. First, the continued appreciation of 
the baht over the last few weeks (to around 34.5/US$ from 
about 35.7/US$ at the beginning of the year) reminded 
observers of the concern last year which resulted in the BoT 
initiating strict exchange control measures (reftel). Second, 
the Director General of the Fiscal Policy Office of the 
Ministry of Finance wondered aloud to the press whether fixed 
rates would be a way to solve both the problem of too rapid 
baht appreciation and the need for fiscal stimulus. Finally, 
on March 23, the BoT had send a letter to banks in Thailand 
ordering them to adjust their currency trading positions to 
the same levels as they held at the end of last year 
(presumably when the positio 
ns were squared for the year-end). 
 
¶2. (SBU) As it happened, the BoT called the meeting to deny 
the rumor of pegging the baht to the dollar (supposedly at 
36/US$) or of having any intention of doing so. BoT officials 
also clarified their March 23 letter, effectively ordering 
banks not to speculate on baht strength. Contacts advise us 
that there were two Thai banks that had established large 
short-dollar positions based on the knowledge that their 
export customers would be seeking to exchange their US$ 
earnings. The BoT used the meeting to remind all banks that 
in the current environment, such front-running of trades or 
taking any short-dollar speculative position was 
unacceptable. The baht is trading at around 35.02/US$ in 
volatile trading as of the morning of March 27. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Comment: It is widely accepted that the BoT has not 
been very good at sending signals to the market. Yesterday's 
effort at moral suasion was at least an effort to change this 
problem and to let the banks know that the BoT will force 
them to share the cost of baht appreciation. The underlying 
problem of a large current account surplus remains. To 
resolve the problem of the strong baht, the RTG is faced with 
the need for fiscal stimulus while distancing itself from the 
simulative policies that the Thaksin regime pursued. They are 
finding it tough to square this circle, especially in the 
face of low consumer and business confidence. We question 
whether the expected series of small cuts in the policy 
lending rate will be a sufficient response. This is one 
reason that rumors of resorting to a pegged exchange rate 
will probably continue to regularly crop up. Septel will 
examine in more detail the problems of the appreciating baht 
and the BoT response. 
ARVIZU