VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGBA #1028 0841301
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZUI RUEWMCF4849 0841246
P 251301Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC0000
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 001028 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAGR IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: BAYJI LOCAL LEADERS SPEAK OUT:  NEW 
BUDGET EXECUTION REGULATIONS CRUCIAL 
 
REF: A) 06 BAGHDAD 4728 B) BAGHDAD 380 
 
¶1. THIS IS A PRT TIKRIT, SALAH AD DIN CABLE. 
 
¶2. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
¶3. SUMMARY AND COMMENT.  BAYJI COMMUNITY LEADERS STRONGLY 
WELCOMED THE PROSPECT OF NEW PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTING 
REGULATIONS IN 2007, WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO BE PUBLISHED BY 
THE MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION 
(MOPDC).  DURING THE CITY COUNCIL MEETING HELD ON MARCH 19, 
COMMUNITY CHIEFS (COUNCIL MEMBERS AND INFLUENTIAL AREA 
SHEIKHS) EMBRACED THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORE TRANSPARENT AND 
ACCOUNTABLE CONTRACTING PROCESS FOR RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. 
BAYJI EPITOMIZES MANY OF IRAQ,S MOST SALIENT PROBLEMS: IT IS 
HOME TO A THRIVING FUEL SMUGGLING INDUSTRY AND A SIGNIFICANT 
AIF AND AQIZ PRESENCE, IT SUFFERS FROM A MORIBUND ECONOMY 
FURTHER WEAKENED BY DE-BAATHIFICATION, AND LITTLE TO NO 
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND THE PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNMENT AND THE GOI.  IN ADDITION, DUE TO A BOYCOTT OF THE 
JANUARY 2005 ELECTION, BAYJI IS UNDERREPRESENTED ON THE 
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL.  HOWEVER, THE SITUATION HERE MAY NOT BE 
UNIQUE.  THE LACK OF A TRANSPARENT PROVINCIAL BUDGET 
EXECUTION PROCESS IN 2006 NOT ONLY NEGATIVELY AFFECTED 
PROVINCIAL GOVERNANCE, BUT ALSO UNDERMINED LOCAL LEADERSHIP 
IN THEIR DIFFICULT STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH THE MUNICIPAL 
GOVERNMENT'S LEGITIMACY IN THE EYES OF THE POPULATION.  AN 
IMPORTANT KEY TO BUILDING LOCAL GOVERNANCE CAPACITY IN 2007 
WILL BE THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMS MANDATED 
BY PENDING PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTING REGULATIONS AS 
STIPULATED BY THE 2007 BUDGET LAW.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
A LONG 22 MILES IN A DECENTRALIZED PROVINCE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. BAYJI IS LOCATED ONLY 22 MILES NORTH OF TIKRIT, THE 
PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, BUT IT MAY BE 1000 MILES IN TERMS OF 
PROVINCIAL POLITICS.  THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE LOCAL 
POPULATION BOYCOTTED THE JANUARY 2005 ELECTION, LEAVING AN 
UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE PROVINCIAL 
COUNCIL.  FOR EXAMPLE, THE CITY OF TUZ, A KURDISH AND 
TURCOMAN ENCLAVE IN THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE PROVINCE HAS 
15 REPRESENTATIVES OUT OF 41 ON THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL, 
DESPITE COMPRISING APPROXIMATELY 13 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL 
POPULATION.  SIMILARLY, ALTHOUGH TIKRIT COUNTS 11 DELEGATES, 
ITS POPULATION IS ONLY 14 PERCENT OF THE PROVINCIAL TOTAL. 
CONVERSELY, BAYJI IS REPRESENTED BY ONLY ONE MEMBER (WHO 
FREQUENTLY DOES NOT ATTEND), ALTHOUGH IT IS HAS A LARGER 
POPULATION (14 PERCENT) THAN TUZ.  HAMAD HAMOUD AL SHAKTI, 
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, HAILS FROM BAYJI BUT IS LARGELY 
INACTIVE IN THE PROVINCIAL BUDGET EXECUTION PROCESS.  WHILE 
THE LIST OF PROJECTS SUBMITTED TO THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL IN 
2006 WAS RELATIVELY WELL DISTRIBUTED IN 2006, IN PRACTICE THE 
PERCENTAGE OF APPROVED PROJECTS HIGHLY FAVORED DISTRICTS WITH 
GREATER REPRESENTATION: 
 
--TIKRIT, 13% OF POPULATION, 33% OF APPROVED PROJECTS. 
--TUZ, 13% OF POPULATION, 22% OF APPROVED PROJECTS. 
--SAMARRA, 16% OF POPULATION, 3% OF APPROVED PROJECTS. 
--BAYJI, 12% OF POPULATION, 7% OF APPROVED PROJECTS. 
--AD DAWR, 4% OF POPULATION, 2% OF APPROVED PROJECTS. 
--BALAD, 17% OF POPULATION, 15% OF APPROVED PROJECTS. 
 
¶5. UNLIKE MANY PROVINCES IN IRAQ, SALAH AD DIN IS NOT 
DOMINATED BY ONE KEY CITY, SUCH AS MOSUL OR KIRKUK.  THERE 
ARE THREE MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS ) TIKRIT, SAMARRA, AND 
BALAD ) AS WELL AS MULTIPLE SMALLER COMMUNITIES SUCH AS 
BAYJI, ASH SHARQAT AND TUZ.  IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A MAJORITY 
ON THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL, AGREEMENT MUST BE REACHED WHICH 
SPANS A SIGNIFICANT GEOGRAPHICAL, TRIBAL, AND ETHNIC GAP. 
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT PROVINCIAL FACTIONS WOULD BE 
DIFFICULT EVEN WITHOUT THE EXISTING ANIMOSITY, CONSIDERING 
THAT REPRESENTATIVES FROM DISTANT LOCALES MUST BRAVE A 
PERILOUS JOURNEY ON DANGEROUS HIGHWAYS, AND THE SPOTTY 
CONDITION OF IRAQ,S COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE.  AS A 
RESULT, EVEN REACHING A QUORUM IN PROVINCIAL COUNCIL MEETINGS 
CAN BE A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE (REFTEL B).  THE GEOGRAPHIC 
AND DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY OF SAD ADD TO THE CHALLENGE BAYJI 
FACES IN RECEIVING ITS SHARE OF PROJECTS. 
 
------------------------------ 
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION LAGGING 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. ON MARCH 19, THE BAYJI CITY COUNCIL MET AT THE OIL 
REFINERY.  REPRESENTING THE TRUE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN 
BAYJI, ONLY SIX (OF 22 TOTAL) COUNCIL MEMBERS WERE PRESENT 
WHILE TWELVE INFLUENTIAL AREA SHEIKHS SHOWED.  DISCUSSION 
 
QUICKLY TURNED TO THE ISSUE OF PROJECT NOMINATIONS FOR 2007. 
ON THE LIST COMPILED BY THE CITY PLANNERS (LOCAL 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEDERAL MINISTRIES) MANY OF THE LISTED 
PROJECTS WERE FAMILIAR; SOME WERE APPROVED IN 2006 BUT WORK 
WAS NOT BEGUN, OTHERS COMMENCED BUT CEASED SHORTLY 
THEREAFTER.  (NOTE: MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS DO NOT HAVE THE 
POWER TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS FOR CAPITAL PROJECTS.  HOWEVER, 
LOCAL APPROVAL OF PROJECT LISTS IS AN IMPORTANT ) ALBEIT ) 
INFORMAL - STEP PRIOR TO THEIR SUBMISSION TO THE PROVINCIAL 
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, WHICH SERVES THE ROLE 
OF A PLANNING COMMITTEE BEFORE FINAL APPROVAL BY THE 
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL, REFTEL.  END NOTE.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
COUNCIL MEMBERS STEP TO THE PLATE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. LOCAL POWER PLAYERS IN BAYJI - FORMAL AND INFORMAL ) HAVE 
LONG VIEWED THE CITY COUNCIL MEETINGS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
AIR GRIEVANCES WITH THE CF COMMANDER ON THE GROUND INSTEAD OF 
AS A LOCAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTION; ADDITIONALLY, MEETINGS WERE 
OFTEN LED BY THE CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM ON THE GROUND.  HOWEVER, 
DURING THE MEETING, CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS TOOK A SMALL STEP 
TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MORE EFFECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNANCE. 
 ARGUING THAT THE COUNCIL HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO APPROVE 
PROJECTS WHICH WERE PRACTICAL AS WELL AS BENEFICIAL, SEVERAL 
COUNCIL MEMBERS EMPHASIZED THAT SMALLER WORKS ) FOR 
TECHNICAL AND SECURITY REASONS - HAD A GREATER CHANCE OF 
COMING TO FRUITION.  ATTENDEES ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE 
OF CHOOSING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS WHICH COULD BE COMPLETED 
IN A TIMELY FASHION, NOTING THE DEEP PUBLIC DISENCHANTMENT 
WITH ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE - GOI, PROVINCIAL, AND LOCAL - 
IN THE HEART OF THIS SUNNI PROVINCE. 
 
---------------------------------- 
CONTRACTING CHALLENGES HIGHLIGHTED 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8. DELEGATES VOICED THEIR FRUSTRATION DURING THE MEETING WITH 
AN INVISIBLE PROVINCIAL CONTRACTING PROCESS, DESCRIBING THE 
PREVIOUS METHOD OF PROVINCIAL PROJECT CONTRACTING ) OFTEN 
PERFORMED IN A BACK ROOM IN TIKRIT BY POWER PLAYERS FROM AL 
ALEM (REFTEL A) ) AS UNFAIR AND DYSFUNCTIONAL.  ACCORDING TO 
THE ATTENDEES, SOME PROJECTS WERE NEVER STARTED, WHILE IN 
OTHER CASES, CONTRACTORS DISAPPEARED (POSSIBLY FOR SECURITY 
REASONS) SHORTLY AFTER BEING PAID.  HIGHLIGHTING THE 
DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED, COUNCIL MEMBERS CITED AN IMPORTANT 
SEWAGE PROJECT (FROM 2006) FOR WHICH A QUALIFIED CONTRACTOR 
COULD NOT BE FOUND.  YET THE PROJECT CONTINUED TO BE APPROVED 
AND FUNDING RESERVED WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN USED ON AN 
ALTERNATIVE PROJECT.  IN THESE CASES, LOCAL LEADERSHIP WAS 
NOT ABLE TO VIEW THE SELECTION OF A CONTRACTOR OR ADEQUATELY 
MONITOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS (OR LACK THEREOF). 
 
------------------------------------------- 
PROSPECT OF NEW REGULATIONS WARMLY RECEIVED 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. DEMONSTRATIVE OF THE WEAK COMMUNICATION CHANNELS BETWEEN 
ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ, NONE OF THE CITY COUNCIL 
MEMBERS HAD ANY IDEA THAT NEW REGULATIONS GOVERNING 
PROVINCIAL BUDGET EXECUTION EVEN EXISTED.  AFTER A BRIEF, 
INFORMAL PRESENTATION BY IPAO REGARDING THE NEW 2007 BUDGET 
EXECUTION REGULATIONS, THE CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS WERE 
EXTREMELY SUPPORTIVE OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES, ARGUING THAT A 
REVISED SYSTEM WHICH PROVIDES LOCAL COUNCILS WITH A MEANS TO 
VERIFY AND TRACK THE PROJECT CONTRACTING AND IMPLEMENTATION 
PROCESS WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD.  AS ONE COUNCIL 
MEMBER STATED, &WE HAVE TO KNOW WHAT THOSE THIEVES IN TIKRIT 
ARE UP TO.  OTHERWISE THEY WILL GIVE ALL THE CONTRACTS TO 
THEIR BROTHERS.8  (NOTE: THE TUZ CITY COUNCIL RESPONDED IN A 
VERY SIMILAR FASHION IN FEBRUARY WHEN BRIEFED ON THE 
ANTICIPATED 2007 BUDGET EXECUTION REGULATIONS BY A PRT 
REPRESENTATIVE.  END NOTE.) 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. COMMENT: SALAH AD DIN IS WORKING TO ESTABLISH A KEY 
FOUNDATION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE CREDIBILITY: AN EFFECTIVE, 
TRANSPARENT PROVINCIAL BUDGET EXECUTION PROCESS.  ALTHOUGH 
THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL HAS RECENTLY MADE POSITIVE STEPS 
RECENTLY TOWARDS ITS ESTABLISHMENT, SIGNIFICANT HURDLES 
REMAIN.  REFORMS IN THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL BUILDING IN TIKRIT 
- THOUGH IMPORTANT ) ULTIMATELY MATTER LITTLE IF CITIZENS ON 
THE STREET IN BAYJI DO NOT SEE PROJECTS ACTUALLY CONSTRUCTED. 
 AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS ACHIEVING GREATER PUBLIC 
LEGITIMACY FOR MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS IN 2007 WILL BE THE 
ABILITY TO INFLUENCE AND MONITOR - THROUGH GREATER INFLUENCE 
 
IN THE PRDC AND AN OPEN BIDDING PROCESS - THE SELECTION, 
CONTRACTING, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROJECTS IN THEIR COMMUNITY.  ADDITIONALLY, THE ABILITY OF 
THE DIRECTOR GENERALS (AND THE CITY PLANNERS WHO WORK FOR 
THEM) TO MONITOR PROJECT EXECUTION ENSURES PROFESSIONAL, 
LARGELY APOLITICAL OVERSIGHT. 
 
¶10. AS BAYJI MOVES TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNANCE, 
THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE TRIALS.  MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS DO 
NOT HAVE THE POWER OF THE PURSE (ULTIMATELY LIMITING THEIR 
INFLUENCE), AND THE SECURITY SITUATION CONTINUES TO 
CONSIDERABLY IMPEDE RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS.  MOREOVER, AT 
LEAST UNTIL NEW ELECTIONS ARE HELD, BAYJI WILL CONTINUE TO BE 
UNDER REPRESENTED ON THE PRDC AND THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL. 
SUSTAINED EFFORT BY THE PRT AND LOCAL CF WILL PROBABLY BE 
VITAL TO ENCOURAGE GREATER INVOLVEMENT AND VISIBILITY ON THE 
PART OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE PROVINCIAL DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESS.  MOST IMPORTANTLY ) DESPITE THE TEMPTATION THAT MAY 
EXIST IN SOME QUARTERS TO ELIMINATE THEM IN THE NAME OF 
PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY - THE PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTING 
REGULATIONS TO BE PUBLISHED BY THE MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION (MOPDC) PROVIDE THE NECESSARY LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR ENSURE THE EXECUTION OF THIS VITAL REFORM.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
¶11. PRT SALAH AD DIN WILL CONTINUE TO STRONGLY ENCOURAGE 
LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET 
EXECUTION PROCESS IN 2007. 
 
¶12. FOR ADDITIONAL REPORTING FROM PRT TIKRIT, SALAH AD DIN, 
PLEASE SEE OUR SIPRNET REPORTING BLOG: 
HTTP://WWW.INTELINK.SGOV.GOV/WIKI/TIKRIT. 
 
KHALILZAD