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Viewing cable 07ANKARA512, BRIEFINGS ON ILLICIT TRAFFICKING AND REVIEW OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ANKARA512 2007-03-07 08:14 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #0512/01 0660814
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070814Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1233
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0135
UNCLAS ANKARA 000512 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP PARM TU
SUBJECT: BRIEFINGS ON ILLICIT TRAFFICKING AND REVIEW OF 
FORENSIC TESTS 
 
REF: A. 2006 STATE 165380 
     B. 2006 STATE 179792 
 
1. (SBU) Summary;  Two nuclear smuggling and forensics 
experts from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conducted 
a nuclear smuggling workshop for members of the Turkish 
National Police (TNP).  They also met with Turkish Atomic 
Energy Authority (TAEK) scientists at the Cekmece Nuclear 
Research Center to discuss additional tests which were 
conducted on the low enriched uranium (LEU) was seized by the 
Turkish National Police in August 2005.  Turkish authorities 
provided results for 4 of the 5 requested tests and engaged 
in a detailed discussion of the results.  TAEK requested 
additional consultations following the complete analysis of 
the results by U.S. experts.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Two nuclear smuggling experts from Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, Dr. David Smith and Dr. 
Zachary Koenig, traveled to Turkey from February 25 to March 
3, 2007 in support of increased bilateral cooperation against 
nuclear smuggling.  The visit began with a two-day workshop 
in Ankara for 38 Turkish National Police (TNP) officials from 
30 field offices throughout Turkey.  This workshop was part 
of TNP efforts to raise the awareness of its field officers 
to the increasing threat from illicit nuclear trafficking and 
to build on cooperation with the USG (ref a).  The U.S. 
experts provided non-technical briefings on current nuclear 
smuggling threats and countermeasures.  The information was 
well received by the participants and, following the 
workshop, the TNP leadership recommended this event be held 
annually to exchange experiences. 
 
3. (SBU) Smith, Koenig and EXBS Advisor met February 28 with 
TAEK President Okay Cakiroglu to discuss areas of cooperation 
in nuclear forensics and the team's visit to the Cekmece 
Nuclear Research Center.  Smith outlined the advances that 
have occurred in nuclear forensics and how cooperation 
between the USG and TAEK is helping to answer questions 
concerning the origin of the LEU seized by the TNP in August 
2005.  Smith and Cakiroglu agreed that working discussions 
between scientists are very beneficial in the identification 
of nuclear items and the disruption of smuggling activities. 
Cakiroglu apologized for the delay in providing the results 
of the tests requested by the USG (ref B), stated that TAEK 
scientists had been dealing with a number of high priority 
issues.  Finally, Cakiroglu informed us that a criminal court 
examining the LEU smuggling case had requested to examine the 
LEU sample on March 2. 
 
4.  (SBU) Smith, Koenig and EXBS Advisor met with Dr. Sevket 
Can, Director of the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training 
Center.  Can discussed the additional LEU test results which 
were made available to Smith and Koenig.  Additionally, Can 
had made arrangements for a sample of the LEU to be observed 
under a scanning electron microscope outfitted with an image 
and energy dispersive analyzer.  After discussion of the 
observations, the USG scientists stated that the new data 
will greatly assist in the determination of the most likely 
origin of this LEU sample.  Can requested a copy of any 
information we develop to facilitate the interpretation of 
data collected from the additional test. 
 
5.  (SBU) The following is the current status of the 
additional test results requested by the USG: 
 
a.  X-ray diffraction test- Results were provided during 
March 2 visit to Cekmece. 
 
b.  Optical microscopy and scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM)- Result provided in late January and forwarded. 
Additional test were performed during visit on March 2. 
 
c.  Trace Element analysis (including U-235 isotopic 
enrichment)- Results were provided during March 2 visit. 
 
d.  Age dating of LEU- This test cannot be performed due to 
the limited availability of isotopic standards at Cekmece. 
 
e.  Transmission Electron Microscopy- These results are still 
pending. A field emission scanning electron microscope will 
be used in place of a transmission electron microscope.  The 
equipment was being repaired and will be operational later in 
March. 
 
6.  (SBU) Comment: Government of Turkey cooperation in these 
technical level events was outstanding.  The participation of 
30 TNP field offices in the workshop demonstrates TNP's 
commitment to increase officers' awareness of the nuclear 
smuggling problem.  TAEK's openness in sharing information 
concerning the seized LEU and preparing a sample in the 
electron microscope for observation is indicative of TAEK's 
 
desire to increase U.S. - Turkish scientist-to-scientist 
cooperation.  Turkey appears intent on establishing a robust 
national program in nuclear forensics data analysis and 
interpretation, and would like to partner with the U.S. in 
this endeavor.  End Comment. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON