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Viewing cable 07AITTAIPEI712, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS, IRAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07AITTAIPEI712 2007-03-28 08:56 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0712/01 0870856
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280856Z MAR 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4655
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6537
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 7784
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000712 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - LLOYD NEIGHBORS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS, IRAN 
 
 
1. Summary:  As the 2008 presidential elections and the alleged 
scandal involving the privatization of the Taiwan Television 
Enterprise continued to receive considerable coverage in the Taiwan 
media on March 28, news coverage also focused on Legislative Yuan 
Speaker Wang Jin-pyng's planned trip to Beijing in April and other 
local issues.  The pro-status quo "China Times" ran a banner 
headline on page two that read "Wang Jin-pyng to Set Foot in 
Mainland [China] in April and Meet with Hu Jintao." 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, a "China Times" news 
analysis discussed the "U.S. factor" behind Wang's planned visit to 
Beijing in April.  The article said Washington is very concerned 
about whether the cross-Strait relations will be calm and tranquil 
during the remainder of President Chen Shui-bian's term.  With 
regard to Iran, a "China Times" column asked why Washington does not 
offer a security commitment to Iran, as it did for North Korea.  An 
op-ed piece in the pro-unification "United Daily News" discussed the 
new Iranian crisis and said Washington is most worried that bin 
Laden will spoil its plan and force the United States to pull more 
of its soldiers into the quagmire of Afghanistan.  End summary. 
 
3. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations 
 
"'U.S. Factor' is an Important Hand Pushing for [Wang Jin-pyng's] 
Ice-Breaking Trip" 
 
Journalists Ho Po-wen and Hsiao Hsu-tsen noted in an analysis in the 
pro-status quo "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] (3/28): 
 
"... The reason why Wang Jin-pyng is able to break the ice [across 
the Taiwan Strait] in April is, without a doubt, because Chen 
Shui-bian, eyeing the campaign situation for 2008, intended to boost 
Wang's influence so that Wang can run neck and neck with Ma 
Ying-jeou.  But the United States' taking a stand [for Wang] is in 
reality a more critical factor.  In March 2006, AIT Taipei Director 
publicly called upon Wang, hoping that he 'could serve as the 
pushing hand that breaks the ice across the Taiwan Strait and foster 
both sides to resume dialogue as early as possible.' 
 
"Classified sources revealed that Wang has recently informed the 
United States in person via formal diplomatic channels of his 
intention to visit mainland China in April.  High-ranking U.S. 
officials, in addition to showing appreciation to Wang for his 
respect of Washington by not 'surprising' the United States, 
expressed a welcome attitude to Wang's trip to the mainland.  U.S. 
officials even relayed a message from the White House to Wang which 
said that the U.S. government was really upset with Chen's making 
the 'Four Wants and One Without' announcement without notifying 
Washington in advance.  With regard to the way Chen 'played his 
card' during the last year of his term, a U.S. official pointed out 
directly that 'this is a matter of personal traits!'  Yet what 
Washington really cares is that Chen, despite the fact that he is 
already a 'lame duck' in the legislative body, still insisted on 
'showing his card.'  Washington is very concerned about whether 
cross-Strait relations will be calm and tranquil in this year. ..." 
 
 
4. Iran 
 
A) "Why Doesn't the United States Offer a Security Commitment to 
Iran?" 
 
The "International Outlook" column in the pro-status quo "China 
Times" [circulation: 400,000] (3/28): 
 
"... During the fourth round of the 'Six-Party Talks' in 2005, the 
United States even requested that Pyongyang not be allowed to 
possess any civilian nuclear facilities because such facilities can 
be transformed for military use and develop nuclear weapons at any 
time.  Pyongyang disregarded Washington's request then and has now 
developed nuclear weapons.  The United States, fearing that Iran 
will someday turn its civilian nuclear facilities to developing 
weapons, has been doing its best to stop Iran's engineering of 
transforming uranium [i.e. uranium enrichment].  But to refine and 
extract concentrated uranium is what Iran needs to do to protect its 
future security, so it will never abandon such a plan and will 
surely follow the lead of North Korea.  The [security] commitment 
Washington offered to North Korea already came too late.  If so, why 
not make an early [security] commitment to Iran, so that the country 
 
will not follow in Pyongyang's footsteps?  Why has the Western world 
never thought of it from this perspective?" 
 
B) "Oil, Oil, It's All Because of Iran" 
 
Kao Hsiung-poh, a Taipei-based strategic commentator, opined in the 
pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] (3/28): 
 
"... The consequences of U.S. war in Iraq are a mixture of success 
of failure.  The success lies in the fact that Washington has, after 
 
all, controlled Iraq's oil; other countries cannot possibly buy oil 
from Iraq without the United States' approval.  The United States 
would probably like to control Iran's oil in the same manner, 
particularly the oil resources near the borders of Iraq and Iran. 
But Washington failed to foresee that the lasting chaos in Iraq has 
caused the hike in international oil prices, which has benefited 
Russia in way that allows it to recover some of its national 
strength.  This is the failure of the U.S. war in Iraq. 
 
"If the consequences of Washington using force against Iran are even 
higher oil prices for a long period and zero chance for the United 
States to build several 'durable' huge military bases in Iran to 
safeguard its inland [oil] route to Central Asia against any lateral 
threats from Russia, Russia will then enjoy more a favorable 
strategic situation than the United States. ...  The new 'Iranian 
crisis' has resulted in a surge in international oil prices, and the 
Saudi Arabian card did not seem to work this time.  The United 
States' options to address this crisis are:  to continue searching 
for possible ways to lower oil prices for a lasting period in the 
future; to try to use a blitzkrieg strategy quickly to control 
Iran's oil and to build huge military bases in Iran with no intent 
to completely occupy and rule the country.  What Washington is most 
worried about now is that bin Laden will spoil its plan and force 
the United States to put more attention and pull more of its 
soldiers into the quagmire of Afghanistan, and in the meantime, Iran 
will gain time rapidly to strengthen its defensive capabilities." 
 
WANG