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Viewing cable 07AITTAIPEI509, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07AITTAIPEI509 2007-03-05 22:38 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0509/01 0642238
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 052238Z MAR 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4331
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6425
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 7674
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000509 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - LLOYD NEIGHBORS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
 
1. Summary:  Several major Chinese-language dailies in Taiwan gave 
front-page coverage March 5 to President Chen Shui-bian's "Four 
Wants and One Without" remarks made at a banquet Sunday evening 
marking the 25th anniversary of the Formosan Association for Public 
Affairs (FAPA) -- namely, Taiwan wants independence, name changes, a 
new Constitution, and development, and Taiwan does not have issues 
of right or left, rather of unification or independence.  News 
coverage on March 3-5 also focused on the Lantern Festival, the 2008 
presidential elections, and the DPP government's plan to change the 
name of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and tear down its 
surrounding wall.  Both the pro-status quo "China Times" and 
pro-unification "United Daily News" devoted the front page and one 
inside page to discussing President Chen's "Four Wants and One 
Without" announcement and the Blue and Green camps' reactions to it. 
 The pro-independence "Liberty Times" and the mass-circulation 
"Apple Daily," however, only gave limited coverage to the news on 
one of their inside pages. Today's evening paper, the "United 
Evening News," ran a front-page banner headline that said "Taiwan 
Stocks Shot down by Bian's Independence Arrow, Plunging by 285 
Points." 
 
2. In terms of editorials an commentaries, a "China Times" analysis 
said one of the reasons why President Chen added dosage to his 
"independence poison" by announcing the "Four Wants and One Without" 
was because his recent heavy-handed name change campaign has failed 
to stimulate Washington and Beijing as he had hoped.  A "United 
Daily News" analysis, however, questioned if Chen can really make a 
clean break with the "Four Nos" pledge he made to the United States. 
 A separate "United Daily News" column discussed a recent article by 
Shirley Kan, a U.S. Congressional Research Service expert, on Taiwan 
and the United States.  The article said the reason why the DPP 
government has become so arrogant was closely related to the United 
States, which wants, but fails, to play well the Taiwan card between 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait.  A "Liberty Times" editorial, on 
the other hand, discussed the recent U.S. arms sales to Taiwan 
announced by the Pentagon.  The article said it is good that 
Washington has noticed the military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait, 
but it is worrisome that the arms deal will be blocked by the Blue 
camp in the Legislative Yuan again.  An op-ed in the 
limited-circulation, pro-independence, English-language "Taipei 
Times" commented on Taiwan's name change campaign and said, 
"(i)nstead of chasing after name changes of little consequence, the 
US had better try to determine what future relationship with Taiwan 
would best serve its interest."  End summary. 
 
A) "Bombshell of 'Four Wants and One Without': Bian Puts in 
'Independence Poison,' of Which the Destructiveness Is Stronger Than 
Firecrackers [set off during the current Lantern Festival]" 
 
Journalist Lin Shu-ling noted in an analysis in the pro-status quo 
"China Times" [circulation: 400,000] (3/5): 
 
"[The impetus for] Bian's surprise remarks was not untraceable. 
First, he was invited to attend a banquet marking the 25th 
anniversary of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). 
Judging from previous experience, Chen normally makes remarks that 
cross the limit at pro-independence activities.  Second, having 
walked out of the shadow of the 'Presidential Office Allowance for 
State Affairs case,' Chen immediately tilted himself toward the dark 
Green stalwarts, in an attempt to secure the pro-Bian strength of 
the Taiwan independence fundamentalists.  Third, Lee Teng-hui was 
criticizing Bian again, and he could not stand Lee's provocative 
remarks. ... 
 
"It has been nearly seven years since Bian came to power, and never 
has he publicly challenged the pledges he made to the United States 
like this before.  The 'Four Wants and One Without' remarks Chen 
tossed out yesterday evening seemed in verbal parallelism to his 
'Four Nos and One Without' pledge, but the obvious intent of these 
remarks was unprecedented.  On the surface, Bian's move seemed a 
repetition of the DPP's routine practice prior to elections, in 
which it tries to boost campaigning for the Green camp by provoking 
China and stepping on the red line on purpose so as to spur 
Washington and Beijing into attacking the DPP government.  On the 
other hand, Bian is more interested in building up his position as 
the 'paramount leader of independence supporters.'  He hopes to kick 
Lee Teng-hui aside as well as restrain and direct the four DPP 
'bigwigs' to follow the agenda he sets. 
 
"Bian's recent move forcefully to push for the name change campaign 
in an almost authoritarian manner has in fact implied his intent to 
stimulate Washington and Beijing.  But he failed to achieve what he 
desired -- Washington just expressed its routine concern without 
giving any harsh comments, while Beijing did not make any response 
at all.  This must be one of the reasons why Chen decided to add 
dosage to his 'independence poison.'  It is a little more than a 
year until [the] 2008 [presidential election].  Bian will not be 
able to continue controlling and manipulating the political 
situation, even if he wants to, after the DPP selects its 
 
presidential candidates.  It will be exactly what Chen hopes for if 
Washington and Beijing make a big move in the wake of his 
announcement of 'Four Wants and One Without.'  In reality, what Chen 
fears most now is that neither the United States nor China pays any 
attention to him and that the 'four bigwigs' give no reaction to his 
remarks. ..." 
 
B) "To Cut off the Pledges of Four Nos and One Without, Can Bian Do 
That?" 
 
Washington correspondent Vincent Chang wrote in an analysis in the 
pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] (3/5): 
 
"... It looks as if Chen Shui-bian wants to make a clean break with 
the 'Four Nos and one Without' pledge that he has made constantly to 
the Americans.  The pro-independence supporters below the stage were 
indulged in and fascinated by Chen's speech. ...  But it would seem 
a premature judgment if one asserts that Chen's 'Four Wants' 
announcement was akin to denying his 'Four Nos' pledge to the United 
States.  Unless Chen announces that he has abandoned the 'Four Nos' 
pledge, there remains room [for him] to maneuver when he explains to 
the Americans about his 'Four Wants and One Without' in the future, 
be they lip service or not. ... 
 
"As a matter of fact, the U.S. State Department was long prepared 
regarding Chen's speech at the FAPA annual meeting; it was just 
unclear about what Bian was going to say.  Based on the Americans' 
understanding and what they have learned about Chen's behavior 
patterns, as well as his argument logic afterwards, even though 
Chen's 'Four Wants and One Without' announcement may trigger 
Washington's tension and concerns, the matter may drop temporarily 
following an exchange of 'questions and explanations,' if Chen does 
not pursue it with any follow-on moves and if such a situation is 
accepted by Washington.  But Washington is clearly aware in its 
heart that this year will not be a quiet year for Taiwan.  Chen has 
already announced that the island will push for its bid to join the 
United Nations under the name of Taiwan.  Perhaps it will depend on 
whether Bian really means what he said to the pro-independence 
faction to tell whether the United States will continue to reiterate 
that its policy remains unchanged, or whether it will take further 
action to tighten its relations with Taiwan." 
 
C) "Frog in the Well and Chicken Little" 
 
The "Black and White" column in the pro-unification "United Daily 
News" [circulation: 400,000] noted (3/5): 
 
Shirley Kan, U.S. congressional expert on Taiwan affairs, recently 
used 'frog in the well' and 'Chicken Little' to describe the 
Taiwan-U.S. relationship.  It goes without saying that Taiwan is the 
'frog in the well' that draws a line limiting itself but blows its 
own horn.  This is a fact well-known to the world.  But for the 
United States to call itself 'Chicken Little,' which watches 
nervously as the DPP plays various kinds of games, is something new. 
... 
 
"It is truly bizarre that it takes the United States seven years to 
figure out that the DPP is a frog in the well, and still Washington 
can do nothing about it.  Let's not just say that, from the United 
States' perspective, Taiwan is like a frog in the well.  In the eyes 
of the Taiwan people, the DPP is a frog in the well from head to toe 
as well!  All the U.S. government worries about is that Taiwan does 
not buy weapons to defend itself and that it will become 
strategically isolated.  But as for the Taiwan people, they have not 
only witnessed the arrogance and incompetence of the DPP government 
but also have to accept the consequences of Taiwan's weakening 
economy and foreign relations. 
 
"The Bush administration might as well give it some thought:  The 
fact that this frog in the well has become so arrogant was in 
reality closely related to the United States, which wants but fails 
to play the Taiwan card well between the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait.  The KMT was very obedient in the past, but the DPP is very 
naughty now.  Taiwan-U.S. relations have long since deviated from 
their former track, and the United States' stick and carrot approach 
is no longer effective.  Just look at how many Americans have come 
to Taiwan over the past few years to lobby arms deals; can the frog 
in the well not feel pleased and smug? ..." 
 
D) "Use People's Power to Safeguard Taiwan's Security via a 
Democratic Mechanism" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 500,000] 
editorialized (3/3): 
 
"Right on the sixtieth anniversary of Taiwan's 2-28 Incident, the 
Pentagon announced on February 28 that it will sell two kinds of 
advanced missiles, totaling over 400, to Taiwan.  Sources added that 
these two kinds of missiles will be equipped on the F-16 fighter 
 
jets in an attempt to strengthen Taiwan's capabilities to defend 
itself against China's threat. 
 
"We are both happy and worried upon hearing the news.  We are happy 
because the military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait has caused 
grave concerns on the part of the United States, which thus 
announced this arms sale according the 'Taiwan Relations Act.'  In 
addition, it was significant that [Washington] chose to announce the 
deal on the sixtieth anniversary of the 2-28 Incident.  [On the 
other hand,] we are worried that the United States proposed this 
arms deal because it is concerned about Taiwan's defensive 
capability.  But Taiwan's legislative body, with the pan-Blue camp 
occupying the majority of seats, will likely shelve the deal again. 
The destiny of the previous special arms procurements budget, which 
was blocked by the Blue camp in the Legislative Yuan, remains 
uncertain yet.  In other words, even though the United States has 
approved [new] arms sale to Taiwan, Taiwan may not be able to get 
the weapons smoothly in time. ..." 
 
E) "Chasing after Names Not so Foolish" 
 
Nat Bellocchi, former AIT chairman and now a special adviser to the 
Liberty Times Group, opined in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] (3/5): 
 
"... The US focus on cross-strait issues is primarily on lowering 
tensions.  As important as that is, and aside from the relationship 
with China, the US ought to concern itself with not only the 
domestic politics of Taiwan, but in gaining consensus within the 
many elements of the government in Washington.  Taiwan's two major 
political parties have very different objectives that impact on the 
direction the nation is likely to take.  The question for the US is: 
What should it do once the elections are over? ... 
 
"Instead of chasing after name changes of little consequence, the US 
had better try to determine what future relationship with Taiwan 
would best serve its interest.  At this stage, one party states it 
would establish a much broader relationship with China.  Little is 
said about security issues, but its actions have shown that Taiwan 
would like not to be much involved in that issue.  The other party 
would continue to press for its political objectives.  As a 
consequence it may well be troublesome, but its interest will likely 
be in continuing close relations with its present friends, while 
continuing to seek dialogue with Beijing.  Instead of pressing 
Taiwan not to change names, it would have been better if Washington 
had pressed China into establishing a dialogue with the elected 
leaders of Taiwan.  Unfortunately, the US also did not seem to have 
the kind of dialogue with Taiwan that is needed." 
 
YOUNG