VZCZCXRO0424
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #0631/01 0891613
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301613Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9069
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0209
RUEHCD/AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ 0207
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 6499
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000631 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM NI
SUBJECT: INEC: PREPARATIONS FOR 2003 VS. 2007 ELECTIONS 
 
ABUJA 00000631  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) Begin Summary: The current posture of the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and 
preparations for the 2007 elections raise worrisome echoes of 
the failures of 2003, when preparations were inadequate and 
polling itself was embroiled in disarray, misconduct and 
confrontation. The inadequacies observed in 2003 appear 
accentuated in 2007. Preparations for the 2003 and 2007 
elections share some common features: inconclusive voter 
registration, inability of the electorate to view the voter 
roll, lack of voter education, late recruitment of ad-hoc 
staff, lack of information about polling units and many other 
issues. Unlike during the 2003 elections, there have been 
numerous pre-election legal challenges in the run-up to the 
2007, owing largely to what analysts have described as the 
dubious role of INEC: principally its relationship with the 
incumbent government and a general inability to provide a 
level playing field for political parties and candidates. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO INEC FOR 2007 ELECTIONS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) In a communiqu issued at the end of a post election 
workshop attended by various stakeholders in Kaduna after the 
2003 elections, it was resolved that INEC required technical 
support in various aspects of election administration to 
ensure the 2007 elections were better managed and more 
credible. Organizations like USAID, DFID, the European Union, 
and the UNDP, working through agencies like IFES, IRI and 
NDI, provided training in specialized areas to various 
stakeholders of the electoral process including INEC. This 
support was to address technical and other identifiable 
hurdles that would threaten credible elections in 2007. 
Analysts insist that INEC has the technical competence 
required for a credible election but lacks the political will 
to be an unbiased umpire in the process. This lack of 
political will could be attributable to the status of INEC as 
an extension of the Presidency. 
 
----------------------------- 
HOW INEC'S LEADERSHIP EMERGED 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) The emergence of INEC's leadership is a fundamental 
challenge to the independence of the Commission. There is a 
striking resemblance in the way INEC leadership emerged in 
2003 and 2007. The Dr Abel Guobadia-led- INEC had direct 
links with the incumbent administration in 2003. Guobadia was 
appointed by President Obasanjo on the recommendation of 
Chief Tony Anenih, a member of the ruling PDP top brass and a 
chief strategist for the re-election of Obasanjo.  All the 
federal INEC Commissioners were believed to be card-carrying 
members of the PDP and were openly partisan in the discharge 
of their duties. Directors of the Commission, meant to be 
career civil servants, were also appointed based on their 
affiliations either with the then-leadership of INEC or the 
incumbent administration. Guobadia worked for the Presidency 
and would not yield to advice or pressure from other 
quarters. His catch phrase then in reaction to public 
criticism was "nobody should tell me how to do my job." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) It is also common knowledge within political 
circles that Professor Maurice Iwu, the current INEC 
Chairman, has strong links to the Obasanjo administration. 
Iwu was introduced to President Obasanjo by one of his 
closest aides - Special Adviser on Domestic Affairs, Dr. Andy 
Uba, who is also the governorship candidate for the PDP in 
Anambra state. Though Iwu's Commissioners were also appointed 
in a similar manner to those in 2003, there are indications 
that some of them hold different views about their 
expectations of what INEC's role should be. There have been 
media reports of major disagreements between Iwu and some of 
the Commissioners on disqualification of candidates, 
particularly of Vice President Atiku Abubakar. Iwu has been 
accused of shutting out candidates that might pose a 
 
ABUJA 00000631  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
challenge to his godfather in Anambra state, Andy Uba. Iwu 
reportedly walked out of an internal INEC meeting and 
allegedly told the Commissioners that he would do what 
President Obasanjo told him to do and asked them to resign if 
they were not "loyal to the President." Although some 
analysts believe Iwu should be fired as "he has left the 
impression of being servile to the president, partial to the 
ruling party and willing to make baffling choices," they 
caution that a change in INEC at this point could lead to a 
breach of the Constitution and a delay in the elections. 
 
---------------------------- 
LOGISTICS FOR 2003 ELECTIONS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) Less than three weeks to the elections in 2003, there 
were still unresolved logistical problems with the election 
preparations. The National Democratic Institute and the 
Carter Center issued a pre-election statement on March 28, 
2003 expressing worries about the state of preparations for 
that election. The statement read in part "NDI and The Carter 
Center are deeply concerned that deficiencies and other flaws 
related to the organization and conduct of the upcoming 
elections, if not addressed and corrected, could irreparably 
harm public faith in the country's democratic process." The 
crucial logistical challenges of that election were voter 
registration and the status of the voter roll, security, 
observer accreditation and general confidence in the 
electoral process. Voter registration was greatly manipulated 
and the voter roll not adequately displayed as required by 
the Electoral Act. There was widespread political violence 
across the country; INEC provisions for accrediting domestic 
observers were extremely cumbersome and electoral 
irregularities were anticipated.  On the other hand, details 
about locations of polling stations and copies of sample 
ballot papers were made available to Diplomatic missions well 
ahead of the start of elections. This same information has 
not yet been shared with the public or diplomatic mission at 
just over 2 weeks prior to the 2007 polls. 
 
---------------------------- 
LOGISTICS FOR 2007 ELECTIONS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) The preparedness of INEC for the 2007 elections has 
been a source of concern for most stakeholders in the 
Nigerian democratic process. Political parties, civil society 
organizations and regional groupings across the country have 
at various times doubted the preparedness and even the 
capacity of INEC to conduct credible elections in 2007. The 
Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), which is a coalition of 
civil society organizations with a focus on electoral 
process, and the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), the major 
regional group for northern Nigeria, have publicly expressed 
doubts about INEC's preparedness for the April elections. 
 
¶7.  (U) Preparations started on a very shaky note with the 
introduction of electronic voter registration and all the 
attendant problems of a new technology in a country with 
little functioning infrastructure. The exercise started late 
with an inadequate number of (generally) malfunctioning 
machines, a lack of information and outright fraud. There 
were allegations of diversions of the Direct Data Capture 
(DDC) machines mostly by members of the ruling political 
party. The voter roll has still not been properly displayed 
for challenges and amendments as required by law. Though INEC 
declared it had registered about 61.5 million voters, it is 
not clear how many of those registered voters will be able to 
cast their votes as INEC "reserves the right to determine how 
many of those registered voters are valid." It is also not 
clear how INEC intends to merge the registrations from the 
direct data capture (DDC) machines and registrations from the 
locally configured laptop computers. Analysts fear there 
might not be a credible voter roll for the elections as 
virtually no one outside of INEC has seen a copy. The INEC 
Chair on March 13, 2007 said permanent voter cards to replace 
the paper receipts some voters received when they registered 
were being printed but did not disclose distribution 
mechanism.  (NOTE:  Some voters received no proof of 
registration and we now hear that INEC may not distribute the 
 
ABUJA 00000631  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
permanent cards at all. END NOTE.) 
 
¶8.  (U) Less than a month before the 2007 elections, it is 
not clear to the Nigerian public where polling units will be 
located, what the ballot papers look like, which domestic 
observer groups will be accredited, or what is INEC's policy 
on election observation. These major outstanding questions 
have continued to create anxiety and suspicion amongst both 
stakeholders and the general public, with some fearing that 
the incumbent administration does not intend to relinquish 
power. Though the House of Representatives on March 13, 2007 
grudgingly endorsed INEC's preparations for the April 
elections, Nigerians, taking into account the widespread 
litigations, disqualification of opposition candidates and 
electoral violence that has been on the increase, are far 
from being convinced INEC was serious about conducting 
elections. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) While President Obasanjo was reported to have said 
he had no misgivings about foreign observers monitoring and 
commenting on the conduct of the next elections, Professor 
Iwu seems more predisposed to shutting out observer groups. 
He had allegedly sought to put in caveats designed to 
restrict the freedom of election observers. Civil society 
organizations are however resolute on closely monitoring the 
process. Mr. Emma Ezeazu of the Alliance for Credible 
Elections (ACE) had reportedly insisted "with or without 
accreditation, Nigerians were going to monitor the elections 
for which communities, unions and associations had already 
been mobilized." 
 
¶10.  (U) On March 14, 2007, INEC placed the first 
advertisements in national dailies calling for applications 
for recruitment of the estimated 500,000 ad-hoc staff needed 
for the elections. INEC had disclosed it was encountering 
problems recruiting ad-hoc staff as people anticipate 
widespread violence during the elections. It is also common 
knowledge that INEC has been loathe to pay the emoluments due 
its ad hoc staff in the past. It is not clear what the 
timeline is for the hiring and training of the ad-hoc staff 
within the coming weeks.  As of March 29, "recruitment is 
underway," according to Iwu. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) As of March 14, 2007, INEC had just reportedly 
commissioned the Security Printing and Minting Company to 
print 400 million (rather than an earlier disclosed number of 
240 million) ballot papers for the elections. The exclusion 
of disqualified candidates on the ballot papers and the 
capacity of the Minting Company to deliver the papers on time 
are outstanding concerns, even though Iwu has announced this 
week that the ballots had "already been printed." The ballot 
papers for presidential elections according to INEC would 
bear photographs of candidates. Analysts are concerned that 
this could lead to a delayed election, as INEC would have to 
reprint ballot papers if candidates currently challenging 
their disqualifications in court eventually won their cases. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶12.  (SBU) Preparations for the 2007 elections compare 
negatively even to the relatively low standard set by those 
of 2003.  Further, supposed gains from the lessons learned in 
2003 have not been realized. With less than three weeks to 
the general elections, Nigerians still have a heightened 
anxiety, uncertainty, suspicion and widespread fear that the 
nation might be drifting to anarchy. The current assertive 
posture of the judiciary and the National Assembly provide a 
counterbalance to INEC's lack of transparency, but this has 
yet to calm the worst fears of the Nigerian public.  END 
COMMENT. 
CAMPBELL