VZCZCXRO3910
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0117/01 0402257
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 092257Z FEB 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1314
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1124
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0917
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0232
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0267
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0543
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0580
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0227
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000117 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: SOUTH NEEDS AS MUCH ATTENTION AS WEST 
 
REF: SECSTATE 15806 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. United Nations (UN) Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Under-Secretary-General (SYG) 
Guehenno told the UN Security Council (SC) at February 8 
consultations that the international community had a crucial 
role to play in ensuring full implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan, particularly in 
the areas of security, the Abyei issue and elections 
preparations.  Stressing that Sudan peace was indivisible, 
Guehenno updated on efforts to stabilize Darfur through 
assistance to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 
appealing to Members to provide the 44 additional officers 
required to complete the Light Support Package (LSP). 
Guehenno said it was the AU which was insisting on a formal 
response from President Bashir endorsing the Heavy Support 
Package (HSP) in order to secure troop contributor 
commitments.  On the timeline for overall deployment of 
assistance to AMIS, Guehenno cautioned that he "did not want 
to deceive the Council" and stated that, largely due to a 
lack of firm troop-contributing country (TCC) pledges, it was 
"unrealistic to think the full package would be in place by 
June."  After consultations, UKUN indicated privately it was 
considering pushing for a statement from the Council calling 
for necessary steps to be taken toward full CPA 
implementation and asked if we could support such a show of 
Council engagement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY KEY IN FULL CPA IMPLEMENTATION 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶2. (SBU) UN DPKO U/SYG Guehenno told the UNSC at February 8 
consultations that the international community had a crucial 
role to play in ensuring full CPA implementation.  Parties to 
the agreement (the National Congress Party (NCP) and the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)) cooperated 
only in areas of mutual interest, resulting in some modest 
power- and wealth-sharing advances (like establishment of the 
new Sudanese currency), but Guehenno complained such 
contentious questions as human rights and use of natural 
resources were left unaddressed.  Guehenno identified three 
main areas of concern requiring international attention. 
 
¶3. (SBU) First among these was the security situation between 
the North and South.  Guehenno characterized the recent spate 
of fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the 
SPLA in Malakal as the "most serious ceasefire breach since 
2002," and attributed it to the parties' failure to integrate 
armed groups, as well as their failure to establish Joint 
Integrated Units (JIUs), which Guehenno called "critical 
deterrents" to armed militias and other spoilers, as well as 
credible confidence-building measures between the sides. 
International assistance was needed to ensure JIU formation, 
as well as to complete the security protocol; despite 
assistance from the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in this 
regard, the SAF continued to oppose party training.  Finally, 
Guehenno appealed for international support on Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) efforts, which were 
undermined by the continued existence of armed groups. 
Guehenno noted that UNMIS had a team currently in the field 
to study how to move DDR forward but confessed to limited 
success on this front because the parties had not established 
the necessary mechanisms called for by the CPA. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The second area of concern Guehenno highlighted was 
the need to resolve the Abyei boundary issue, which he said 
has seen no significant progress, especially given the 
absence of a civilian administrator for over two years. 
Guehenno raised the possibility that mediation by the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) might be 
required if the process continued to stall.  Demarcation of 
the North-South border would go far in resolving oil 
revenue-sharing issues, but Guehenno remarked that as long as 
the border area remained as highly militarized as it was at 
present, the potential for violence remained an urgent 
concern. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Guehenno's third area of concerned revolved around 
elections preparations.  Guehenno said that UNMIS is 
preparing to play a key coordination role for elections.  He 
noted, however, that groundwork to get the census going could 
not begin because the Government of National Unity (GNU) had 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000117  002 OF 003 
 
 
yet to release the requisite funds (despite the fact that 
there are only ten months left to meet the census deadline of 
December 2007).  Guehenno said that the parties could use a 
message of "international solidarity and support" to make 
unity more attractive to southerners.  Guehenno reported that 
a delegation of the Government of South Sudan visited UNMIS 
headquarters in Khartoum during the week of February 5 with a 
message urging a peace dividend for the South.  Guehenno 
accordingly recommended that donors support development 
programs in the South as a matter of urgency. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Guehenno provided little information on the 
suspended Juba Peace Talks between the Government of Uganda 
and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), despite questions from 
some Members, including Ambassador Sanders.  He mentioned 
reports of increased banditry in areas where LRA rebels were 
known to operate but admitted there was no direct proof 
linking the group to the incidents.  The perpetrators of such 
attacks were difficult to determine.  The UK Deputy PermRep 
announced that HMG would contribute $500,000 to the UN fund 
supporting the Juba Talks. 
 
MEMBERS URGE THAT DARFUR NOT DETRACT FROM SOUTH SUDAN . . . 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
¶7. (SBU) Many Members cautioned that the crisis in Darfur not 
be allowed to overshadow the crisis in the south of Sudan, 
urging that a new Special Representative of the SYG be 
appointed for UNMIS as quickly as possible to ensure that CPA 
implementation got the full attention it deserved, an 
appointment Guehenno assured was a top priority for the SYG. 
Members called for a reinvigoration of the Assessment and 
Evaluation Commission, for progress with Other Armed Groups, 
for resolution of the Abyei question and for accelerated 
elections preparations.  The Chinese representative expressed 
support for UNMIS' work and, in another indication of its 
recent "aggressive" rhetoric vis-a-vis Sudan, urged greater 
cooperation from the GNU with UNMIS.  The Ghanaian 
representative voiced support for the pending investigations 
into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UNMIS 
personnel, to which Guehenno reiterated the UN's "zero 
tolerance, zero complacency and zero impunity" policy. 
 
¶8. (SBU) After consultations, UKUN indicated privately it was 
weighing the issuance of a statement (presumably a 
Presidential Statement) from the Council calling for 
necessary steps to be taken toward full CPA implementation 
and asked if USUN could support such a show of Council 
engagement.  The Belgian Mission also approached Poloff to 
ask if USUN were planning to draft such a statement. 
 
. . . YET DARFUR DISCUSSIONS INEVITABLE 
--------------------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) Stressing that Sudan peace was indivisible, Guehenno 
updated on efforts to stabilize Darfur through assistance to 
AMIS.  He reported that UN support under the LSP was 
progressing, with 50 troops and 32 police advisers deployed 
since December 28, as well as 192 night vision goggles and 36 
GPS systems purchased.  Guehenno appealed to Members to 
provide the 44 additional officers required to complete the 
LSP.  He also raised the link between the recruitment of 
these remaining personnel to the outstanding issue of 
agreement from the North Darfur Governor to purchase the land 
necessary to build accommodations for these personnel, as 
well as for the Governor's permission to study the water 
table in this area. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Guehenno confirmed that details of the HSP had been 
finalized by the UN and the AU, but that a response from 
President Bashir on the package was still pending.  In 
response to a question from the French PermRep, Guehenno said 
it was the AU which was insisting on a formal response from 
President Bashir endorsing the HSP in order to secure TCC 
commitments; Guehenno announced that there would be another 
TCC meeting for the HSP on February 14.  Guehenno added that 
the international community needed to continue to push the 
GNU to accept the HSP in order to assure proper procurement 
of resources.  On HSP costs (already projected by the SYG at 
$194 million for six months), Guehenno reported that DPKO was 
going back and forth with the UN Bureau of Management on the 
financial dimensions of this package but expected the 
Comptroller to finalize the plan within the next 12 days, 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000117  003 OF 003 
 
 
after which it would be presented to the UNSC for review and 
for eventual General Assembly endorsement.  Ambassador 
Sanders pressed for swift action by DPKO to finalize these 
figures and thus eliminate a potential bottleneck to 
deployment.  Guehenno appealed for assistance from partners 
in convincing a reticent AMIS Force Commander of the merits 
of not conditioning the restructuring of AMIS from eight to 
three sectors on the arrival of the requested two additional 
battalions. 
 
¶11. (SBU) On the timeline for the hybrid mission, Guehenno 
said the UN and AU were currently completing a rapid 
re-assessment of the information in the SYG's June 2006 
Report on deployment to Darfur and would submit the 
conclusions of this latest review the week of February 12. 
Guehenno did not expect the basic findings to differ 
substantially from the June 2006 Report but noted that issues 
of command and control arrangements (whose basic structure, 
according to Guehenno, had to come from DPKO and not the AU), 
force size, force generation modalities, recruitment of 
civilian personnel and funding were outstanding. Once 
management and financing aspects were finalized, a joint 
concept of operations and an operational plan for deployment 
could be drafted and submitted first to the GNU for approval, 
then presented to the UNSC. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Guehenno reminded that AMIS would require 
logistical and financial support from donors through the end 
of its mandate but did not mince words on how long a period 
this would be.  In response to numerous concerns raised by 
Members, Guehenno cautioned that he "did not want to deceive 
the Council" and stated that, largely due to a lack of firm 
TCC pledges, it was "unrealistic to think the full package 
would be in place by June."  With no firm TCC commitments, it 
was "anyone's guess" as to how long it could take to get the 
hybrid on the ground, a reality compounded by the fact that, 
according to Guehenno, for deployment purposes "Darfur is not 
Lebanon," and the TCCs it would attract would likely not have 
the same self-sustainment capacities as those of other 
operations. 
WOLFF